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Thesis Summary 
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My task in this thesis is to assess the theological implications of Herman Melville's 
aesthetic understanding of the modern Subject as a duplicitous self-creation. Although 
Melville is obviously not a theologian, either by discipline or confession, I will argue 
we find in the complex theatricality of his life and fiction a means of articulating the 
potential of a truly radical theological thinking. Such a thinking, I argue, 'unthinks' all 
previous grounds, in order then to recast them imaginatively. For Melville, we shall 
see, that which identifies theology'as theology' is not simply an unattainable, 
transcendent Thing-in-Itself. It is, on the contrary, the active emergence of 
unthinkable excess from the materialistic immanence of its self-characterisation. The 
aesthetico-theological thinking in view here highlights the necessity of a repositioning 
of theological discourse from the binary perspective that inevitably leads to self- 
present identification, be it in a discipline or a confession, to the radically decentered / 
desa( ralized interdisciplinarity of theology becoming-itself. 
I seek to achieve this end by situating Melville close to the Germanic philosophical 
climate that was sweeping across the American literary landscape of the mid-19th 
century. Melville's ambivalent attitude toward his own desire for self-destruction, and 
thus, too, his desire for a non-subjective common pool of artistic genius, is strictly 
parallel to his misgivings about Transcendentalism and Romanticism. It is, I argue, in 
the dialectical materialism of Friedrich Schelling that we find Melville's philosophical 
analogue, in their respective efforts to understand the self-becoming of the Absolute / 
God / Truth. Here we find an aesthetico-theological thinking attuned to the creative 
inadequacy of self-becoming, whereby the finite inadequacy and perspectival 
duplicity of theological self-presentation carry the potential of a self-creativity that 
makes all things new. As such, for aesthetico-theological thinking there is truly 
nothing behind or beyond the materiality of experience - i. e., no Ding an sich or 
transcendental determination of being. And precisely for this reason the awareness 
and actualisation of something new, indeed something miraculous because it was 
previously impossible, is made possible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning is going on. Everywhere. Amidst all the endings, so rarely ripe or ready. They show up late, 
these beginnings, bristling «ith promise, yet labored and doomed. Every last one of them is lovingly 
addressed: 'in the beginning. ' But if such talk - talk of the beginning and the ending - has produced the 
poles, the boundary markers of a closed totality, if'the beginning' has blocked the disruptive infinities of 
becoming, then theology had better get out of its own way. 
In the beginning, theology starts again. ' 
1. On Introductions 
An introduction, in addition to being a formal greeting or welcome, is meant to 
set the tone and the tenor of a particular project, so as to hint at the chorus of voices 
and themes that will in due course emerge. In so doing, a project's ending is 
translated, or, in the event of its malignancy, metastasises to its beginning. Typically 
written after the book's body, and sometimes even its conclusion, introductions can 
often be slightly shady. They are, Mark C. Taylor affirms, 'awkward, embarrassing 
affairs coy games of hide-and-seek, revelation and concealment, appearance and 
disappearance. '2 Which is to say, a conclusion is never far from its introduction. The 
reader will soon notice that this introduction is no different. 
Replete with its as yet unsubstantiated assertions, an introduction tends to be, 
for no less an authority on the subject than Hegel, 'a string of random statements and 
assurances about truth'. ' The insidious implication of these 'random statements' and 
'assurances', he fears, is that they unfaithfully portray truth as some autonomous, 
constructive particularity, some Kantian Ding-an-sich, that (for Hegel) illegitimately 
precedes the philosopher's attempt to develop an argument. In any narrative, be it 
philosophical or otherwise, such truth might range from the writer's historico-cultural 
1 Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (London: Routledge, 2003), 3. 
I Mark C. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel & Kierkegaard (Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 1980), 2. 
3 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenornenolog of Spirit (trans. A. V. Miller; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 1. 
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preconceptions and agendas, to the intentions and purposes read into the absent author 
by his or her reader. Problems arise, however, when one conflates such 
preconceptions with (authorial) self-conscious immediacy. On this point, even Soren 
Kierkegaard, one of Hegel's chief critics, agrees, finding in it a rationale for his use of 
pseudonyms and'indirect communication': 
It gives me pleasure to see that the pseudonyms, presumably aware of 
the relation subsisting between the method of indirect communication 
and the truth as inwardness, have themselves said nothing, nor misused 
a preface to assume an official attitude toward the production, as if an 
author were in a purely legal sense the best interpreter of his own 
words; or as if it could help a reader that an author had intended this or 
that, if it were not realized; or as if it were certain that it was realized 
because the author himself says so in the preface; ... or as 
if an author 
were served by having a reader who precisely because of the author's 
clumsiness knew all about the book. ' 
For Hegel, following his signature logic, the immediacy of truth assumed in 
any given introduction / preface stands opposed to its eventual emergence in and 
through the dialectical Absolute of identity-in-difference, and is the hallmark of naive 
irrationalism. Indeed, as he famously mocks the position of his former roommate 
Friedrich Schelling, it is to present the 'Absolute as the night, in which, as people say, 
all cows are black'. ' On the contrary, he continues, 'One can say of the Absolute that 
it is essentially a result, that it is only at the end what it is in truth'. 6 As such, 
' Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (trans. David Swenson and Walter 
Lowrie; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 225-226. Cf., Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood, 2- 
5; 90-107; Altarity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 322-300. 
' As Karl Jaspers has noted, though, Hegel's jab was actually very similar to Schelling's 
critique of those who misunderstood the concept of intellectual intuition. He writes: 'Most people see 
in the being of the absolute nothing but a pure night and are unable to know anything in it; it dwindles 
, away for them into a mere negation of multiplicity' (Qtd. in Karl Jaspers, Schelling; Grösse und 
l'c'ncOngnis [Munich: Piper, 1955], 302). Jason Wirth notes that even after Hegel noted in a letter that 
he \w as criticizing those who do not properly understand intellectual intuition and not (as it was 
commonly regarded) specifically Schelling, he declined Schelling's request that he say as much in 
future editions of the Phenonrcnolog of Spirit. See Jason Wirth, Introduction to The Ages of the 
l' rld, by Friedrich W. J. Schelling (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), ix, 133- 
34n. 7) 
6 Ile-cl, I'heru omeººol o E' y. 22. 
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introductions are 'not only superfluous but, in view of the nature of the subject matter, 
even inappropriate and misleading. '' The truth of a philosophical text, Hegel goes on 
to argue, should be self-explanatory; that is to say, the immanence of truth embodied 
in the dialectical poetics of such truth's self-creation [Bildting]. R Of course, one can 
but hope that Hegel appreciated the irony that his condemnation of introductions was 
written as a preface to Phenomenology of Spirit, itself a six-hundred-page introduction 
to his vaunted and often vilified philosophical system. ' While I do not make similar 
systemising claims for my project here, I dare not miss the importance of his 
interrogative contempt of introductions, nor its instructive irony. 10 
2. An Untimely Intrusion 
Similarly, and true to the original sin of the Calvinist upbringing weighing 
heavily on his soul from birth, Herman Melville lived his life acutely aware of the 
untimely intrusion of its end. Like several of his most famous characters and 
narrators, he believed his ending to be somehow out of place, before its time. In 
Moby-Dick, for instance, Ishmael is sensitive, from the very beginning of his journey 
7 Hegel, Phenomenology, 1. 
8 Terry Pinkard describes Phenomenology of Spirit well: 
Hegel intended the book to satisfy the needs of contemporary (European) humanity: 
it was to provide an education, a Bildung, a formation for its readership so that they 
could come to grasp who they had become (namely, a people individually and 
collectively 'called' to be free), why they had become those people, and why that had 
been necessary.... [I]t intended to show its readership why 'leading one's own life', 
self-determination, had become necessary for 'us moderns' and what such 'self- 
legislation' actually meant. (German Philosophy, 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 222). 
9 See Jacques Derrida's delight in the crafty paradox of 'the preface that Hegel must write to 
denounce a preface' (Dissemination [trans. Barbara Johnson; Athlone Press: London, 1981 ], 11). 
10 For his part, Hegel vw as deeply ambivalent about the place of Phenomenology of Spirit in his 
philosophical system. While he describes it in the text as an 'Introduction', he never actually lectured 
on the original phenomenology while teaching in Berlin; and by the end of his life, in fact, had gone so 
fir as to disavow it as a true Introduction at all. And yet, he continued distributing copies of the book 
to friends and \ isitors. and e\ en made contractual obligations to publish a revised edition (he died 
before he could do so) (Pinkard, German Philosophy, 221-22). 
on the Pequod, to the fact that the inevitable end of Ahab's wrathful search for Nlobv 
Dick was suicide. 
All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees ofthings; 
all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and cakes the 
brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil, to crazy 
Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practicably assailable in 
Moby Dick. He piled upon the whale's white hump the sum of all the 
general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam down; and 
then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst his hot heart's shell 
upon it. '' 
In a dialectical manoeuvre that will prove especially significant for my reading of 
Melville, the inevitability of Ahab's 'cardiac arrest', as it were, is that which conditions 
the very possibility of the 'monomania' of the Pequod's captain and crew. That is to 
say, the ending of Mobv-Dick is the fundamental presumption that makes the novel 
itself at all possible. Neither such a manoeuvre, nor its implications for an aesthetic 
re-evaluation of subjectivity, is as simple as it may at first seem, 
When Melville himself died in 1891 several obituaries expressed shock that he 
had not died years earlier. In fact, one year earlier Edward Bok had observed: 
There are more people to-day who believe Herman Melville dead than 
there are those who know he is living.... Forty-four years ago, when 
Typee appeared, there was not a better known author than he, and he 
commanded his own prices. Publishers sought him, and editors 
considered themselves fortunate to secure his name as a literary star. 
And to-day? Busy New York has no idea he is even alive, and one of 
the best-informed literary men in this country laughed recently at my 
statement that Herman Melville was his neighbor by only two city 
blocks. 'Nonsense', said he. 'Why, Melville is dead these many years! ' 
" Herman Melville, Mobr-Dick; or, The Whale, in The Writings of Herman Melville (eds. 
F-larrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle; vol. 6; Evanston and Chicago: 
Northwestern University Press and The Newberry Library, 1988). 184. The narrator of Pierre, which 
was finished one year after Mobv-Dick, also feels the prick of death's prematurity when he laments his 
inability to change the course of Pierre's inevitable demise: 'Are there no couriers in the air to warn 
thee away from these emperilings.... Where now are the high beneficences? Whither fled the sweet 
angels that are alleged guardians to man? ' (Herman Melville, Pierre; or, The Ambiguities, in The 
Writings of Herman Melville [eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle; vol. 7; 
Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press and The Newberry Library, 1971]. 186). 
9 
Talk about literary fame? There's a sample of it! 12 
For the New York Times he just as well should have been dead, for they could not 
even remember his name: in its two notices of his death, his first name was reported, 
respectively, as 'Henry' and'Hiram'. 13 And in a glaring oversight that has persisted 
until only recently, The Press claimed that 'he had done almost no literary work 
during the past sixteen years. '14 Seemingly silent unto the end, Melville's death is 
memorialised by a blank scroll chiselled onto his tombstone in the Bronx, where he is 
buried next to his son, Malcolm. " 
What, though, of his beginning? By all accounts, it certainly seems innocent 
enough. But is it really? Might it be pertinent, for example, that Melville's mother 
added a terminal 'e' to her children's surname after the death of their father in 1832? 
A one-letter change is, of course, small, inconsequential. What difference does a 
character make? For her son Herman, however, the change would ultimately hint at 
12 Qtd. Jay Leyda, The Melville Log: A Documentary of Herman Melville, 1819-1891 (vol. 2; 
New York: Gordian, 1969), 827. 
13 Laurie Robertson-Lorant, Melville: A Biography (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1996), 614; Hershel Parker, Herman Melville: A Biography, Volume 2 [1851-1891] (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 911-12. 
14 'Death of a Once Popular Author', qtd. Leyda, 2: 836. In reality, Melville had written more 
lines of poetry than Emily Dickinson and almost as many as Walt Whitman. Moreover, Laurence Buell 
notes, all three poets wrote poetry for roughly the same amount of time, a little longer than twenty-five 
years. Melville's career as a novelist lasted but a decade ('Melville the Poet' in The Cambridge 
Companion to Herman Melville [ed. Robert S. Levine; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 
135). Granted, after Clarel (1876), Melville's published poetry was limited to two privately printed 
volumes, twenty-five copies each, John Marr and Other Sailors (1888) and Timoleon (1891). For 
more about Melville's status as a poet, see Elizabeth Renker, 'Melville the Poet: Response to William 
Spengemann' American Literary History 12 (Spring-Summer, 2000): 348-54; William C. Spengemann, 
'Melville the Poet' American Literary History 11 (Winter, 1999): 571-609; Hershel Parker, 'The Lost 
Poems (1860) and Melville's First Urge to Write an Epic Poem' in Melville's Evennoving Dawn: 
Centennial Essays (eds. John Bryant and Robert Milder; Kent, Oh.: Kent State University Press, 1997): 
260-75; Stanley A. Goldman, Melville's Protest Theism: The Hidden and Silent God in Clarel (DeKalb, 
Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993). 
15 Another premature death, Malcolm Melville had died in 1867, at the age of eighteen, by a 
self-inflicted gunshot wound. Originally ruled a suicide 'while laboring under temporary insanity of 
Mind', the questions and uncertainty surrounding the whole affair resulted in the cause of death to soon 
thereafter be ruled an accident (Leyda, The Melville Log, 2: 687-91). See also, Robertson-Lorant, 
Melville, 513-17; Parker, Herman Melville, Volume 2,642-46. 
10 
the inherent fluidity of his identity, a notion with which he would occasionally play by 
signing letters with his original surname, 'Melvill'. Consciously or not, Elizabeth 
Renker suggests, these acts of reversion would effectively split him in two. 16 Melville 
himself, in fact, suggests something similar when he concludes a letter to his British 
publisher, John Murray, whom he had not yet met, by playfully questioning the latter's 
persistence 'in carrying on this mysterious correspondence with an imposter shade', 
that is, 'the fanciful appellation of Herman Melvin'. " 
3. Herman Melville and the Aesthetico-Theological Vision 
In this way, Melville's was a kind of paradoxical self-creation, or self- 
becoming, not dissimilar to that described by Maurice Blanchot: 
The writer only finds himself, only realizes himself, through his work; 
before his work exists, not only does he not know who he is, but he is 
nothing. He only exists as a function of the work, but then how can the 
work exist? ... 
If he does not see his work before him as a project 
already completely formed, how can he make it the conscious end of 
his conscious acts? 18 
It is the aim of this thesis is to assess the theological implications of Melville's 
presentation of modern subjectivity as aesthetic self-creation. Moreover, it is 
precisely because of the centrality of the Subject / subjectivity in modern (i. e., post- 
Kantian) philosophy, that is, its endeavour to re-think the role and limits of subjective 
imagination and spontaneity, that my argument is ultimately an affirmation of Thomas 
16 Elizabeth Renker, Strike Through the Mask: Herman Melville and the Scene of Writing 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 15. For the clearest example, see his letter to Exert 
: ý. Duyckinck, 13 Dec. 1850 in Herman Melville, Correspondence, in The Writings of Herman '11 '1 , ille 
(cds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle; vol. 14; Evanston and Chicago: 
North\\cstcrn University Press and The Newberry Library, 1993), 172. 
17 Melville, Correspondence. 105. Motivating, this ghostly allusion was 1lurrav s request in a 
previous letter to 'test the corporeality of Melville by 'clapping eyes upon him in London'. 
18 Maurice Blanchot, 'Literature and the Right to Death' in The Station Hill Blanchot Reader 
(trans. Iv dia Davis. Paul Auster. and Robert Lamberton; BarrvtoN\ n. N. Y.: Station Hill, 1999). 361-02. 
J J. Altizer's provocative declaration: 'We must be prepared to accept the paradox that 
modern philosophy has been more deeply theological than modern theology. which is 
perhaps not so paradoxical if our greatest modem imaginative vision has been more 
fully theological than has our theological thinking. "' For Altizer, this is true because 
it is the modern philosophical vision that allows theological thinking to rethink its 
own deepest grounds, those of subjectivity, 'a re-thinking which is initially an 
unthinking of every established theological ground' -- only then is truly theological 
thinking possible. Such is, he concludes, 'the first goal of radical theology', and is the 
mark of a theology that harnesses the potential of a united thinking and creativity / 
imagination. 20 
My analysis of Melville's presentation of subjectivity, as the creative duplicity 
of self-becoming, will show him to be an exemplary model of Altizer's point. In him 
we will find theology (not to mention literature) characterised in ways hitherto 
thought unthinkable. As such, I will argue that the truest import and relevance of 
contemporary theology is contingent on the aesthetics of its unthought subjectivity - 
namely, the free theological Subject as a revolutionary poesis, that is, a creative 
emergence from the unavoidable collisions between religion, literature, and 
philosophy. 2' As we will see with Melville, while such an interdisciplinarity may 
19 Thomas J. J. Altizer, 'Doing Radical Theology', unpublished manuscript, 4. 
20 Altizer, 'Doing Radical Theology', 2.4-5. 
21 In this way, the task of thinking about theology remains fully hermeneutical, as described by 
Rüdiger Bubner: 
Hermeneutics has become more and more of a key word in philosophical discussions 
of the most \ aried kind. It seems as if hermeneutics creates cross-connections 
between problems of different origin. In linguistics and sociology, in history and 
literary studies, in theology, jurisprudence and aesthetics, and finally in the general 
theory of science, hermeneutic perspectiNes have been successfully brought to bear. 
In this wway, the traditional philosophical claim to universality is renewed under 
another name (Modear Genpan Philosophy [trans. Eric l latthewws: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981], 45). 
12 
often seem peculiar, or perhaps even forced, it is best understood not simply as the 
happy or obvious convergences and coincidences of different discourses in 
harmonious dialogue. On the contrary, my emphasis here is on precisely the forced 
peculiarity of what emerges as its radically disruptive, repressed aesthetico- 
theological excess. Only in this way does one's thinking about theology become 
theological thinking. 
David Jenkins expresses something similar when he specifies literature as 
theology's forgotten dialogue partner: 'Theologians need ... to stand under the 
judgement of the insights of literature before they can speak with true theological 
force of, and to, the world this literature reflects and illuminates. '-- - Such a forceful 
perspective, nevertheless, remains a marginal one. This is but one of the reasons 
David Jasper can candidly sigh: 'I am tired of the academic game of proving that I 
have read this and this - one reads about a lot of things, and what is interesting is why 
some strike one as desperately important and others as instantly forgettable. (Most 
"theology", as such, bores me to tears. )'23 Theology, as understood by the likes of 
Jenkins and Jasper, amongst others, is as though an unthought, aesthetic excess that 
blurs discursive contours whilst blinding hegemonic systems of closure, and thus 
remains vital beyond its strictly confessional / disciplinary confines. 
This, of course, is not to say that Melville himself is a theologian. Rather, I 
will contend that the aesthetico-theological potential for a truly revolutionary freedom 
and autonomy emerge from and sustain the complex theatricality of his life and 
22 David Jenkins, 'Literature and the Theologian' in Theolo N, and the University: An 
Ecumenical Investigation (ed. John Coulson; Baltimore: Helicon, 1964), 219. 
23 David Jasper, Pie Studr of Literature and Religion: An Introduction (2"d ed.; Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1992), xv. For a different, but related, appraisal of traditional theology's diminishing 
cultural role, and the potential of cultural and literary studies to revitalise see David E. Klemm, 'Back to 
Literature -- and Theology'? ' in Postmodernism: Literature and the Future of Theologe (cd. DaN id 
Jasper; Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), 180-90; and Michael Grimshaw, 'Tourist, Traveler, or Exile: 
Redefining the Theological Endea\ or', Journal of Religion 81 (April 2001): 294-70. 
13 
fiction. Contrary to the most common postmodern reading of Melville, with which 
my own will surely be associated, my point in emphasizing 'theatricality' is not that 
Melville introduces and/or participates in a counterfeit economy, as it were, wherein 
classical notions of truth and identity are forever frustrated by one's epistemic 
inability to see beyond the mask of phenomenal limitation. His is, rather, one in 
which the gamble of faith that anything at all exists behind the phenomenal mask is 
itself betrayed as constitutive of the masquerade. For Melville, that which identifies a 
character'as a character', for us the quintessential 'theological' Subject, is not simply 
the belief in an unattainable / disguised Thing-in-Itself, i. e., that which lies beyond 
and thus guarantees identity; it is, rather, the unthinkable (that is to say, repressed) 
possibility and freedom that unavoidably emerges from the material processes of self- 
characterisation / self-becoming. 
What Melville's thinking suggests is that in the same way that, for instance, 
textuality in deconstruction remains a necessarily impossible avoidance, i. e. a 
primordial condition of possibility, so does the idiosyncratic eruption of theology (as a 
truly free Subject) in its material, objective embodiment'as theology'. Furthermore, 
his reflections suggest the need for a radical repositioning of theology from the binary 
perspective that leads to self-present identification - be it in the veins of, for example, 
Spinozan immanence, Kierkegaardian transcendence, or even Aquinian confession 
to the complexly evolutionary, radically decentered / desacralized aesthetic intensity 
of a materialistic theology. In the aesthetic rethinking opened up by the likes of 
Melville, the Subject (i. e., of theology) is freed, if only for a miraculous moment, 
from its reflection upon the destructive desire and attempts for an impossible 
cognisance of its own incognisancc - that is, the excessive moment of its self- 
characterisation. In the aesthetico-theological vision of Herman Melville there is, in 
14 
short, truly nothing behind or beyond the mask of phenomenal experience. As such, it 
is concerned less with the necessity of what is than with the possibility of what might 
be, and thus with the self-creative freedom of its self-characterisation. 
4. The Polytemporal Approach 
One of the key features of Bruno Latour's argument in his provocativelti, titled 
book We Have Never Been Modern is his insistence on the reversibility of time. For 
Latour, reality is built around the natural proliferation and networking of 'quasi- 
objects' that are neither simply subjects nor objects. Their appearance or role as 
subject or object / cause or effect is, he argues, dependent upon one's particular 
perspective, discipline, or discourse. As such, he continues, the modem notions of 
temporality and progress, and thus discursive possibilities and norms, are thrown into 
a turbulent discord. He writes: 
Modernizing progress is thinkable only on condition that all the 
elements that are contemporary according to the calendar belong to the 
same time.... For this to be the case, these elements have to form a 
complete and recognizable cohort. This beautiful order is disturbed 
once the quasi-objects are seen as mixing up different periods, 
ontologies or genres. Then a historical period will give the impression 
of a great hotchpotch. Instead of a fine laminary flow, we will most 
often get a turbulent flow of whirlpools and rapids. Time becomes 
reversible instead of irreversible. 24 
It is, therefore, reasonable that some of today's most provocative thinking can only be 
thought provocatively at all insofar as we recognize its 'polytemporal' causes and 
effects. 25 Although I wish to ultimately resist the anti-revolutionary / anti-apocalyptic 
24 Bruno Latour, We Haie Never Been Modern (trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, %lass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1993), 73. 
'` Cf., 'Let us suppose, for example, that we are going to regroup the contemporary elements 
along a spiral rather than a line. We do have a future and a past, but the future takes the form of a 
circle expanding in all directions, and the past is not surpassed but revisited. repeated. surrounded. 
protected, recombined, reinterpreted and reshuffled. Elements that appear remote if we follow the 
spiral may turn out to be quite nearby if we compare loops. Conversely, elements that are quite 
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implications of Latour's idealisation of the evolutionary adaptation of networks, the 
networks in which Melville and theology participate, i. e.. their interdisciplinary / 
hermeneutic connection, are also anything but straightforward. " In the course of this 
thesis, for instance, we will often find ourselves straddling generations. To this end, I 
will seek to flesh out the cultural-philosophical-theological networks, those obvious 
and immediately contemporary, as well as those not so obvious and temporally 
anachronistic. 27 
In Chapter One, I present a mostly biographical portrait of a young Herman 
Melville consumed by the questions of his own authorial self-becoming. His writing, 
as is especially clear in his first novel, Typee, has never been without the structure of 
duplicity and self-doubt, or the attendant desire for self-destruction. As such, Melville 
echoes the opening paragraph of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo, '- and so I tell my life to 
myself, 28 and participates in the autobiographical dilemma of self-becoming heralded 
in the eighteenth-century by Lawrence Sterne and popularised at the turn of the 
twenty-first century by Dave Eggers. As we will see, it this tradition's same appetite 
for self-destruction that marks the intensity of subjective freedom most evident in 
Melville's later novels. 
In Chapters Two and Three, I argue that the ambivalence regarding self- 
destruction and self-assertion can only be adequately understood when held in relief 
contemporary, if we judge by the line, become quite remote if we traverse a spoke. Such a temporality 
does not oblige us to use the labels "archaic" or "advanced, " since every cohort of contemporary 
elements may bring together elements from all times. In such a framework, our actions are recognized 
at last as polytemporal' (Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 75). 
26 Cf., Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 48. 
27 Obviously, I am not using the word 'anachronistic' pejorati\ely; but rather, in the -sense that 
'reading against the grain' of history may hold potential for drawing attention to certain 'indivisible 
remainders' otherwise repressed in every identifying closure, text or philosophical system. See e. g., 
Slaty of 7-i2ek, On Belief (London: Routledge, 2001). 96. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals/ Erne Homo (trans. \'\ alter Kaufmann; 
New York: \'inta-c, 1969). 221. 
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to the philosophical climate of 18th-/19th-century Germany. While it may, initially 
seem a departure from the narrative begun in the first chapter, Melville's presentation 
of subjectivity throughout his novels is far too closely aligned to the convergence of 
aesthetics and subjectivity found in Kant and the theory of the romantic novel 
developed by Early German Romantics for it to be ignored. Nevertheless, while main, 
of the formal similarities with the Romantics outlined in Chapter Two are often stark 
and the influences apparent, especially in Mardi, Melville's enduring significance is 
his agonistic resistance to the appropriation of Romantic ideals by several of his 
American contemporaries, particularly what he regarded as the dehumanised, spiritual 
esotericism of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Therefore, in Chapter Three, I contend that the 
transition from Melville's ambivalent embrace of Romantic ideals in his essay 
'Hawthorne and his Mosses' (especially regarding authorial ownership of texts and 
self-assertion) to the complex 'apocalyptic ism' of Mobv-Dick and Pierre is 
symptomatic of Friedrich Schelling's aborted philosophical aim of articulating the 
materialistic genesis of God's self-becoming. 
In this way, moreover, I will argue in Chapter Four that Melville does not truly 
exemplify the aesthetico-theological thinking until after the apocalypticism of Mobv- 
Dick and Pierre. As such, it is not until the poetic duplicity of his final novel, The 
Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, that the full implications of a fully radical 
theology are realised in an aesthetic theology. Here I will demonstrate that in 
Melville's masquerade of confidence and faith the wearing of masks does not obscure 
or defer the revelation of a transcendent truth or ultimate kernel of self-identity, be it 
that of divine revelation, mystical silence, pantheistic All, or nihilistic void. Rather, 
in a sense perhaps suggestive of Deleuzian immanence, and thus explosive to the 
simple equation of modern aesthetics and liberal humanism, Melville's masquerade is 
1? 
the characterisation / materialisation of theological truth as the aesthetic intensity of 
unthinkable possibility. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
MELVILLE & THE PROBLEM OF SELF-PRESENTATION 
1. Fresh From the Sea 
Fresh from the sea at the age of twenty-five, following his final journey as a 
merchant sailor in October 1844, Melville regarded the writing of his first novel as the 
very beginning of his life. Indeed, as he writes in a letter to Nathaniel Hawthorne, 
From my twenty-fifth year I date my life, three weeks have scarcely passed, at any 
time between then & now, that I have not unfolded within myself. '"' What is 
especially important to note here is that such an unfolding within himself is only 
possible in the very act of unfolding himself withotit. That is to say, if we are to take 
Melville at his word, which he later insists we must, any sense of his self-discovery or 
self-consciousness as an artist and a free thinker must be held in tandem with the fact 
that such a discovery is only possible in the very act of his writing. In this way, it is 
particularly instructive to approach our reading of Melville as that of a certain kind of 
self-creation / self-becoming. 
By April 1845, Melville was confident enough in his hastily written 
manuscript detailing his adventures on the Marquesas Islands to send portions to 
Harper Brothers for possible publication. Though one editorial assistant favourably 
compared what he read to Robinson Crusoe, Harpers nevertheless rejected it on the 
grounds that 'it was impossible that it could be true and therefore was without value. " ' 
Not soon thereafter, Thomas Nichols, a colleague of Melville's brother in New York, 
feeling'sure that the reviews of the English press would make its American success', 
advised Melville to send it to London. Proclaiming that the manuscript had held him 
Nlely ille, Correspondence, 193. 
ý0 i. cyda, The Al li'ille Log, 1: 196. 
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rapt, Nichols had no doubt of its potential for success, 'not at all sure that the process 
could be reversed. i3' Thus galvanised, Melville sent his manuscript to London with 
his brother Gansevoort, who had recently accepted a post there as the secretary to the 
American legation. By January 1846, with its acceptance by Wiley & Putnam 
Publishing in America32 following directly on the heels of its acceptance by John 
Murray for the British Colonial and Home Library, 33 Nichols' assessment had been 
proven true. But two months later, Melville's first novel appeared in England under 
the title Narrative of a Four Months' Residence among the Natives of a Valley of the 
Marquesas Islands, and within the month in America as Typee: A Peep at Polynesian 
Life. 34 
The beginning of Melville's writing career, however, was not without its 
problems. John Murray, for example, was so worried about certain passages that, in 
31 Leyda, The Melville Log, 1: 197. 
32 The first edition of Typee was published in America as a part of Evert Duyckinck's new 
series for Putnam's, the 'Library of Choice Reading'. At the time, there was not yet an international 
copyright law on either side of the Atlantic Ocean. As a result, cheap foreign novels were often sold at 
the expense of native authors; though, as William Charvat notes, American authors suffered more 
because they produced fewer works that appealed to an international middle-class audience, as well as 
the immaturity of America's publishing industry (The Profession of Authorship in America, 1800-70: 
The Papers of William Charvat [ed. Matthew J. Bruccoli; Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1978], 29). The fact that Duyckinck wished to feature exclusively American authors highlights the 
risky and tenuous nature of his business venture. For more information on the 'Library of Choice 
Reading' and the socio-economic conditions of the early American publishing industry, see Ezra 
Greenspan, 'Evert Duyckinck and the History of Wiley and Putnam's Library of American Books' 
American Literature 64 (Dec., 1992): 677-93; and Steven Fink, Prophet in the Marketplace: Thoreau's 
Development as a Professional Writer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 143-47. 
33 John Murray had been convinced of the merits of Melville's novel early in 1846 by no less 
than Washington Irving, who was currently serving as the American minister to Spain. 
Serendipitously, Irving had accompanied John Murray to a business meeting with Gansevoort Melville, 
and had reportedly praised the portions of the book read aloud as 'exquisite' and 'graphic', predicted its 
success, and advised Gansevoort to take the manuscript to Putnam as soon as possible. Less than a 
week later, Putnam, exclaiming that the chapters given him were so exciting he had to miss church, 
agreed to publish it in America (Leyda, The Melville Log, 1: 202; see also, Hershel Parker, Herman 
Melville: A Biograph, v [vol. 1; Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996-2002], 
393-98). For more on John Murray, see Angus Fraser, 'John Murray's Colonial and Home Library' 
Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America 91 (Sept., 1997): 339-408; and Fraser's 'A Publishing 
House and Its Readers, 1841-1880: The Murrays and the Miltons' Papers of the Bibliographical 
Society of America 90 (Mar., 1996): 4-47. 
'a 'Typee' was not affixed to the British version until the Revised Version later that year. 
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addition to Melville's editorial changes, he hired a reader to delete or change passage 
'for the benefit of both author and book'. 35 His American counterpart was even more 
squeamish, particularly with regard to its frank eroticism. As a result, the orgiastic 
frenzy that the Marquesan girls, in all their 'abandoned voluptuousness', excited 
onboard the Dolly had to be given a very cold shower indeed by Wiley & Putnam's, 
and then later once again in the Revised Edition by Melville himself. It was reasoned 
that if Americans were presented with Tepee's depiction of a Marquesan queen who, 
wishing to display her tattoos, 'bent forward for a moment, and turning sharply round, 
threw up the skirts of her mantle', they, like the book's Frenchman who is accosted by 
this 'unlooked-for-occurrence', would quickly retreat and sales would suffer. 36 A 
similar editorial fate met the temptation and sexual insinuation of Melville's bachelor- 
sailors upon first meeting the island girls who boarded their ship. 'How avoid so dire a 
temptation? ' the novel's narrator, Tommo, wonders salaciously. 'For who could think 
of tumbling these artless creatures overboard, when they had swam miles to welcome 
us? t37 Unwilling to extend such a welcome to what might be perceived as deviant, 
Melville and his American publisher agreed that readers of Tvpee should not face any 
of the unbridled 'unholy passions of the crew and their unlimited gratification', " and 
35 Leon Howard, 'Historical Note' in Typee: A Peep at Polynesian Life by Herman Melville, in 
The Writings of Herman Melville (eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle; 
vol. 1; Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press and The Newberry Library, 1968), 282. 
Henry Reader, the principle editor of the manuscript, was paid a little over half the amount Melville 
himself was paid for writing the manuscript. 
36 Melville, Tvpee, 8. 
37 Melville, Tepee, 15 
;R Melville, Tepee, 15. Tommo tries to reassures his reader that these indulgences on shore are 
actually for the sailors' own good, as they are far better than the sexual temptations of those sailors 
stuck out at sea without a woman in sight. Surprisingly, neither publisher found questionable 
Mcly ille's unsubtle suggestion of homosexuality aboard whaling ships (Melville, Tvpee. 22-23; 346- 
47). Cf., the 'plainly phallic' dance, as William Charvat calls it, which sneaks into both versions of the 
original and revised editions. Here, Tommo describes the dance as stimulating 'active, romping. 
mischievous c\olutions. in which e\crv limb is brought into requisition. Indeed, the \larquesan girls 
dance all ov cr. as it \w ere; not only do their feet dance. but their arms, hands. fingers, av. their very 
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they were deleted in toto. 39 
Also of concern was Melville's inflammatory hectoring of missionaries. In 
one of the opening anecdotes of Typee, Tommo tells the 'somewhat amusing' story of 
a missionary who, undaunted by the difficulty of proselytising the Marquesans, and 
'believing much in the efficacy of female influence', brought his white wife with him 
to the islands. Never before having seen a white woman, the islanders initially 
regarded her as a new god. When reverence was eventually replaced with curiosity as 
to what was behind the enshrining 'sacred veil of calico', the missionary's wife was 
stripped of her clothes. Discovering she was but a mere woman beneath the fabric, 
the islanders contemptuously informed her that such 'deception' could not continue. 
Because she was not, Tommo wryly explains, 'sufficiently evangelised' to deal with 
this or the possibility of whatever might follow, she summarily 'forced her husband to 
relinquish his undertaking, and together they returned to Tahiti. "" 
For obvious reasons, many American Christians were not as amused as 
Tommo by such anecdotes. This is a 'racily-written narrative', cries the New York 
Evangelist. It'abounds in praises of the life of nature, alias savageism, and in slurs 
and flings against missionaries and civilization.... We are sorry that such a volume 
eyes, seem to dance in their heads. In good sooth, they so sway their floating forms, arch their necks, 
toss aloft their naked arms, and glide, and swim, and whirl, that it was almost too much for a quiet, 
sober-minded young man like myself (152; Charvat, The Profession of Authorship in America, 213). 
39 It is interesting to note, however, those instances of indulgence that Melville insisted on 
keeping. For instance, immediately following the passage cited above, in a portion not originally 
deleted, he continues: 'Alas for the poor savages when exposed to the influence of these polluting 
examples! Unsophisticated and confiding, they are easily led into every vice, and humanity ww eeps over 
the ruins thus remorsely inflicted upon them by their European civilizers. Thrice happy are they who, 
inhahiting some yet undiscovered island in the midst of the ocean, have never been brought into 
contaminating contact with the white man. ' The implications of this passage are stark, as Tommo 
appears to regard colonial, perhaps even missionary, contact, as an implicit rape. For a similar 
discussion sec Melville, T. ipee, 123-30. 
a° \lcI\ille, IVJ)ee, 6-7. 
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should have been allowed a place in the "Library of American Books. "" Though it 
begins similarly - i. e., 'An apotheosis of barbarism. A panegyric on cannibal 
delights! An apostrophe to the spirit of savage felicity! '- William Bourne's re% ic\w in 
the Christian Parlor Magazine is a bit more focussed in its attack. Specifically, he 
focuses his ire on the statements in the book'wherein the cause of MISSIONS is 
assailed, with a pertinacity the misrepresentation and degree of hatred, which can 
only entitle the perpetrator to the just claim of traducer. 12 A contemporary and friend 
of Bourne, Horace Greeley's reading is similar, if more tempered. In his assessment 
of Tvpee and Omoo, Melville's second book, he describes Melville as a'born genius, 
with few superiors either as narrator, a describer, or a humorist', but one whose books 
can 'fairly be condemned as dangerous reading for those of immature intellects and 
unsettled principles. ' For Greeley, while Melville's writing is elusive enough to avoid 
being 'positively offensive', his 'tone is bad'. 43 
With its sexual innuendo, barbs aimed at missionaries and 'civilised' colonial 
powers in the South Seas, not to mention Melville's typical array of spelling gaffes 
and indecipherable scribbles, editorial revisions are hardly surprising. " What is 
surprising, however, is the extent to which he personally revised the American edition 
tºwwice, deleting various passages deemed scandalous, for the sake of 'wide & 
41 Watson G. Branch, ed., Melville: The Critical Heritage (London: Routledge, 1974), 81. 
42 Branch, Melville, 85-86. Branch notes that Christian Parlor Magazine was designed by its 
editor, Reverend Darius Mead, 'to combat the irreligious and immoral literature of that day. ' 
a` Branch, Melville, 121-22. For a similar British reaction, see George Paston, At John 
hlºn-ruv'. '. Records of a Literary Circle, 1843-1892 (London: John Murray. 1932), 53. 
as Elizabeth Renker provocatively deals with the interesting implications of %lel\ ille's career- 
long difficulties with spelling and writing in her excellent book Strike Through the Wask: Herman 
11chville and the Scene of Writing. For examples of Melvillc's penmanship, the Northwestern- 
Newherr\ editions of his \\ ork include comprehensi\ e analyses of extant manuscripts. 
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permanent popularity of the work. '' William Charvat regards this interest in 'public 
taste' as a mark of Melville's burgeoning professionalism as an author, and ultimately 
what distinguishes his first two novels from most of his others. " In this way. as we 
will see in more detail below, a certain ending, or desired deletion, infringes and 
irreducibly alters his beginning as an author. 
2. Melville and Self-Destruction 
The problems with Typee were always much deeper than its editorial issues. 
Significantly, many of its readers refused even to believe Melville was its author. 
Thinking his writing too fanciful and description too vivid to be those of a common 
sailor, 'Herman Melville' was, they averred, but a character, a nom de plwne. 4' Even 
John Murray had accepted the manuscript in spite of his reservations that it seemed 
more the work of a 'practised writer' than that of an ordinary sailor. " Apropos such 
suspicion, Charvat points out that this is the only time in his fiction that Melville 
seeks to identify himself clearly with those 'good-for-nothing-tars', as he playfully 
' Melville, Correspondence, 31-32. These changes, Howard suggests, are important not 
simply because of their effects on Typee alone but also on Melville's writing in general (Howard, 
'Historical Note', 280). 
46 Charvat, The Profession of Authorship in America, 217; cf., 3-29. Until the 1820s, with the 
advent of Washington Irving and James Fenimore Cooper, professional, critically appreciated 
authorship in America was a virtual impossibility. Previous to this, the American literary scene 
resembled that of the British aristocracy during the reigns of Elizabeth and James, in which an author 
was supported by a patron and would typically only sell a novel anonymously. Charvat contends that 
in order to be considered professional, writing must be the main, or at least a prolonged, financial 
resource for the author (i. e., no anonymity). Additionally, because such writing is done with the intent 
of being sold in an open market, it is also heavily influenced by buyer's tastes and reading habits. In 
spite of its imperfections, Charvat's definition is helpful in thinking about what separates writers like 
Irving and Cooper from their American predecessors like Susannah Rowson and Charles Brockden 
Brown. 
47 Leyda, The Melville Log, 2: 914. The London Spectator's unsigned review comes close to 
the same conclusion, but then consents that because the author was an American sailor this doubt is in 
fact unfounded. Unlike in England, the review rationalises, in America there is no disrespect awaiting 
respectable young men who choose to become sailors. Moreover, the opportunities for education are 
more widespread in America, affording a 'great familiarity with popular literature and a readier use of 
the pen than is usual with classes of the same apparent grade in England' (Branch, Melville, 54). 
48 Melv ille, Corr-csponJence, 30-31. 
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describes them in Tvpee, who are intent on marring an otherwise peaceful sea journey 
of 'state-room sailors, who make so much ado about a fourteen-days' passage across 
the Atlantic'. 49 In Omoo, for instance, he is a man of education, in Mardi, a 
gentleman; and in Redburn and Moby-Dick, he is not even the narrator. " There are, 
however, several reasons one would do well to approach Charvat's suggestion with 
caution, not least of which being his incomplete assessment of the complexities 
involved in ever at all identifying Melville as narrator. One might wonder, with 
James Duban, if this common assessment actually 'undervalued the aesthetic 
dimensions of the work of an artist who was fond of creating personae and narrators 
whose views ... cannot 
in every instance be taken as "authorial "'. 51 There is, then, an 
appropriate coincidence in the fact that Melville's initial defence is not even his own, 
but that of Gansevoort Melville, who writes to Murray: 
The Author will doubtless be flattered to hear that his production 
seems to so competent a judge as yourself that of a'practised 
writer' - the more so as he is a mere novice in the art, having had no 
experience; for it is within my personal knowledge that he has never 
before written either book or pamphlet, and to the best of my belief has 
not even contributed to a magazine or newspaper. In regard to the 
other point to which you allude I can only give you the assurance of 
my full and entire belief that the adventurer, and the writer of the 
adventure are one & the same person. 52 
Which is to say, 'Herman Melville', the sailor cum author / author cum sailor had only 
just begun. 53 
49 Melville, Ti pee , 
3. 
50 Charvat, The Profession of Authorship in America, 204,207. 
51 James Duban, 'Clipping with A Chisel: The Ideology of Melville's Narrator's' Special Issue 
cof Texas Studies in Literature and Language 31 (1989): 342. Nevertheless, even Duban appears 
ultimately to fall prey to the same insatiable need for referential stability, «ithout considering the 
dynamic,, of the same 'aesthetic dimensions' that make the stability he assumes (as stasis) impossible. 
52 Leyda, i/ic Melville Log, 199-200. 
53 Gi msc\ oort's reply, it turns out, is only part true. As early as 1839, M1eI\ ilIc's 'Fragments 
from a Writing Desk' had appeared in a local paper, the Democratic Press and l. cmsingburgh 
\(Ircrri. crr, under the pseudonym 'L. A. V. '; later that year, the same paper also published 'The Death 
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And yet, but a mere six years later, Melville would already sense what he 
regarded as his imminent demise. In a much-quoted, professionally disillusioned 
letter to Nathaniel Hawthorne he writes: 
I am like one of those seeds taken out of the Egyptian Pyramids, 
which, after being three thousand years a seed and nothing but a seed, 
being planted in English soil, it developed itself, grew to greennness, 
and then fell to mould. ... 
I feel that I am now come to the inmost leaf 
of the bulb, and that shortly the flower must fall to the mould. " 
Five months later, in his final letter before Hawthorne moved from nearby Pittsfield, 
Massachusetts, Melville even goes so far as to absolve the former of any obligation to 
reply, due to the possibility that'if you do answer it, and direct it to Herman Melville, 
you will missend it for the very fingers that now guide this pen are not precisely 
the same that just took it up and put it on this paper'. 55 How are we to understand this 
convergence of beginning and ending in apocalyptic annihilation, whereby the true 
torment of life is its natural desire for an ending that can only ever emerge from the 
impossibility of ever actually experiencing this ending as such? Nathaniel Hawthorne 
in his English Notebooks best describes the growing intensity of his former 
neighbour's ambivalent preoccupation: 
Melville, as he always does, began to reason of Providence and 
futurity, and of everything that lies beyond human ken, and informed 
me that he had'pretty much made up his mind to be annihilated'; but 
still he does not seem to rest in that anticipation; and, I think, will 
never rest until he gets hold of a definite belief. It is strange how he 
persists - and has persisted ever since I knew him in wandering to- 
Craft', under the pseudonym 'Harry the Reefer' (Herman Melville, The Piazza Tales and Other Prose 
Pieces, 1839-1860, in The Writings of Herman Melville [eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. 
Thomas Tanselle; vol. 9; Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press and The Newberry 
Library, 1987], 191-204,424-27). All the same, it seems highly unlikely that Gansevoort would risk 
his rising reputation in the diplomatic community for the sake of his younger brother's unproven 
writing career. And NNhile it is improbable that he knew nothing about Mclville's previous publications, 
for indeed Nick ille had sent him a copy of the paper with the first piece (though he did not explain the 
pseudonym), Ganscvoort either forgot these early \vritings, or simply regarded them as insignificant 
attempts of a callow t\\cnty-year-old. Cf., Leyda, The Melville Log, 1: 85. 
" Mely ill c. Correspondence, 193. 
Si Melville, Correspondence, 213. 
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and-fro over these deserts, as dismal and monotonous as the sand hills 
amid which we were sitting. He can neither believe, nor be 
comfortable in his unbelief; and he is too honest and courageous not to 
try to do one or the other. If he were a religious man, he would be one 
of the most truly religious and reverential; he has a very high and noble 
nature, and better worth immortality than most of us. " 
Melville, as it were, cannot truly begin without somehow ending, and yet neither can 
he come to his end without beginning once again. 
Importantly, Melville's dialecticism stands opposed to the modern 
phenomenological understanding of death and apocalypse. As Heidegger famously 
points out a century later, 'Dying is not an event, [but] a phenomenon to be 
understood existentially. "' As such, the 'being-towards-death' that identifies an 
individual as uzt i, i liviclual is an impossible gift and destination, for as Derrida adds, 
'every relation to death is an interpretive apprehension and a representative approach 
to death. "' Unwrapping this 'gift of death', we end up only playing with its bows and 
strings. '[O]ne never dies now', the phenomenologist whispers from beyond the 
grave, for 'one always dies later, in the future - in a future that is never actual, that 
cannot come except when everything will be over and done'. 59 In this perspective, the 
grave matters because the 'beyond' is within, rendering the Subject forever separated, 
from its beginning and end. " 
The dialectic of Melville's beginning and ending, though, is not simply that of 
56 Nathaniel Hawthorne, The English Notebooks (ed. Randall Stewart; New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1941), 432-33. 
57 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson; Ne 
York: Harper and Row, 1962), 284. 
sR Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death (trans. David Wills; Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995), 45. Notably, Derrida's title, The Gift of Death [Donner la mort, ], equivocates between the 
ordinary meaning ascribed to donner, 'to give', and the idiom, 'to put to death' (as in se donner la mart, 
'to commit suicide'). 
59 Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature (trans. Ann Smock; Lincoln: Uni\ ersity of 
Nebraska Press. 1982), 164-65. 
'0 Maurice Blanchot. Fa«v- Pas (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), 35. 
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a strict circularity, and thus not reliant on phenomenologically derived notions of 
presence. Moreover, neither is it indicative of a commonplace wholeness or Absolute, 
whereby beginning and ending require each other to become themselves. In the 
words of Slavoj Zizek: 
According to the standard doxa, the telos of the dialectical process is 
the absolute form that abolishes any material surplus. If, howe\ cr, this 
is truly the case ... 
how are we to account for the fact that the Result 
effectively throws us back into the whirlpool, that it is nothing but the 
totality of the route we had to travel in order to arrive at the Result'. `' ' 
As such, and a point too seldom sufficiently appreciated or explored by the 
phenomenological tradition, the power of dialecticism does not lie in the hegemony of 
its self-reflective completion but in the creative imperative of its inherent / 
constitutive failure. As such, insofar as the stable, reflective differentiation between 
beginning and ending threatens to radically blur beyond all redemption, the 
assumption of a correspondent (i. e., Platonic) or analogous (i. e., neo-Platonic) 
identification of self, even as one divided from the impossible experience of its own 
death (and thus as a 'divided self), becomes increasingly problematic. 
Realising this, at least on some level, Melville pens a stammering postscript in 
his valedictory letter to Hawthorne: 
I can't stop yet. If the world was entirely made up of Magians, I'll tell 
you what I should do. I should have a paper-mill established at one 
end of the house, and so have an endless riband of foolscap rolling in 
upon my desk; and upon that endless riband I should write a thousand 
a million billion thoughts, all under the form of a letter to you. 
The divine magnet is in you, and my magnet responds. Which is the 
biggest? A foolish question - they are One. 62 
As we will see, this unified 'One', the bedrock of a metaphysically stable Absolute 
identity, is for Melville always an irreducibly, and thus ironically, Sisyphean striving. 
61 Slavoj 2i2ek, Tarrying With the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology 
(Durham: Duke Universit\ Press. 1993), 156. 
1'2 N1c1\'ille, Correspondence, 213. 
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Indeed, the dramatic / tragic implications of this constitutive failure and irony are 
particularly evident in the debates concerning the authenticity of Tvpee. 
3. A 'Straitforward' Presentation 
In spite of its general popularity, most mid-nineteenth-century American and 
British critics considered fiction a low and potentially dangerous art form, due to its 
meretricious degradation of fact: 
The infusion of romance into history cannot, we think, but have a bad 
effect on the reader, by rendering the dull matter of fact of the latter, 
tasteless and spiritless, in comparison with the piquant extravagance of 
the adulterated mass, and weakening at the same time that salutary 
distinction, which the mind should always preserve between truth and 
falsehood. The imagination ought not to be pampered thus, at the 
expense of the other faculties. 63 
The imagination provoked by fiction, Samuel Miller warns, poses a redoubtable 
danger to the individual and society because it has 'a tendency too much to engross 
the mind, to fill it with artificial views, and to diminish the taste for more solid 
reading. ' Such thoughts are actually counterfeit, he warns, and will only 'cheat it [the 
" 
mind] of substantial enjoyment. " Therefore, lest one be foolish enough to desire such 
mental and spiritual privation, admonishes the Reverend James Gray, one should 
exercise utmost caution 'against ever making the characters of romance a standard by 
which to judge character in real life. "-` To Melville's palpable consternation, the 
°' American Quarterly Review (1846): 46; qtd. Michael Davitt Bell, The Development of 
American Romance: The Sacrifice of Relation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1980), 20.1 am 
especially indebted to Michael Bell's The Development of American Romance and Philip Gura's The 
lt'isdoin of 11'ords: Language, Theology. and the Literature in the ; 'evv England Renaissance 
(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1981) for guiding me to the writings of Samuel 
Miller and likeminded adherents to Scottish 'Common Sense' philosophy. 
°' Samuel Miller, Brief Retrospect of the Eighteenth Century (vol. 2: New York: B. Franklin, 
1970), 179.176. 
Qtd. Terence Martin, The Instructed Vision: Scottish Common Sense Philosophy and the 
Origin of . 1mcrwan 
Fiction [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), 67. 
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flourishes of his self-styled 'Romance of Real Life' proved an all too easy target for 
the purveyors of the day's critical opinion. " Although its reviews were generally % er} 
positive and in line with his novel's overall popularity with readers, those reviews that 
were not favourable to Melville's willingness to mix fact and fiction were vociferous 
and malignant enough to raise as much (if not more) concern than those that 
bemoaned the offensiveness of this mixture's actual content. 67 
Tellingly, London's Literary Gazette chided other reviewers who treated Tv pee 
as 'real and authentic', suggesting instead that they had been duped by Melville's April 
Fool's joke. 68 If Melville was joking, however, he certainly was not the one laughing. 
On the contrary, his initial public reaction in the 21 April 1846 issue of the Albany 
Argi, s is notable first for its ambiguity, as it is altogether unclear whether the 
newspaper is quoting or paraphrasing him when it reports: 
The author desires to state to the public, that TYPEE is a true narrative 
of events which actually occurred to him. Although there may be 
moving events and hairbreadth escapes, it is scarcely more strange than 
such as happens to those who make their home on the deep. 69 
One month later, his blank face proved to be but a mask. In response to a review in 
the 17 April 1846 Morning Courier and New-York Enquirer that Melville regarded as 
especially obnoxious and malicious, 70 he donned the name 'Alexander Bradford' and 
66 Melville, Correspondence, 55. Cf., G. Harrison Orians, 'Censure of Fiction in American 
Romances and Magazines, 1789-1810, ' Publication of the Modern Language Association 52 (1937): 
195-214. For the British side of the same debate, see J. M. S. Tompkins, The Popular Novel in 
England 1770-1800 (London: Constable, 1932), 210-17. 
67 For positive and negative reactions to Tvpee, see Hugh W. Hetherington, Melville's 
Reviewers: British and American 1846-1891 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 
20-65; and Branch, Melville, 3-12,53-89. 
68 Melville, Correspondence, 86. 
69 Melville, Correspondence, 35. 
'0 Tepee ww as, according to this review in all essential respects.... a fiction, -a piece of 
Munchausenism, - from beginning to end. It may 
be that the author visited, and spent some time in 
the Marquesas Islands ... 
But ý\c ha\e not the slightest confidence in any of the details, while many of 
the incidents narrated are utterly incredible. We might cite numberless instances of this monstrous 
exaggeration; but no one can read a dozen pages of the book without detecting them. This would 
be a 
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sent the paper an article defending the good name of'Herman Melville'. -' Although 
the article was never published and was ultimately lost, 'Bradford' lives on in an 
accompanying letter: 
I have endeavored to make it appear as if written by one who had read 
the book & beleived [sic] it -& moreover - had been as much 
pleased with exactly the right sort of thing. The fact is, it was rather an 
awkward undertaking any way - for I have not sought to present my 
own view of the matter (which you may be sure is straitforward [sic] 
enough) but have only presented such considerations as would be apt 
to suggest themselves to a reader who was acquainted with, & felt 
freindly [sic] toward the author. " 
To aid his defence, Melville once again, as it were, returns to the water. As we have 
already seen, however, his intentions remain far from obvious. In an unfortunate 
misspelling, Melville here plunges beneath the 'strait' that he feels best describes his 
'own view of the matter', in such a way that it is not simply his own view but also that 
of 'Bradford'. 
Even the purported verification of TN pee's truth, and thus also the truth of 
Melville, is watered down by ambiguity. At first, unequivocal vindication seemed at 
hand when Richard Tobias Greene wrote to the Buffalo Commercial Advertiser 
claiming to be the same 'Toby' who had abandoned Tommo (or, so the argument goes, 
Melville), and who the latter believed had been killed by island natives. 73 'I am the 
true and veritable "Toby, " yet living', he writes, 'and I am happy to testify to the entire 
matter to be excused, if the book were not put forth as a simple record of actual experience. It 
professes to give nothing but what the author actually saw and heard. It must therefore be judged, not 
as a romance or a poem, but as a book of travels, - as a statement of facts: - and in this light it has, in 
our judgment, no merit whatever ... 
' (Leyda, The Melville Log, 1: 21 1-12). 
'1 In reality, Alexander Bradford was the author of American Antiquities and Researches into 
the Origin and History of the Red Race, as well as a former classmate and a friend of Nlelville's older 
brother, Ganse\oort Mlelville, and had agreed to the ruse. 
\Icl\ ille, Correspondence, 37-38. 
73 McIv ille. l vpec. 106-09. 
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accuracy of the work, so long as I was with Melville. " Melville's letter to John 
Murray in the wake of this revelation is suggestive: 
I have to inform you that 'Toby' who figures in my narrative has come 
to life tho' I had long supposed him to be dead. I send you by this 
steamer several pages ... containing allusions to him. Toby's 
appearance has produced quite a lively sensation here and'Truth is 
stranger than Fiction' is in every body's mouth. - In Buffalo where he 
"turned up" the public curiosity was so great that "Toby" was induced 
to gratify it by publishing the draught of a letter which he had 
originally sent to me. This is not the letter, however, which appears in 
the papers I send you. -I was sorry for this on some accounts, but it 
could not be helped. 75 
Whether Melville's disappointment is directed toward the publishing of Greene's 
letter, or to the fact that he could not send it himself to Murray for publication, is, 
once again, unclear. Subsequently, both Greene's letter to the Buffalo newspaper and 
the story of his fate on the island were heavily reprinted, whereas Melville's 
addendum, 'The Story of Toby', was almost completely ignored. 76 That Melville was 
even pushing his own version of events cannot help but to compel one to regard this 
as yet another instance of Melville's deep ambivalence about the difference between 
'truth' and 'fiction'. 
As one might have expected, John Murray remained unconvinced by 
Melville's 'straitforward' presentation of truth. While he accepted Melville's 
addendum, Murray refused to incorporate it into the revised, tamer edition of Typee, 
and published it instead as a short pamphlet. Toby's existence was verification 
7' Leyda, The Melville Log, 1: 220; Melville, Correspondence, 578-79. 
75 MclviIIe, Correspondence, 5 5. 
76 For Greene's letter to Melville, see Melville, Correspondence, 579-84. In an unfortunately 
lost letter, Greene would later demand a share of Melville's profits for Tepee. He soon thereafter, 
though, recanted it as a 'cursed letter', pointing out that he did not compose it, but merely folloýýed the 
lead of his persuasive friends. He concludes instead: 'I find on consideration that I have no right to any 
such thing. You must my dear friend forgive and forget all, as an old ship-mate and friend, you must 
remember human nature is liable to err. I am heartily sorry. that I e\er penned that infernal scra\%1' 
088). 
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enough for that story alone, he argued, but not for Tvpee as a whole. Consequently, 
Murray once more insisted that Melville provide 'documentary evidence' of his time 
on the Marquesas Islands. Of course the story from this point is by now predictable. 
Such a request, Melville sniffs contemptuously in his response, is 'indescribably 
vexatious', for only a 'parcel of blockheads' would now dare question his book's 
veracity. " According to Melville, the 'resurrection of Toby' was quintessential, 
irrefutable proof of his book's truth; not only was no other proof necessary, there was 
nothing else available. ' Knowing that Murray would not agree, Melville's 
exasperation is increasingly obvious as he continues his letter. Indeed, exasperation 
leads to desperation, as exemplified by Melville's curious array of collected evidence: 
a daguerreotype of Greene, a lock of Greene's hair, and an unanswered application to 
the owners of the Acrtsh, u't for proof of Melville's and Greene's desertion. 79 The 
'documentary' verification Murray seeks, though, Melville insists, is simply 
impossible. By the end of his letter, he is so vexed that his pen is literally quaking in 
a panic. In his psychosomatic scrawl, and rushing to beat the day's posting deadline, 
Melville subsumes himself and his evidence in the written page: 'Typee however must 
at last be beleived [sic] on its own account they [Americans] beleive [sic] it here 
now -a little touched up they say but trite. 
"' Not surprisingly, John Murray 
remained unconvinced. 
When the same dispute emerged regarding Omoo, and was accompanied by 
Melville's growing disappointment at the money he was receiving from Murray, his 
77 Melville, Correspondence, 65. 
79 Melville, Correspondence, 55. Cf., Melville's letter to Evert Duyckinck: 'Seriously, Llv 
Dear Sir, this resurrection of Toby from the dead - this strange bringing together of two such places 
as Typee and Buffalo, is really very curious. - It can not but settle the question of the 
book's 
genuineness' (50). 
79 Melville, C'orr-c°sj ondence. 65-66. 
80 Melville, Correspondence. 65-66. 
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sudden transformation whilst writing his third novel, Mardi, is not without reason. 
The first salvo of this, Melville's 'virtual declaration of literary independence', is 
openly expressed in his response to Murray on 25 March 1848: R' 
To be blunt: the work I shall next publish will in downright earnest 
[sic] a "Romance of Polynisian [sic] Adventure" - But why this? The 
truth is, Sir, that the reiterated imputation of being a romancer in 
disguise has at last pricked me into a resolution to show those who may 
take any interest in the matter, that a real romance of mine is no Typee 
or Omoo, and is made of different stuff altogether. '' 
His new direction established, Melville concludes his letter with a flat response to 
Murray's repeated requests of his two previous books: 'I will give no evidence'. 
Realising that he had at this point all but destroyed his professional 
relationship with his British publisher without having a ready replacement, Melville's 
prevaricating follow-up letter on 19 June 1848 effectively attempts to stall for more 
time. It begins by acknowledging Murray's predisposition against romances, but 
shamelessly hopes all the same that he will not only make an exception in Melville's 
case but also considerably increase the amount of his advance! To soften the blow of 
his audacity, or at least to keep Murray reading, Melville goes on to claim that he has 
recently come upon 'two original documents, evidencing the incredible fact, that I 
have actually been a common sailor before the mast in the Pacific'. Voila, proof! The 
truth, however, is far more predictable than Melville's best fiction. On the heels of 
this revelation he then bemoans the fact that even though he at present has somehow 
misplaced the most important of the documents, his publisher's patience will be 
rewarded as soon as he finds them. Of course, the phantom documents were never 
81 Walter E. Bezanson, 'Mobr-Dick: Document, Drama, Dream' MA Companion to. tl(lville 
Studies (cd. John Bryant; New York: Greenwoord Press. 1986), 176. Or, as \Villiam Char\at expresses 
it. 'Sonmetinme between January 1 and March 25.1848, Melville \\ as transformed from a journalist to a 
ýý riter' (Ch. arv at, Profession of Authorship in ;1 rnerieo, 217). 
'2 I\1cIN 1 lle, (correspondence, 106. 
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found, if they ever existed, and Melville lost his British publishing contract eight 
months later. 83 
4. 'And so I tell my life to myself 
At this point it would be deceptively easy to suggest that in hiding 'Melville' 
behind a mask, his pseudonymous pen unwittingly splits Melville himself, that is, by 
virtue of his being a deconstructed 'divided self or ideological 'symbolic fiction', the 
fullness of Melville's identity is structurally deferred, and thus he is never entirely 
himself. What we find in his use of the 'Bradford' mask, and the ensuing circularity of 
'Melville' actively characterised as both Subject and Object, is the dynamic, inherent 
excessiveness of self-characterisation. In the complex notion of self-becoming 
exemplified by Melville's duplicity, subjective autonomy / freedom is only ever 
actualised as such in and by a self-characterisation that is not capable of 
encompassing or circumscribing that which it actualises. In this way, autonomy / 
freedom, as the irreducible excess of self-characterising 'duplicity', retroactively 
initiates its actualisation as autonomy / freedom. " Such is, I argue, the aesthetico- 
theological intensity of self-becoming, whereby the Subject is truly itself, and thus 
truly free, only inasmuch as it miraculously (i. e., retroactively / autopoetically) erupts 
from the immanence of its duplicitous self-characterisation. " 
If, as Frank Ken-node has suggested, there is'a need in the moment of 
R; Melville, Corresppondence, 109,113-15,594. 
" 'Retroactive' because it does not at all precede its actualisation, but acti\cly and 
paradoxically emerges front it. 
85 Though certainly related, this stands in subtle contrast to the postmodern pessimism of one 
like Michel Fouacult, for \\hom'identity, which wie attempt to support and unify under a mask, 
is in 
itself only a parody: it is plural; countless spirits dispute its possession, systems intersect and compete' 
('Nietzsclhc, Genealogy, History' in Essential Works oFFoucault, I954-I9<<'-I: Aesthetics. Method, and 
I'pistcinolo v [\ol. 2: ed. James D. Faubion; Ne\\ York: The New Press, 1994], 386). 
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existence to belong, to be related to a beginning and to an end', " all self-presence is 
necessarily a presentation whose 'subject' is only ever 'becoming'. Indeed, he 
continues, the redemptive self-presentation of fiction would be a necessary one. " 
Apropos Nietzsche's reflections in The Will to Power, Melville carries this necessity 
to its radical, and ultimately theological, end: i. e., a Subject constructed in and as a 
narrative that is never sure how to begin, whose 'becoming must be explained without 
recourse to final intentions ... must appear justified at every moment (or incapable of 
being evaluated; which amounts to the same thing)'. R8 Such is, we might say, the 
autobiographical dilemma of self-becoming, whereby the Subject echoes Nietzsche in 
Ecce Homo: '- and so I tell my life to myself"' In other words, one cannot begin to 
think about the beginning and ending of the Subject without, at the minimum, a tacit 
acknowledgement of its autobiographical structure. 90 
86 Frank Kermode, The Sense of An Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), 4. 
87 Ken-node goes on to suggest that 'we may call books fictive models of the temporal world' 
(Kermode, The Sense of an Ending, 54). C. f., '[W]e experience the "fictionalization" of history as an 
"explanation" for the same reason that we experience great fiction as an illumination of a world that we 
inhabit along with the author. In both we recognize the forms by which consciousness both constitutes 
and colonizes the world it seeks to inhabit' (Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural 
Criticism [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978], 99). 
88 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale; New 
York: Random House, 1967), 377. For further reflections on the construction of the 'fictive self, 
particularly in the wake of deconstruction, note also Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London: 
Methuen, 1980), 56-84; James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, The Self We Live By: Narrative 
Identity in a Postmodern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
89 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals/ Ecce Homo, 221. 
90 Insofar as this is true, we can affirm Derrida's instructive comment: 
And since what interests me today is not strictly called literature or philosophy, I'm 
amused by the idea that my adolescent desire - let's call it that - should have directed 
me toward something in writing which was neither the one nor the other. What was 
it? 'Autobiography' is perhaps the least inadequate name, because it remains for me 
the most enigmatic, the most open, even today (Jacques Derrida, "'This Strange 
Institution Called Literature": An Interview with Jacques Derrida' in Acts of 
Literature /Jacques Derrida [ed. Derek Attridge; trans. Geoffrey Bennington and 
Rachel Bowlby; New York: Routledge, 1992], 34). 
That is to say, the redemptive ambitions of fictive self-presentation mix with those of philosophy and 
aesthetics. It is precisely in this very conjunction, I argue here, similar to what Maurice Blanchot has 
called elsewhere 'the space of literature', that our theological thinking is at all possible. 
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Two experimental novels separated by more than two centuries further 
illustrate the enigma of autobiography exemplified by Melville's duplicitous self- 
presentation. On the one hand, there is Laurence Sterne's Tristram Shandy [ 1760], 
where the very possibilities of self-presentation are put to the test - are, in fact, 
pressed to their breaking point in the introductory story of Tristram's conception. 
Dave Eggers, on the other hand, in his recent 'memoir-y kind of thing'. A 
Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius [2000], grapples with the material question 
of autobiography in his frustratingly forestalled, best-selling attempt to depict the 
deaths of his father and mother - deaths that, he feels, mark his own demise as 
tragically immanent in his life now. Both books, in their narratives of beginnings and 
endings, experience (and revel in) the problematic nature of writing and reading these 
very same narratives, and in this way further contextualise our thinking about 
Melville's sense of self-becoming and duplicity. 
In attempting to tell the stories of his own conception and birth, Tristram 
Shandy recognises and admits a certain debt to his uncle Toby. " Tristram is, of 
course, separated from such events, and instead must rely on Toby's avuncular 
anecdotes to explain, in roundabout fashion, how he came to be called 'Tristram' 
(versus the proper name intended by his father, Trismegistus', which was forgotten by 
the family's chambermaid just prior to the child's christening) as well as'son'. 92 His is, 
in effect, that most ironic of Socratic confessions: 'I know that I do not know' - i. e., 
')1 Laurence Sterne, Tristram Shandy (ed. Howard Anderson; New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 
1980), 3. 
`"- Sterne, Tristram Shandy, 207-08. The misfortunate forgetfulness of Susannah, the 
chambermaid, is in stark contrast to the di\ ine association of the name 'Trismegistus' (thrice-greatest] 
\\ ith the Egyptian god of know ledge and ww isdom, Thoth. 
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the infinite, empty knowledge of one's ignorance. 93 In light of this debt to his uncle, 
the originating, authorial ownership of Tristram's conception remains a mystery, for it 
is as much (if not more) Toby's story as it that of Tristram. On the one hand, Tristram 
needs Toby to fill in the blanks of what he does not and cannot know or depict; on the 
other hand, Toby needs Tristram not only as his anecdote's physical referent, but also 
for his anecdote to be made known, inasmuch as Tristram Shandy (the novel) is itself 
the autobiography Tristram is attempting to write in Tristram Shandy. Theirs is, like 
Melville's dilemma of beginning and ending, a classic dialectic of uncertain 
originality and authority, as the legitimate claim of each is constituted by its own 
fundamental failure as such a claim (and, thus, its relation with the other). Though he 
claims the book he is writing is his 'Life and Opinions', Tristram's 'patriarchal' 
position over the text, his inseminating moment, as it were, is always interrupted. " 
This is something Walter Shandy, Tristram's father, knows all too well. A 
slave to precision and routine, Mr. Shandy had made it a monthly routine ('on the first 
Sunday night of every month throughout the year') to wind by hand the household's 
large clock just prior to having sex with his wife Elizabeth -'in order ... to get them 
all out of the way at one time, and be no more plagued and pester'd with them the rest 
of the month. i9' Unbeknownst to him, however, Mrs. Shandy had developed an 
93 Plato, The Last Days of Socrates (trans. Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant; rev. ed.; 
London: Penguin, 1993), 40-45. Soren Kierkegaard characterises Socrates' ironic subjectivity 
similarly, as'absolute infinite negativity'. 'It is, ' he writes, 'negativity because it negates; it is infinite 
because it negates not this or that phenomenon; and it is absolute because it negates by virtue of a 
higher which is not. Irony establishes nothing, for that which is to be established lies behind it' (The 
Concept of Irony [trans. Lee M. Capel; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965], 278, emphasis 
mine). 
94 Closely related to such interruption is textual digression, for which Tristram Shandy is most 
famous. For example, see Tristram's panegyric to digression: 'Digressions, incontestably, are the 
sunshine; - they are the life, the soul of reading; - take them out of this 
book for instance, - you 
might as well take the book along with them; - one cold eternal winter would reign in every page of 
it; restore them to the writer; - he steps forth like a bridegroom, - 
bids All hail; brings in variety, and 
forbids the appetite to fail' (52). 
`'' Sterne, Tristram Shandy, 4-5. 
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'unhappy association' between her husband's monthly duties, to the extent that she 
'could never hear the said clock wound up, - but the thoughts of some other things 
unavoidably popp'd into her head, & lice tvrsa'. 96 This, of course, leads Tristram 
to recount the moment of his conception on the first Sunday of March 1718, where, in 
a comic case of coitus interruptus, and to Mr. Shandy's puzzlement, his wife enquired: 
Pray, my dear, quoth my mother, have you not forgot to %vind the 
clock? -------Good G----! cried my father, making an exclamation, but 
taking care to moderate his voice at the same time, - Did ever- woinan, 
since the creation of the world, interrupt a man with such a silly 
question? `' 
Tristram's fears (inherited from his father) regarding the personal implications 
of this seemingly nonsensical question at the moment of his conception haunt both his 
life and the telling of his life's story. 'I wish either my father or my mother, or indeed 
both of them, as they were in duty equally bound to it, had minded what they were 
about when they begot me', he laments. 
Well, you may take my word, that nine parts in ten of a man's sense or 
his nonsense, his success and miscarriages in this world depend upon 
their motions and activity, and the different tracks and trains you them 
into; so that when they are once set a-going, whether right or wrong, 
'tis not a halfpenny matter, - away they go cluttering like hey-go- 
mad; and by treading the same steps over and over again, they 
presently make a road of it, as plain and as smooth as a garden-walk, 
which ... the 
Devil himself sometimes shall not be able to drive them 
off it. 98 
His is, he concludes, again parallel to what we have seen to be the case of Melville, 
the lot of a cursed man, whose 'misfortunes began nine months before he ever came 
into the world. "' As such, should the details of his painful, accidental circumcision by 
96 Sterne, Tristram Shandv, 5. 
07 Sterne, Tristram Shand', 2. 
98 Sterne, l ristrain Shanth, 1-2. 
99 Sterne, I ristram Shunth, 3. 
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way of a falling window sash surprise us? '°° Considering Tristram's complex 
relationship with Toby, should we be overly shocked by the latter's own wounded 
groin, 'owing to a blow from a stone, broke off by a ball from the parapet of a horn- 
work at the siege of Namur'? '°' Are not both instances absolutely appropriate? The 
wounds to male pride a scarred penis, an interrupted ejaculation - bleed forth into 
a loss of originating authority; or, in the specific case of the author here, Tristram 
Shandy, the loss of his proper name. Consequently, the lament of Tristram's father for 
his son is equally applicable to his son's eponymous book: 
Unhappy Tristram! child of wrath! child of decrepitude! interruption! 
mistake! and discontent! What one misfortune or disaster in the book 
of embryotic evils, that could unmechanize thy frame, or entangle thy 
filaments! which has not fallen upon thy head, or ever thou camest into 
the world - what evils in thy passage into it! What evils since! 
102 
It is enough for now simply to suggest that Tristram Shandy's (and thus, too, Tristram 
Shandv's) unfortunate 'weaknesses both of body and mind, which no skill of the 
physician or the philosopher could ever afterwards have set thoroughly to rights' are 
the problematic, ostensible effects and emblems (i. e., 'a foundation [that] had been 
laid') of self-presentation. 103 The surprising consequence is that such a characteristic 
'weakness' also marks both the possibility and the impossibility of beginning Tristram 
Shandy, for its reader and writer alike. '04 
Dave Eggers's depiction of his parents' deaths proves to be no less troubled a 
too Sterne, Tristram Shandy, 264-65. 
101 Sterne, Tristram Shandy, 48 (emphasis mine). 
102 Sterne, Tristram Shandy, 215. 
103 Sterne, Tristram Shandv, 3 
10' Tristram realises that his text is as broken as he, and that its fragility is what keeps it in 
motion, and is its truth. He writes: 'This is Nile ww ork. - For which reason, from the beginning of this. 
you see, I have constructed the main ww ork and the adventitious parts of it with such intersections, and 
have so complicated and involved the digressive and progressive movements, one NN heel \N ithin 
another, that the whole machine, in general, has been kept a-going; - and, \N hat's more, it shall be kept 
, t-going these forty `ears. if it pleases the fountain of health to bless me so long ww ith life and good 
spirits' (Sterne. Tristram Shandy. 52). 
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self-presentation. Viciously playful, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius 
revels in its incendiary tendencies, exploring the fissures that make reading and 
writing possible. For instance, of its dialogue Eggers writes: 
This has of course been almost entirely reconstructed. The dialogue. 
though all essentially true except that which is obviously not true, as 
when people break out of their narrative time-space continuum to 
cloyingly talk about the book itself - has been written from memory, 
and reflects both the author's memory's limitations and his 
imagination's nudgings. '°5 
Here, Eggers reflects his willingness to instil in his 'true story' a significant structural 
play (i. e., a degree of'give' or 'slack'), whereby nonfictional characters carry a latent 
potential as fictional creations. 10' 
Though in its original hardback release, real names (and in many cases, phone 
numbers) were used 'to prove that one could be completely factual, and still tell a 
story that felt and read novelistic, somewhat timeless, at least fluid' some had to be 
changed when certain friends, those presumably more squeamish than Eggers about 
openly airing their dirty laundry, requested noms de guerre. 107 Eggers, of course, is 
savvy enough to recognise that nobody wants to show up at a masquerade ball and be 
the only one in costume, so he suggests his readers should also feel welcome to 
change characters' names. In fact, he offers to send, upon request, a digital copy of 
the book on a 3.5" floppy disk, suggesting that 'using the search-and-replace function 
105 Dave Eggers, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius (New York: Vintage, 2000), ix. 
106 Admittedly, 'play' has become for some critics, often for very good reason, a game whose 
sense of novelty has been effectively played out (often quite poorly). My intention in using it here is 
neither strictly rehabilitative or corrective, but mostly a resistance to the notion that 'play' can only c\er 
be understood as a free, frivolous or pleasurable postmodern watchword that, in my experience, has a 
tendency to shut down far more constructive conversations than it starts. 
107 Da%e Eggers, 'Mistakes We Knew We Were Making: Notes Corrections Clarifications 
C'larificcations. -1 pp<ologies Addenda', Appendix to A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, 9. His 
rationale for changing names in the paperback edition is that he had 'lost my taste for this sort of 
courage.... In a few cases, ww here I had originally lashed out at real people in backhanded ways. and 
used their real names in doing so, I have removed or softened these parts, because in the last year, I',. e 
also, almost completely, lost my taste for blood' (12). 
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your computer surely features, readers should be able to change all the names within. 
from the main characters down to the smallest cameos. (This could be about you! 
You and. vourr pals! )i10R Which is to say, the mask Eggers presents his reader is not 
intended solely for his book's characters. In a concession to those readers who are 
bothered by the notion of reading a memoir, or perhaps simply by the idea of reading 
his, Eggers invites his reader'to do what the author should have done, and what 
authors and readers have been doing since the beginning of time: PRETEND IT'S 
FICTION 1.109 However, not unlike the self-destructive apocalypticism at the core of 
the duplicity in Melville's earliest correspondence and novels, Egger's invitation belies 
the deathly excess that ultimately renders his text disturbingly distended. 
The nine-page preface to A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius is but 
one aspect of Eggers' desperate attempt to stall writing about his parents' deaths. 
Because these deaths (especially that of his mother) are the impetus for both the story 
he tells and the fact that he is telling it at all, identifying the beginning of Egger's self- 
presentation, as we have seen in Melville and in Tristram Shandy, is no easy task. 
Prior to the preface, for instance, which includes explanatory notes and passages he 
excluded from the main text, his book would seem to begin with a one page 'Rules 
and Suggestions for Enjoyment of this Book'- wherein, again like Tristram Shandy, 
Eggers points out sections of the book that are perhaps more important to read than 
others, attesting to the 'nice novella length' of chapters one through four, and how 'the 
book thereafter is kind of uneven'. 1' Immediately following the preface, where one 
typically expects a book's 'beginning' to begin (is it not normal, in fact, for many 
108 Eggers, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, xxix-xxv. 
109 Eggers, ;1 Heartbreaking lVork of Staggering Genius, xxiii-xxivý. 
110 l ugcrs, / Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, vii. Cf., Tristram's apologies and 
rationalisations in /ristrarn Shandy for his wanton digressions and tedious telling of details (Sterne, 
I ristrum Shand Y, 6-7; cf.. 4.203-0 5). 
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people to skip a book's preface, to consider it superfluous to the work's actual 
content? ), Eggers unveils a table of contents, which belatedly includes the 
aforementioned 'Rules and Suggestions' and Preface sections. Next is a self- 
consciously rambling twenty-five-page Acknowledgements section, which Eggers 
tries to explain in the appendix of his memoir's paperback edition, 'Mistakes We 
Knew We Were Making': 
[T]he Acknowledgements were written before the rest of the book, as 
both an organizational device and a stalling mechanism. I was not 
looking forward to writing the first chapter, and wasn't sure if I could 
write those thereafter, so I had a nice time fiddling with the front 
matter, which came easily, and helped me to shape the book in my 
head before starting into it. ''' 
In fact, prior even to the 'Rules and Suggestions' that precede the preface, the 
ostensible beginning of this most ironic of novels, Eggers goes so far as to experiment 
with the copyright page, where he includes, as a supplement to the obligatory legal 
information that details his (and his publisher's) textual ownership, his height and 
weight, eye and hair colour, as well as descriptions of his hands, allergies, and sexual 
preference. "Z 
My point here is not to anathematise or applaud Eggers's book, or to judge the 
merits of his sarcastic revelry (its reviewers have already been quick enough to do 
both). Moreover, neither is it to contradict his claim to have included such material 
and played with such structures simply 'because doing so is fun. ' Rather, apropos the 
autobiographical dilemma of self-becoming mentioned above in regard to Melville 
IM Eggers, 'Mistakes We Knew We Were Making', 16. 
112 Furthering the point made above about characterization, Eggers adds here: 'This is a work 
of fiction, only in that in many cases, the author could not remember the exact words said by certain 
people, and exact descriptions of certain things, so had to fill in gaps as best he could. Otherwise, all 
characters and incidents and dialogue are real, are not products of the author's imagination, because at 
the time of this writing, the author had no imagination whatsoe\er for those sorts of things, and could 
not conceive of making uqp a story or characters' (Eggers, A Heartbreaking IVork, copyright page). 
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and Tristram Shandy, I mean only to point to the parallel implications of Eggers's 
difficulty in beginning to write his text alongside that of his readers' difficulty in 
beginning to read it. 
The sudden death of Eggers's parents made him feel that he, like Melville, was 
marked for an imminent death; that death was, in fact, already inside him, biding its 
time. Eggers relays this notion in his Acknowledgements section, under the section 
labeled'The Aspect Having To Do With (Perhaps) Inherited Fatalism': 
This part concerns the unshakeable feeling one gets, one thinks, after 
the unthinkable and unexplainable happens - the feeling that, if this 
person can die, and that person can die, and this can happen and that 
can happen ... well, then, what exactly is preventing everything from happening to this person, he around whom everything else 
happened? 13 
Consequently, not only is he convinced, as he says several times throughout the 
memoir, that he probably already has AIDS, that disease, any disease, is almost 
undoubtedly already killing him, but also that 'each and every time an elevator door 
opens, there will be standing, in a trenchcoat, a man, with a gun, who will fire one 
bullet, straight into [me], killing [me] instantly'. '" In a perhaps unconscious nod to 
Nietzsche, with whom we began thinking about the linkage of autobiography and self- 
presentation, Eggers's memoir ends as appropriately and equivocally as it begins. 
That is to say, in a self-destructive sacrifice to his readers, the community with whom 
he wishes to identify and seek identity. ' 15 
113 Eggers, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, xxxiii. 
1 14 Eggers, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, xxxiv. Of this fantasy Eggers ww rites: 
'I have no idea \\hy I fear this, expected it to happen. I even knew how I would react to this bullet 
coming from the cIc\ator door, what word I would say. That Nord «as: Finally' ('Mistakes We Knew 
We Were Making', 17). 
1 1` Cf., Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings (eds. Raymond Gruss 
and Ronald peirs; trans. Ronald Speirs; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). In a frenzy 
of modern Dionysian prose. Eggers devours himself: 
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Nevertheless, as was the case with Melville's desire for annihilation, death is 
nothing one awaits or that arrives. Although the strained and digressive self- 
presentations (be it of beginnings and/or endings) of Sterne, Eggers, and Melville are 
certainly divided, this is a far cry from the too-hastily announced 'impossiblity' that so 
many continue to ascribe to subjectivity - i. e., as that which is wholly other and 
eternally deferred. Though the parlance may at first glance be the same, my premise 
is fundamentally different. Namely, that the purportedly deferred impossibility of the 
author (and thus, we might add, also the reader), the (still)birth of tragedy, as it were, 
is an impossibility that happens in the active self-becoming of subjective 
characterisation. 
5. The Aesthetics of Duplicitous Self-Creation 
The precipitous rise and fall of Melville's eleven-year writing career has been 
well-documented, with most biographers highlighting the differences between the 
'early Melville' of Typee and Omoo, Melville as 'truth-seeker' in Mardi and Moby- 
Dick, and Melville as'truth-denier' in Pierre and The Confidence-Man. 16 While I do 
not mean to suggest that one should read the all-encompassing duplicity of a novel 
like The Confidence-Man the same way one reads the (relatively) more 
Don't you know that I am connected to you? Don't you know that I'm trying to pump 
blood to you, that this is for you, that I hate you people, so many of you 
motherfuckers - When you sleep I want you never to wake up, so many of you I 
want you to just fucking sleep it away because I only want you to run under with me 
on this sand like Indians, if you're going to fucking sleep all day fuck you 
motherfuckers oh when you're all sleeping so many sleeping I am somewhere on 
some stupid rickety scaffolding and I'm trying to show you this, just been trying to 
show you this - What the fuck does it take to show you motherfuckers, what does it 
fucking take what do you want how much do you want because I am willing and I'll 
stand before you and I'll raise my arms and give you my chest and throat and wait, 
and I've been so old for so long, for you, for you, I want it fast and right through me 
- Oh do it, do it, you motherfuckers, do it do it you fuckers finally finally finally 
(Eggers, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, 436-37). 
116 For example, see Nathalia Wright, 'Form and Function in Melville' Publication of the 
Modern Language Association 67 (June 1952): 330-340. 
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straightforward travel epic Typee, thus subsuming Melville's authorial beginning and 
ending, I have sought in this chapter to show that the intertwining of duplicity and 
self-presentation is not exclusive to his final novel. "' Indeed, in light of the problems 
regarding autobiographical self-presentation highlighted above, what would it mean to 
accept Typee (and thus, too, Melville's inaugural self-presentation as an author) as 
Melville says we must: i. e., on'its own account'? 
Where might one begin this multitudinous text, in which the author seems to 
prefer outside sources over his own experiences? As Charles Anderson notes, this 
outside influence was so strong that Melville 'almost habitually leaned upon his 
authorities even in matters with which he certainly must have had a first-hand 
acquaintance. For some reason, he preferred to work from the descriptions of 
previous authors, which he found ready at hand ... sometimes even retaining the 
exact phraseology of his original. " 18 Melville copied so much, Anderson continues, 
that he probably could have written his alleged first-person narrative of adventures on 
the Marquesas Islands without ever having so much as seen them. 19 Hershel Parker, 
perhaps the most noted Melville scholar of the past forty years, agrees: 
All in all, the evidence seems to show that Melville's last-minute 
cobbling was not inspired by his publisher but by his own desire to eke 
117 Edgar Dryden comes to a similar conclusion in his examination of Melville's fictional form, 
but the openness he finds in Melville's early narrators to their outright fictionalization of identity is 
ultimately diluted because he unreflectively begs the question. To say that a narrator 'fictionalizes his 
earlier experience in an attempt to define its truth or meaning to himself and to his reader', or that by 
'turning his experience into a story, he places himself outside of that experience - in effect, treats it as 
though it belonged to someone else' misses the evolutionary, autopoetic dynamics in which the nuances 
of Melville's later thinking revels (Melville's Thematics of Form: The Great Art of Telling the Truth 
[New York: Knopf, 1968], 35,36-37). 
11K Charles Robert Anderson, Melville in the South Seas (New York: Dover, 1939), 146. 
Anderson is thinking specifically of Captain David Porter's Journal of a Cruise Made to the Pacific 
Ocean in the U. S. Frigate Essex, in the Years 1812,1813, and 1814 [18151, Charles S. Stewart's A Visit 
to the South Seas, in the U. S. Ship Vincennes, During the Years 1829 and 1830 [1831], and William 
Ellis' Polynesian Researches [1829] (118-19). Ina passage deleted from the American revised edition, 
the narrator of Tepee admits having read Stewart and Ellis, but not Porter (Melville, Tvpee, 5-6). 
1 19 Anderson, Melville in the South Seas, 166. 
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out his brief impressions from his four weeks among the Typeeans 
(rather than the four months he was claiming), plundering sourcebooks 
for passages which could be rewritten as his own experiences. 120 
Although critics like Anderson and Parker resist charging Melville with outright 
plagiarism, "' Elizabeth Renker points out that their defences 'suggest most forcefully 
the felt presence of the "charge" rather than its dismissal. "" The anecdotal fact that 
Typee's financial fortunes were significantly diminished by the widespread British 
distribution of Routledge's rogue version is but one of the parallels to Melville's own 
textual piracy. "' Indeed, it was also in Britain that the manuscript of Omoo was 
seized as contraband by a Customs' Officer while in en route to John Murray for final 
approval, 'under the pretence of its being an American reprint of an English work. ' 124 
Like a counterfeit coin, Melville's text, from the beginning, had been manufactured by 
and circulated in a network of impropriety that inevitably he could not completely 
control. 
120 Hershel Parker, 'Evidences for "Late Insertions" in Melville's Works' Studies in the Novell 
(1975): 413. 
121 'Melville transformed his borrowings with such skill that the charge of plagiarism is 
inadmissible', Howard Vincent concludes (The Trying-Out of 'Moby-Dick' [Kent, Oh.: Kent State 
University Press, 1980], 6). Gordon Roper, responding to similar 'borrowings' in Melville's second 
book, Omoo, argues that they'were not those of a plagiarist'. Rather, they were simply intended to fill 
in the gaps of his first-hand experience ('Historical Note' in Omoo: A Narrative of Adventures in the 
South Seas in The Writings of Herman Melville [eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas 
Tanselle; vol. 2; Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press and The Newberry Library, 
1968], 325). 
122 Renker, Strike Through the Mask, 3. In her chapter on plagiarism in Typee, Renker 
explores Melville's self-consciousness about his 'borrowings' and how this haunts him throughout the 
book in the form of tattooing (1-23). 
123 See Howard, 'Historical Note, 297-98; Leyda, The Melville Log, 2: 921. Despite its general 
popularity, Typee was not an overwhelming bestseller in either America or Britain. Though Melville 
made $2,000 from the book, this came over a span of forty-one years, leaving Melville in 1846-47 
scrambling to make ends meet. Even after he was able to secure a more lucrative publishing contract 
- at least until the financial failure of Moby-Dick in 1851 and the complete 
fallout with his readers and 
publishers a year later - and he was making more money than most other American authors of the 
day, Melville had a propensity for taking on ill-advised debt. For additional reading on Melville's 
income, see Charvat, The Profession of Authorship in America, 190-203. 
124 Leyda, The Melville Log, 1: 236-37. 
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Moreover, when Anderson suggests that one should not be too critical of 
Melville, because his 'borrowings' are merely the manifestations of a young man 
'conscious of his own inexperience as a writer', "' he fails to fully appreciate that the 
conscious inexperience that so distinguishes the beginning of Melville's writing career 
is itself manifested by the self-destructive appropriation of disparate voices. 126 For 
Melville, as seen above, when the consistent point of contention is that of one's 
character, be it a question of one's morality or one's identity, the true authorial victory 
(i. e., that of self-assertion) is always in the form of a self-violence. That is to say, it is 
not merely that Melville somehow furtively benefits from this violence. On the 
contrary, the authorial 'victory' is essentially Pyrrhic in the sense that while it has 
always already been won, i. e., the Subject is asserted as 'Subject', it is won 
retroactively, and thus by virtue of the inherent excess of a duplicitous self- 
characterisation. As such, unthinkable, impossible freedom erupts from and disrupts 
the closed circularity of self-assertion in the guise of self-destructiveness (and vice 
versa), but also sustains the repressive desire for such closure. What we find in 
Melville, in other words, is the problematic self-becoming of the modem Subject. It 
is precisely in this relation of subjectivity to masques and masquerades, I argue, that 
Melville exemplifies the profound possibilities of recasting theology in the aesthetic 
light of its self-characterisation / autopoesis. 
That Melville's creative / poetic disingenuousness is evident as early as Tvpee 
offers then salient credence to Warwick Wadlington's suggested 'inchoate' affinities 
125 Anderson, Melville on the South Seas, 126. 
i2( John Bryant notes that Melville's dilemma, and what I would contend makes it peculiarly 
self-destructive, insofar as this is possible, is that 'he was publishing 
false goods and knew it' (, t/clti'ille 
and Repose. - The Rhetoric of Humor in the American 
Renaissance [\e\\ York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993], p. 132). 
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between Melville's first and last novel. 'Z' In this way, the difference between the two 
books of faith that frame Melville's beginning and ending, "' which the London 
Literary Gazette regarded, respectively, as an April Fool's joke and the product of a 
'March hare with a literary turn of mind', 129 is not one simply of measured degree, but 
rather one of performative complexity. "' 
How, then, does one accept Typee on'its own account', in light of the 
confession that it has been "'spun as a yarn, " not only to relieve the weariness of many 
a night-watch at sea, but to excite the sympathies of the author's shipmates'? 13' For his 
part, Tommo / Melville rationalises that the three-year separation of event and 
narration, not to mention the 'very peculiar circumstances in which he was placed', 
excuses him from the normal conventions of journalistic writing. The narrative 
technique employed here, explains Wadlington, is that of 'the picturesque sense of 
127 Warwick Wadlington, The Confidence Game in American Literature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1975), 62. I consistently refer to The Confidence-Man as Melville's final novel, due 
to Billy Budd's posthumous discovery, editing, and publication, as well as my focus on the period of 
Melville's 'professional' writing career. In terms of William Charvat's definition of 'professional' 
writing, Melville's writing career was finished after the publication of The Confidence-Man (1857). In 
not considering Billy Budd (or his poetry, for that matter) a 'professional' work, I am not depreciating 
its contribution to the dynamic I find at work in Melville's fiction. On the contrary, in returning to the 
water yet again, even beyond his death, one cannot help but think Melville's (literary) ending as 
troubled as its beginning, for it is inasmuch as it is always being re-enacted upon the variegated 
imbroglio of posthumous perspectives and interactions of editors and readers who wish to regard it as 
Melville's 'final word'. 
128 The theme of faith, or confidence, that is seemingly so forthright in The Confidence-Man, 
is also vital to the 'journalistic' integrity of Typee's narrator. Near the beginning of his tale, he pledges: 
'I may here state, on my faith as an honest man ... 
' (Melville, Typee, 23) 
129 See n. 43. The Gazette's review of The Confidence-Man goes on to suggest that the book 
itself was 'a hoax on the public - an emulation of Barnum. Perhaps the mild man in mourning, who 
goes about requesting everybody to put confidence in him, is an emblem of Melville himself (Branch, 
Melville, 373,375). The Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review, who, unlike most reviewers, 
actually enjoyed Melville's more imaginative fiction over his 'South Pacific travels', suggested that The 
Confidence-Man's 'hero' was actually much'like Melville in his earlier works, ask[ing] confidence of 
everybody under different masks of mendicancy' (385). 
130 This is where I part company with Wadlington, who seems to regard the difference as one 
of degree when he writes: 'I mean to argue that ... 
in Moby-Dick and The Confidence-Man he succeeds 
in transposing the merely rhetorical-personal into the superpersonal by the sheerest and most durable of 
margins' (The Confidence Game in American Literature, 53). 
131 Melville, Typee, xiii. 
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nearness-with-distance', whereby Melville creates an 'illusion of unmediated 
involvement'. "' Indeed, while Typee's Preface ends with an affirmation that the book 
had been written in 'the desire to speak the unvarnished truth', it is vital we not ignore 
the self-conscious irony that it never actually says it does so successfully? 133 As such, 
the result is a piece of writing that is neither pure journalism nor pure fiction. 1 ' 
Or, as Nina Baym argues in her important essay on Melville's 'quarrel' with the 
fictional form, he not only effectively breaches his 'genre contract' with journalistic 
travel writing, but also with that of fiction. ' 35 While the finality of her claim that 'none 
of Melville's longer works are wholly or even mainly fiction' hints at a rather limited 
conception of fiction, the examples she cites of Melville's repeated ruptures of the 
novel, as form and genre, are persuasive. In light of this, and in partial agreement 
with the argument developed by Gustaaf van Cromphout, I will explain in Chapter 
Two why this quarrel with fiction, as a self-stable genre and form, is itself indicative 
of Melville's complex engagement with it, whose importance is finally borne out in 
the conception of subjectivity that emerges from his flirtations with the early 
Romantic conception of the novel as the genre of infinite reflection. 136 
132 Wadlington, The Confidence Game in American Literature, 57,51 (my emphasis). 
133 Typee, xiv. Leon Howard observes this important detail in his reflections on whether 
Typee should be regarded as fact or fiction, in his'Historical Note', 293. 
134 For fictional elements and techniques in Typee, see Howard, 'Historical Note', 291-93; 
Wadlington, The Confidence Game in American Literature, 56-68; John Samson, 'The Dynamics of 
History and Fiction in Melville's Typee' American Quarterly 36 (Summer 1984): 276-90; Robert A. 
Lee, "'Varnishing the Facts": Typee and the Art of Melville's Early Fiction' Durham University Journal 
72 (1980): 203-09; Michael Clark, 'Melville's Typee: Fact, Fiction, and Esthetics' Arizona Quarterly 34 
(1978): 351-70. 
135 Nina Baym, 'Melville's Quarrel with Fiction' PMLA 94 (October 1979), 910. Cf., Brian 
Higgins and Hershel Parker, 'The Flawed Grandeur of Melville's Pierre' in New Perspectives on 
Melville (ed. Faith Pullin; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1978), 162; R. P. Blackmur, The 
Lion and the Honeycomb: Essays in Critique (New York: Harcourt, 1955), 162. For a contemporary 
re-examination of this genre, at least implicitly so, see Jacques Derrida, 'The Law of Genre' in 
Modern 
Genre Theory (trans., Avital Ronell; Harlow, England: Longman, 2000), 219-31. 
136 Gustaaf van Cromphout, 'Melville as Novelist: The German Example' Studies in American 
Fiction 13 (Spring, 1985): 31-44. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
MELVILLE AND GERMAN ROMANTICISM 
1. Riding the 'High German Horse' 
By 1848, due to the relative success of his first two novels, Melville was 
clearly enjoying the social circle afforded him by Evert Duyckinck's'cellar', in which, 
amidst cigar smoke and copious amounts of brandy, he kept company with other New 
York artists and writers and discussed the culture of the day. 137 Of even more 
importance, however, inclusion in this boy's club also opened to Melville's disposal 
Duyckinck's massive library of sixteen thousand volumes. Drawing from the libraries 
of both Duyckinck and the New York Society, as well as what he could buy with his 
five hundred dollar advance from Harpers, Melville's intellectual appetite at this time 
was rapacious. Amongst the volumes he consumed between 1848 and 1850 were four 
volumes of Thomas Browne; three of Rabelais; Jean Paul's Flower, Fruit and Thorn 
Pieces; Carlyle's Sartor Resartus and the two-volume German Romance; Frithiofs 
Saga, by Esaias Tegner; David Hartley's Observations on Man; a volume of 
Shakespeare; 13' Goethe's Autobiography and Wilhelm Meister (Carlyle's translation); 
137 Melville's relationship with Duyckinck has received a great deal of attention, most of it 
grounded only on scant pieces of epistolary evidence. It remains an important consideration, however, 
because his presence (and eventual lack thereof) cannot help but be noticed throughout Melville's 
career as a novelist. Their relationship is dealt with at length in Watson Branch, Hershel Parker, and 
Harrison Hayford, 'Historical Note' in The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, by Herman Melville 
(eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle; vol. 10; Evanston and Chicago: 
Northwestern University Press and The Newberry Library, 1984), 257-76; Jonathan A. Cook, Satirical 
Apocalypse: An Anatomy of Melville's The Confidence-Man (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1996), 133-42; Donald Kay, 'Herman Melville's Literary Relationship with Evert Duyckinck' College 
Language Association Journal 18 (1975): 393- 403; and Daniel A. Wells, "'Bartleby the Scrivener, " 
Poe, and the Duyckinck Circle' ESQ: A Journal of the American Renaissance 21 (First Quarter, 1975): 
35-39. 
138 Shakespeare made a particularly strong impression on Melville: 'Dolt & ass that I am I 
haNc 11\ cd more than 29 years, & until a fcNN days ago, never made close acquaintance with the divine 
William. Ah. he's full of sermons-on-the-mount, and gentle, aye, almost as Jesus. I take such men to 
be inspired. I fancy that this moment Shakspearc [sic] in hea\en ranks with Gabriel Raphael and 
Michael. And if another Messiah ever comes twill be in Shakespere's [sic] person. ---- I am mad to 
think how minute a cause has prevented me hitherto from reading Shakespeare. But until now, e\erv 
.ýl 
Defoe's The Fortuulate Mistress; a complete edition of Burton's Anatomy of 
Melancholy; Coleridge's Biographia Literaria; and one well-thumbed copy of 
Seneca's Morals by Way of Abstract. 
"' 
Much of Melville's choice of reading, it should be noted, was not primarily 
that of individual whimsy. It was, rather, highly indicative of the literary culture into 
which he had recently thrown himself. If, according to the North American Review in 
1840, the positive reception of Goethe and Romanticism % is the likes of Thomas 
Carlyle14° and Samuel Taylor Coleridge"' portended a'German mania' prevailing over 
the American literary scene, by 1848 Melville was downright infected. 14' And while it 
is ultimately impossible to know the full extent Melville read and comprehended 
everything he checked out, purchased or browsed, and far beyond the aim of this 
chapter to even attempt to do so, it is certainly the case that what he did read 
(especially Carlyle and Coleridge) deeply affected the style and content of what he 
wanted to write. 143 Indeed, most commentators agree, such reading should probably 
be credited as the impetus for his declaration to John Murray during their dispute 
about his novels' historicity: 'My instinct is to out with the Romance. "" 
The sheer breadth of Melville's reading whilst writing his third novel, Mardi, 
copy unendurable to my eyes which are tender as young sparrows. But chancing to fall in with this 
glorious edition, I now exult over it, page after page' (Melville, Correspondence, 119). 
139 Cf., Merton M. Sealts, Jr., Melville's Reading (rev. ed.; Columbia, S. C.: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1988), 32-43; cf., 59-72. 
140 Henry A. Pochmann, German Culture in America: German Culture in America: 
Philosophical and Literary Influences, 1600-1900 (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press. 
1961), 96-100. 
141 Pochmann, German Culture in America, 96-100. 
14' Qtd. in Cromphout, 'Melville as Novelist', 32. By 1848, The Literani World added, 'What 
man or woman of cultivation does not, at this epoch', take an interest in 'the fanciful and fascinating 
literature of the Germans'. 
143 (, f., Pochmann, German Culture in America, 436-440,755-60 n. 235-65. Pochmann's \work 
remains unparalleled in its presentation of the Germanic influence so readily available to, and so 
eagerly devoured by, Melville. 
144 N1clv, illc, Correspondence, 106. 
, 1) 
is, we find, strikingly parallel to its sophomoric aspirations. Though the novel is tilled 
with instances of profound beauty, as well as many moments of drama and comedy 
reminiscent of his first two novels, it is difficult not to find it a very frustrating book 
actually to read. George Ripley's review for the New York Tribune sums up the 
general opinion at the time: 
We have seldom found our reading faculty so near exhaustion, or our 
good nature as critics so severely exercised, as in an attempt to get 
through this new work by the author of the fascinating Tepee and 
Omoo. If we had never heard of Mr. Melville before, we should soon 
have laid aside his book, as a monstrous compound of Carlyle, Jean- 
Paul, and Sterne. '45 
If the first forty chapters were at all representative of the rest of the book, Mardi 
undoubtedly would have gone on to become another seafaring success. In these early 
chapters (i. e., volume one of the first British edition), the action is fast and furious. 
The narrator and his 'chummy' shipmate, Jarl, jump ship from the whaler Arcturion, 
taking refuge for sixteen days in a small boat out on the open seas; whereupon they 
encounter another ship, the Parki, abandoned save for an argumentative Polynesian 
couple, Samoa and his ill-tempered wife Annatoo, who recount the dramatic story of 
having survived the massacre of their shipmates by islanders; a storm sinks the Parki, 
killing Annatoo and forcing the three men back to the small boat; they happen upon 
another small boat filled with natives, where a beautiful woman named Yillah is held 
captive as a sacrifice; the three men rescue her and kill the head priest; Yillah 
inexplicably transforms from a olive-skinned brunette into a blue-eyed blonde, and 
just as inexplicably disappears. Though Melville's use of the supernatural at this point 
of an otherwise straight forward 'travel narrative' was risky, and would undoubtedly 
lose a few readers here and there, lack of any real, substantive plot from Chapter Forty 
ýa Branch, Melville, 161, cf. 139-82. 
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on would effectively alienate those who remained. It did not take readers long to 
realise that the ensuing quest for Yillah, which for long portions of the massive novel 
is not even mentioned, was simply a means for Melville to process all too openly the 
new intellectual world his reading and reflecting had disclosed to him. "' 
If the reviewers of Mardi, like Fitz-James O'Brien in a retrospective analysis 
of Melville in 1857, had hoped that a voyage to the 'Old World' might cure him and 
his writing of the dreaded'German disease', i. e., that upon his return he would be 
ready once again 'to give us pictures of life and reality', "' he was set to disappoint 
them greatly. As a matter of fact, but two days into such a journey in 1849, Melville 
was introduced to the respected German scholar George Adler, who was travelling 
abroad to recuperate from the completion of his multi-volume English-German 
lexicon, a project, it was said, that had nearly driven him insane. 148 For forty days, 
Melville's journals report, he and the 'Coleridgean' Adler were almost inseparable, 
eating breakfast with one another in the mornings, walking the deck of the 
Southampton or touring London and Paris during the afternoon, and drinking whiskey 
while talking 'high German metaphysics' late into the evening. In one entry, Melville 
writes: 
146 The result was, not surprisingly, a financial disaster. Melville's new English publisher, 
Richard Bentley, sums up the result in a letter to Melville: 'the first volume [the first forty chapters] 
was eagerly devoured, the second was read - but the third was not perhaps altogether adapted to the 
class of readers whom "Omoo" and "Typee", and the First Volume of "Mardi" gratified' (Melville, 
Correspondence, 596). For specific sales figures, see Charvat, The Profession of Authorship in 
America, 231, and Elizabeth Foster, 'Historical Note' in Mardi and Voyage Thither, by Herman 
Melville (eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle; vol. 3; Evanston and 
Chicago: Northwestern University Press and The Newberry Library, 1970), 670. 
147 Branch, Melville, 367. 
' It should be noted, incidentally, that upon returning to New York in 1852, Adler's 
hallucinations and paranoia soon returned, and ultimately led in 1853 to his permanent 
institutionalisation. Cf., George J. Adler, Letters of a Lunatic: or, A Brief Exposition of My Universitti 
Life, during the Years, 1853-54 (New York: privately published, 1854). For additional biographical 
information on Adler, see Herman Melville, Journals, in The Writings of Herman Melville (ed. 
Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle; vol. 15; Evanston and Chicago: 
Northwestern University Press and The Newberry Library, 1989), 251-52; Sanford E. Marovitz, 'More 
Chartless Voyaging: Melville and Adler at Sea' Studies in the American Renaissance (1986): 373-84. 
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I forgot to mention, that last night about 9 1l2 P. M. Adler & Taylor 
came into my room, & it was proposed to have whiskey punches, 
which we did have, accordingly. Adler drank about three table spoons 
full - Taylor 4 or five tumblers &c. We had an extraordinary time & 
did not break up till after two in the morning. We talked metaphysics 
continually, & Hegel, Schlegel, Kant &c. were discussed under the 
influence of the whiskey. '49 
Such was the pattern, set early in the voyage, of Melville's intoxicated excursions of 
mind aboard what he called 'the high German horse'. "O 
In the rest of this chapter, I will demonstrate that in the explicit manoeuvres / 
declarations of works like Mardi and'Hawthorne and his Mosses', as xell as the 
implicit structure of self-destruction / self-creation described in Chapter One, Melville 
shares with early German Romanticism in particular a similar conceptualisation of the 
Self and the Absolute. In what follows here and in Chapter Three, the theoretical and 
aesthetic perspectives of Romantic subjectivity, as embodied in and articulated by the 
Romantic theory of the novel, are read in terms of their philosophical and historical 
context - specifically, the critical philosophy of Kant, and then the speculative 
idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. 15' In this way, the profound similarities, and 
ultimately differences, between Melville and early German Romanticism will become 
explicit, and will form the basis for our thinking in Chapter Four of Melville's vital 
role as an exemplar for contemporary aesthetico-theological awareness. 
2. Kantian Apperception and the Art of Schematism 
The purpose of critical philosophy, according to Kant, was maturity, as 
opposed to the 'self-incurred immaturity' evident in the all-too-common 'inability to 
149 Melville, Joournals, 8. 
tso Ic] vi lie, Journals, 9. 
151 1 confine my reflections in the present chapter to early Romanticism's philosophical 
forebears, Kant and Fichte. Both Schelling and Hegel, however, will prose pivotal in Chapter Three to 
the re-contextualisation of Melville's reserNations about the Romantic project. 
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use one's understanding without the guidance of another. "52 Moreover, he continues, 
'For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. "" In the end, then, all 
that was necessary for mature thinking was courage - the willingness truly to think 
freely. Kant envisioned the intellectual progression as analogous to the stages of life, 
from the infancy of dogmatism to the maturity of scepticism (optimistically omitting, 
Melville would surely point out, the fourth stage of life, decay): 
The first step in matters of pure reason, marking its infancy, is 
dogmatic. The second step is sceptical; and indicates that experience 
has rendered our judgment wiser and more circumspect. But a third 
step, such as can be taken only by fully matured judgment, based on 
assured principles of proved universality, is now necessary, namely, to 
subject to examination, not the facts of reason, but reason itself, in the 
whole extent of its powers, and as regards its aptitude for pure a priori 
modes of knowledge. This is not the censorship but the criticism of 
reason, whereby not its present bounds but its determinate [and 
necessary] limits, not its ignorance on this or that point but its 
ignorance in regard to all possible questions of a certain kind, are 
demonstrated from principles, and not merely arrived at by way of 
conj ecture. 'sa 
It is not, Kant continues, that scepticism is a 'permanent settlement', or an end unto 
itself; rather, it is a'resting-place' [Wohnplatz] that affords a critical perspective on 
that which one holds to be dogmatically true. "' 
152 Immanuel Kant, 'An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment? "' in Kant's Political 
Writings (ed. Hans Reiss; trans. H. B. Nisbet; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54. 
153 Kant, 'An Answer to the Question', 55. 
154 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (trans. Norman Kemp Smith; New York: 
Macmillan, 1929), 607 (A761 / B789). Kant published two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason in 
1781 and 1787. There were substantial changes in the second edition, and scholars continue to argue 
about the ways some very crucial issues seem to be treated differently in the two editions, which 
in turn 
leads to arguments about the alleged superiority of one edition over another, their mutual consistency 
or lack of consistency, and so forth. In the footnotes, I follow the well-established practice of citing 
both editions, the 1781 edition as the A edition, and the 1787 edition as the 
B edition. 
155 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 607 (A761 / B789). Cf., 'Reason must in all its 
undertakings subject itself to criticism; should 
it limit freedom of criticism by any prohibitions, it must 
harm itself, drawing upon itself a damaging suspicion. Nothing is so important through 
its usefulness, 
nothing so sacred, that it may be exempted 
from this searching examination, which knows no respect 
for persons. Reason depends on this freedom 
for its every existence. For reason has no dictatorial 
authority' (593 [A739 / B767]). 
ýfý 
For Kant, because its focus is on what must first be the case for the Subject 
truly to understand the status of its knowledge about the world, the critical perspective 
has priority over all attempts to speak definitively about the world. Knowledge, or 
understanding, he explains, is dependent on the conceptual linkage of perceptions / 
representations (i. e., the 'manifold of experience') in rule-bound judgments. For any 
given intuition, such as that of a rock or a dog, we make a conceptual judgment when 
we identify it as such (as 'a rock' or 'a dog') due to the features it shares with other 
intuitions also deemed either 'rock' or 'dog'. In this way, any given instance or object 
of conceptual judgment is: (1) mediated knowledge -'the representation of a 
representation' and (2) a synthesis of representations 'In every judgment there is 
a concept which holds of many representations, and among them of a given 
representation that is immediately related to an object'. 15' Without the conceptualising 
synthesis of intuition, that is, if there was nothing but sensuous experience without 
conceptual judgement, Kant points out that there would only be the insane chaos of 
endlessly undifferentiated, and thus literally unthinkable, particularity. 
Kant's obvious first hurdle was to avoid the fallacy of a logical regress, 
whereby one is left to wonder emptily about the origin or grounds of the first 
conceptual rule, or the ultimate foundation of knowledge, because whatever was 
established as the first rule would itself require a conceptualising rule in order for it to 
be identified as 'the first rule'. Kant, thus, ascribes the basis of conceptual judgment to 
a 'peculiar talent' of the Subject (which is also to say, a talent peculiar to the Subject 
alone): 
156 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 105 (A68 / B93). Following the example of Terry Pinkard, 
as well as Beatrice Longuenesse. 1 am, it should be noted, treating the A (1781) and B (1787) versions 
of Kant's Transcendental Deduction as reasonably harmonious. See Pinkard, German Philosophy, 27 
n. 12, and Beatrice Longuencssc. Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Diseursivity in the 
Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason (trans. Charles T. Wolfe, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 9-10,33-34.59-64.109-11. 
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If [judgment] sought to give general instructions how we are to 
subsume under these rules, that is, to distinguish whether something 
does or does not come under them, that could only be by means of 
another rule. This in turn, for the very reason that it is a rule, again 
demands guidance from judgment. And thus it appears that, though 
understanding is capable of being instructed, and of being equipped 
with rules, judgment is a peculiar talent which can be practised only, 
and cannot be taught. It is the specific quality of so-called mother-wit; 
and its lack no school can make good. 15' 
Kant calls this innate talent to connect images with their concept, and thus to actually 
see something as something, 'schematism', and attributes it to the art of the 
individual's 'reproductive imagination'. 158 The schema of any sensible concept, he 
explains. 'is a product ... of pure a priori 
imagination, through which, and in 
accordance with which, images themselves first become possible. i159 In this way, it is 
not images that underlie one's conceptual categories, but the schematic activity of 
one's own imagination. 
Though it may not seem so immediately, the implications of this for 
subjectivity prove to be profound. For schematism as an innate art to make any sense 
at all, Kant realised he must first presuppose the necessity of a unified / unifying self- 
consciousness, or what he calls 'the synthetic unity of apperception'. That is to say, 
echoing Terry Pinkard, 'any representation of a multiplicity as a multiplicity involves 
not merely the receptivity of experience; experiencing it as one experiential 
multiplicity requires the possibility of there being a single complex thought of the 
experience. ' For such a thought to occur, he continues, 'requires a single complex 
157 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, 177 (A 133 /B 172). 
1 `' Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 181-83 (A 139-142 /B 178-181). 
159 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 183 (A 142 / B181) 
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subject to think it'. "' Indeed, as Kant famously writes in the second edition of The 
Critique of Pure Reason: 
It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my 
representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me 
which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that 
the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to 
me. '6' 
Importantly, the unifying self-consciousness that accompanies each thought, and thus 
makes it nnv thought, is not that of the Cartesian cogito, in which the thinking and the 
being of the subject are identical (what Kant calls the 'analvtic unity of apperception'). 
Rather, for Kant, this kind of awareness of oneself as a unified Subject is similar to 
one's intuition of any other sensible object, and thus is dependent on the 
conceptualising synthesis of different moments of consciousness. Such is, in Kant's 
terms, the very condition of possibility for the 'empirical consciousness' of oneself: 
For the empirical consciousness, which accompanies different 
representations, is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity 
of the subject. That relation comes about, not simply through my 
accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so 
far as I conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious of 
the synthesis of them. Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a 
manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible 
for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in [i. e. 
throughout] these representations. '"' 
In contrast, the pure self of synthetic apperception - what Kant calls the 'I think' 
is a free act of unmediated 'spontaneity'; that is, it is purely self-created, the self in- 
itself, and thus is not dependent on its representation in time and space. 
160 Pinkard, German Philosophy, 30. 
161 Kant Critique of Pure Reason, 152-53 (B131-132) 
162 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 193 (B133). Kant famously adds to this: In other Nvords, 
only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness. do I call then 
one and all mine. For otherwise I should ha\ c as many-coloured and di\ erse a sclf as I ha\e 
representations of which I am conscious to myself (154 [B134]). 
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Inasmuch as the self of pure apperception is both the unity of perception that 
synthesises all manner of intuitions according to the rules of conceptual 
understanding, as well as the very thought / synthesising process that thinks this unity, 
it never appears as such (i. e., in the empirical limits of self-presentation). As such, the 
Kantian subject can never truly know and apprehend itself as the pure thing-in-itself: 
[I]n the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of 
myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I 
am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition.... Accordingly, 
I have no knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to 
myself. 163 
Pure apperception, rather, remains but a necessary, but ultimately empty, thought. In 
this, Kant concludes, apperception is the condition of possibility for empirical self- 
consciousness. 
This, consequently, becomes the basis for Kant's withering critique of 
traditional metaphysics, as represented in and by those various philosophical and 
theological strongholds devoted to 'pure' and 'transcendent' notions, i. e., experientially 
ineffable and yet nevertheless thinkable, such as God and the soul. For Kant, it is not 
the case that such notions are logically contradictory or impossible. Rather, they are, 
in the words of Slavoj Zizek'empty notions devoid of their (intuited objects).... The 
problem is precisely that while it is easy to imagine them, we can never fill out their 
notion with positive, intuited content. "" For this reason, Kant deemed them 
antinomies i. e., objects-of-thought [Gedankendinge], and thus not capable of being 
experienced or represented as such. In short, then, because knowledge is by definition 
16' Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 169 (Bl 57-158). Cf., 'I exist as an intelligence which is 
conscious solely of its power of combination; but in respect of the manifold which it has to combine I 
am subjected to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense), namely, that this combination can be made 
intuitable only according to relations of time, which lies entirely outside the concepts of understanding, 
strictly regarded. Such an intelligence, therefore, can know itself only as it appears to itself in respect 
of an intuition \v hich is not intellectual and cannot be given by the understanding itself (169 [B159]). 
Ziük. Lciri "ing UA the , A'cu, ative, 109. 
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finite, it can only circumscribe the limits of the knowable, without denying or 
affirming that which necessarily is outside such a limit. 165 
3. The Absolute Subject as Self-Positing I 
The Kantian enquiry of and about truth / identity cuts to the core, too, of 
Melville's musings in Mardi. When, for instance, the journalistically-inclined Mohi 
sceptically wonders whether a legend'seems a credible history', suggesting instead 
that it had been 'invented', the philosopher Babbalanja cautions that this is no reason 
to dismiss it: 
Truth is in things, and not in words: truth is voiceless.... [W]hat are 
vulgarly called fictions are as much realities as the gross mattock of 
Dididi, the digger of trenches; for things visible are but conceits of the 
eye: things imaginative, conceits of thF; fancy. If duped by one, we are 
equally duped by the other. 166 
Undaunted, Mohi asks the question that ultimately haunts Melville and his readers, 
and indeed many of Kant's: 'if all things are deceptive [or, apropos Kant, merely 
phenomena], tell us what is truth. ' To this Babbalanja can only answer, sounding not 
unlike Kant with regard to his antinomies: 'The old interrogatory; did they not ask it 
when the world began? But ask it no more.... [T]hat question is more final than any 
answer. t167 
Indeed, the Kantian problematic of the antinomies, i. e., as finally and fully 
ineffable and uncertain, is indistinct from that of the character of the Subject in Mardi. 
165 Again quoting Zizek, By saying "the Thing is non-phenomenal, " we do not say the same as 
"the Thing is not phenomenal"; we do not make any positive claim about it, we only dra\\ a certain 
limit and locate the Thing in the wholly nonspecified void beyond it (Tarrying With the , \`egatMe. II ). I 
Consequently, and strictly analogous to his understanding of pure apperception, both God and the soul, 
though unthinkable, would become for Kant the very conditions of possibility for one's ethical 
judgments. 
1611 N1ck ille, Mardi, 283-84. 
1e0 Melville, Mardi. 284. 
61 
Perhaps reflective of Melville's own character having been called into question by 
critics of Typee, in Mardi we find a discordant chorus of characters holding all 
manner of contradictory opinions, and each generally regarding the opinion of the 
others to be either immature, insane, or irresponsible. All of these voices, however, 
are themselves problematised by the narrator's silence regarding his identity - which 
is to say, his character. 16' After all, even when the inhabitants of the island Odo 
finally provide a name for the narrator in Chapter Forty, 'Taji', it is but a case of 
mistaken identity, for they only do so after mistaking him for their sun god. 169 As 
William Charvat notes, in his becoming 'Taji', the hitherto first-person narrator of 
Mardi essentially vanishes: 
The 'I' of the first chapters becomes 'we' in the allegory, and even the 
'we' often becomes the voice of authorial omniscience released from 
the control of the grammatical first person. Sometimes within the 
space of a page or two, Taji speaks as 'we', is addressed by the author 
as 'you', and is referred to by his companions in the third person as if 
he were not there. 170 
In short, his status as omniscient commentator is diffused through his new travel 
companions: i. e., Yoomy, the poet; Mohi, the storyteller; Babbalanja, the philosopher; 
and King Media, the demigod. "' In this, Melville seems to be saying by the end of 
168 For a discussion of this ambiguity of character, both of Taji (as character) and (the nature 
of) Mardi, see Christopher S. Durer, 'Melville's "Synthesizing" Narrator: Mardi, Fichte, and the 
Fruhromanticker' Romanticism Past & Present 10 (Winter 1986): 45-60; Russ Pottle, 'The Monkey 
Before the Whale: "Signifyin(g)" and Melville's Mardi' Journal of Narrative Technique 23 (Fall 1993): 
136-53; John Wenke, 'Melville's Mardi: Narrative Self-Fashioning and the Play of Possibility' Texas 
Studies in Literature and Language 31 (Fall 1989): 406-425. 
169 This is, of course, reminiscent of Typee, where 'Tommo' is also a kind of pseudonym - i. e., 
not simply because, biographically, 'Tommo' is purportedly standing in for Melville, but because of the 
inability of the Typeeans to successfully pronounce 'Tom' (which was not his real name either! ). In 
this, 'Tommo' is a pseudonym of a pseudonym (Melville, Typee, 72). As was the case with Tommo, the 
truth that we generally assume lies behind a character (that is, where their characteristic identities begin 
and end) thus remain as elusive as that of Melville. 
170 Charvat, The Profession of Authorship in America, 221-22. 
171 After the murder of the high priest and the transformation of the narrator into'Taji', Charvat 
writes, 'the physique becomes insubstantial and translucent, and the continuing solidity of Jarl and 
Samoa are embarrassing to the story'. As such, Melville found it necessary to fade them out of his 
story - and, indeed, ultimately even killed them off. Melville, Charvat continues, may actually have 
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Mardi, it is altogether fitting that Taji's search for Yillah should culminate in his 
literal suicide. 
Melville here, I would suggest, touches on the shared concern of Kant and 
early German Romanticism: namely, in the words of Piotr Parlej, for 'the production 
of the subject in its proper form, the production of the subject as this subject's 
subject. '"Z Similar to Kant's 'peculiar talent', peculiar to the autonomous Subject, 
then, we find in Schlegel the Subject's 'spiritual viewing' [An. schaucig] of itself, 1' i. e., 
its self-presentation as its own subject. In his emphasis on circularity and reflection, 
however, Schlegel's (and, we will see, Melville's) understanding of subjectivity is 
even more deeply indebted to the speculative idealism of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, for 
whom philosophy was essentially a pure thinking about thinking. 1' The pure I of 
Fichte's philosophy, as such, 'looks at itself, and in this looking penetrates 
'immediately all that it is'. 15 Or, as Hegel characterises it, an 'artistic consciousness 
[künstliche Bewußtsein], the consciousness about consciousness, so that I have the 
consciousness of what my consciousness is doing'. 1' 
realised that much of his reading audience would ultimate leave with them, 'for among his alternative 
explanations of Samoa's refusal to continue the search (he was "not the first man, who had turned back, 
after beginning a voyage like our own") was his distaste for Babbalanja's "disquisitions" (which were 
indeed distasteful to most reviewers), and for a Mardi [the island] which had not met his expectations' 
(The Profession of Authorship in America, 220). 
172 Piotr Parlej, The Romantic Theory of the Novel: Genre and Reflection in Cervantes, 
Melville, Flaubert, Jorce, and Kafka (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 19. 
173 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms (trans. Ernst. Behler and Roman 
Struc; University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968), 102. 
"' lt is for this precise reason that Friedrich Schlegel characterises Fichte in Athenaeum 
Fragment 181 as 'a Kant raised to the second power', whose 'theory of knowledge is always 
simultaneously philosophy and philosophy of philosophy. ' In his philosophy, Schlegel continues, 'one 
has to look as [Fichte] does - without paying attention to anything else - only at the whole and at the 
one thing that really matters' (Schlegel, 'Lucinde' and the Fragments, 202). 
175 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Werke, 1797-1798, in J. G. Fichte - Gesamtausgabe der 
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (eds., Reinhard Lauth and Hans Gliv, itzky; vol. 4: 
Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1964), 196. 
176 G. W. F. Hegel, Torlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III, in Werke (eds. Eia 
Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel; vol. 20; Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), 393. 
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For Fichte, Kant's elusive 'I think' is only coherent on the condition that 'prior 
to all positing in the self, the self itself is posited. '" Unlike Kant, however, the 
unified Self is not simply a fact that can or should be presupposed as necessarily true. 
On the contrary, Dieter Henrich points out, there is, in fact, no Fichtean 'Subject-Self 
prior to self-consciousness'. On the contrary, 'the subject, too, first emerges at the 
same time as the whole consciousness expressed in the identity "I = I". '"R That is to 
say, alongside Fichte's fundamental thesis, 'the Self posits itself absolutely and 
unconditionally'. 1' As such, the 'I' can only realise itself as such in the activity of the 
'I' being itself; that is, in the 'deed-act' of reflection upon itself, 'through which I know 
something because I do it'. 18° For Fichte, then, the Self is precisely the act of self- 
positing / self-presentation, i. e., 'through which a Subject-Self becomes aware of itself 
as an Object-Self"" In this way, the Kantian distinction between self-consciousness 
as an intuition and concept is breached, and becomes instead a spontaneous, unitary 
awareness (or, in Fichte's terms, 'intellectual intuition'). 182 
The most obvious difficulty that strains Fichte's philosophical idealism, 
though, is the matter of subjective particularity. That is, if the 'I' is unlimited, endless 
activity, how do we account for the feeling of limitation, or differentiation, that 
constitutes individuality? Fichte's response is that limitation / differentiation (what he 
177 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Fichte's Werke 1: Zur Theoretischen Philosophie (Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyer, 1971), 95. Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Fichte are my own, with the 
assistance of Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre), with First and Second Introductions (ed. and 
trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970). 
I7 Dieter Henrich, 'Fichte's Original Insight, ' in Contemporary, German Philosophy (trans. 
Da\ id R. Lachterman; vol. 1; University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982), 25. 
179 Fichte, lt c'rke I, 98. 
180 Fichte, lV(, ke 1,463. As Henrich simplifies, 'the Self posits itself absolutely as positing 
itself, or alternatively, self-consciousness is a 'look that sees itself and in each case is already this act of 
seeing ('Fichte's Original Insight', 29,33). 
181 Henrich, 'Fichte's Original Insight', 25. 
"2 Frederick Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity (Ne\ý York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 84: Henrich, 'Firhte's Original Insight', 29-30. 
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calls Anstoss or'check') is itself necessary for the activity of self-positing to be 
unlimited. 'This makes sense', Andrew Bowie comments, 'in as much as a feeling of 
compulsion has as its prior condition that which can feel compelled, which must 
therefore be aware of its freedom. "" Were there no resistance or'check', i. e., no'not- 
I', there would be no 'infinite striving' to overcome such resistance or limitation, no 
reflective activity of self-positing, and thus no T. In this way, then, the Fichtean 'I', as 
infinite striving, is prevented from ever being finally objectivised as a'knowing 
subject'. "4 
Reason steps into the method (from which Reflection arises) and 
determines [the imagination] to receive B [i. e., the 'not-I'] into the 
determinate A (the subject): but now the A presented as determinate 
must be once again restricted by an infinite B, at which the imagination 
proceeds exactly as above; and so it goes on, until the (here theoretical) 
reason is a complete determination of itself, where the imagination 
requires no restrictive B other than reason - that is, until it reaches the 
representation of what represents [Vorstellung des Vorstellenden]. In 
the practical sphere, imagination goes on into the infinity, up to the 
absolutely indeterminable idea of the highest unity, which would be 
possible only after a completed infinity, which is itself impossible. "' 
In effect, Bowie concludes, Fichte's argument requires both 'a relative I and not-I 
within an Absolute which is still conceived of as I', but never fully explains why the 
'Absolute I' should ever have split itself in the first place. "' 
Walter Benjamin argues in his dissertation on the early German Romantics 
that it is here that the similarities between the idealism of Fichte and the romanticism 
193 Andrew Bovvie. Schelling and Modern European Philosoph r: An Introduction (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1993), 18. Cf., Pinkard, German Philosophy, 1760-1860,1 12-20. 
"' Cf., '[l]f every item of knowledge really had a subject, the subject itself could not 
be an 
item of knowledge. Otherwise, we would have to assume a subject of this subject and thus surrender to 
the infinite regress that Fichte feared so much. The idea of the Self xti ould sink into the abyss. 
The 
paradox of the subject-less knowing is preferable to that' (Henrich, 'Fichte's Original Insight', 
36). 
1R5 Fichte, Werke 1,217. 
186 13o\\ 1c, Sc-helling and Modern F: uropeuin Philosophy, 18. 
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of Friedrich Schlegel are overwhelmed by their fundamental differences. "' Whereas 
for Fichte, self-positing presupposes the ontological determination / reflection of the 
'I', 188 'the Romantics start from thinking-oneself, as a phenomenon; proper to 
everything, for everything is a self"" That is to say, in contrast to the intuitive 
immediacy of Fichte's self-knowing and self-positing Absolute, whereby 'thinking as 
the thinking of thinking ... achieves completion in the self-positing I', 
19° early 
German Romanticism denies the intuitive / sensory role of the 'not-I', and instead 
posits the conceptual immediacy of the Absolute as an infinitization of the finite 
subject's self-consciousness and reflection. Or, as Benjamin describes it, 'the thinking 
of thinking of thinking (and so forth)'. 19' In this 'third-level reflection', versus the first 
level of epistemological 'sense' and the second level of Fichtean 'reason', Benjamin 
explains, the 'thinking of thinking' can be either (indeed, ultimately, is both) the object 
of thought, i. e., thinking, or the 'thinking subject (thinking of thinking) of thinking'. 192 
The result, he concludes, are infinite levels of possible reflection, and thus an infinite 
plurality of meaning. In this way, he continues, the Romantics redefined the sense of 
infinity, from Fichte's notion of infinite advance or striving, to that of the 'full 
infinitude [erfüllte Unendlichkeit] of interconnection', 193 whereby 'reflection expands 
18' Walter Benjamin, 'The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism' in Selected Writings, 
Volume 1,1913-1926 (ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings; Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), 120-35. All translations of Benjamin's dissertation have been 
checked against the original German in Gesammelte Schriften (ed. Rolf Tidemann and Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser; volume 1; Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974,9-122. 
'" Fichte, Werke I, 530n. 
189 Benjamin, 'The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism', 128. 
190 Rodolphe Gasche, 'Thc Sober Absolute: On Benjamin and the Early Romantics' in Walter 
Benjamin and Romanticism (ed. Beatrice Hanssen and Andrew Benjamin; New York: Continuum, 
2002). 56. 
191 Benjamin, 'The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism', 128; cf. 139-40. 
192 Benjamin, 'The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism', 129. 
193 Benjamin, 'The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism', 120. 
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without limit or check, and the thinking given form in reflection turns into formless 
thinking which directs itself upon the Absolute'. 194 Where Fichte located the Absolute 
teleologically in the deed-act of positing, the Romantics regarded the Absolute 
immediately as the infinite staging of reflection / thinking. 19' Consequently, much to 
the disapproval of Benjamin, the Absolute of early German Romanticism can be 
distinguished from lower forms of reflection 'only in quantity and not in qualitv. i19b 
4. The Literary Absolute 
It is not hard to imagine how and why Melville found much of Romanticism 
so immediately engaging. Like Melville, Friedrich Schlegel (arguably, the most 
important philosophical voice of early German Romanticism) was also deeply 
ambivalent about the novel. Indeed, it is precisely this ambivalence that lends his 
engagement with the novel its self-admitted theological proportions. This is perhaps 
most illustrated when Schlegel writes: 'Only through religion does logic become 
philosophy; only from it comes everything that makes philosophy greater than 
science. And instead of an eternally rich, infinite poetry, the lack of religion gives us 
194 Benjamin, 'The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism', 129. 
195 Cf., 'To take thinking ... merely as mediate and only intuition as immediate 
is a totally 
arbitrary procedure on the part of those philosophers who assert an intellectual intuition [i. e., Kant and 
Fichte]. The properly immediate, it is true, is feeling, but there exists also an immediate thinking' 
(Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophische Vorlesungen (1804 bis 1807) in Kritische Friednch-Schlegel- 
Ausgabe (ed. Jean-Jacques Anstett*, vol. 12; Munich: Sch6ningh, 355-56). 
196 Parlej, The Roniantic Theorl, of the Novel, 28. For further elaboration on Benjamin's strong 
reserý ations about the 'sobriety' of the Romantic Absolute (i. e., its profanation / loss of transccndence). 
scc Gjasch6, 'The Sober Absolute', 63-68 (e. g., 'In short, the Romantic theory according to which the 
centres of reflection can be elevated to the medium of reflection itself through reflexive inten s ifi cation 
condemns the medium of reflection, or the Absolute, to being only the enhanced reflection of ýý hatcý er 
is reflcctl\, ely raiscd to that higher level.... Such an understanding of the Absolute (or of 
consciousness) critails a loss of the force of transcendence and the relatl\ ization of difference ...... 
reflection that knows only intensification, and not the possibility of diminishing, presupposes Lind 
ýisscrts a continuity between the profane and the Absolute that can only make the Absolute tangible as 
soinething protane' [63]). 
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only novels or the triviality that now is called art. i197 Elsewhere, Schlegel writes of his 
disdain for the modern tendency to regard the novel as a separate genre: 'It must be 
clear to you why, according to my views, f insist that all poetry should be romantic 
and why I detest the novel insofar as it wants to be a separate genre. "" As Parlej 
notes, on one hand, Schlegel is compelled to condemn the novel as a genre; and yet, 
on the other hand, he invokes its 'etymological derivative', romantic, as the privileged 
characteristic of'all poetry'. "' For Schlegel, however, such ambiguity is itself 
constitutive of the term der Roman, for it 'denotes both the presence of the 
transcendental subject to itself, as postulated by Kant's philosophy, and a literary 
genre inherited from antiquity. i20° In short, then, one can only understand the nature of 
Romantic resistance to the identifying taxonomy of genre (be it Melville's or 
Schlegel's resistance) in light of its Kantian-inspired conception of the 'transcendental' 
Subject. 
According to Schlegel the 'subject-work, i. e., the subject in the process of 
becoming, cannot be bound by any preexisting aesthetic rules, or even the intentions 
of its artist or author. On the contrary, in the infinite play of the poetic absolute, 20' 
each work must be considered separately on the basis of its own immanent laws. He 
writes in Athenaeum Fragment 51: 
197 Friedrich Schlegel, Tucinde'and the Fragments (trans. Peter Firchow; Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 242. For this and all subsequent citations of Critical Fragments, 
Athenaeum l, 'ragments, and Ideas I have consulted the original text in Charakteristiken und Kritiken 1, 
1796- 1801 in Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe (ed. Hans Eichner; vol. 2, Munich: Sch6ningh, 
1967). 
198 Friedrich Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, 101. 
199 Parlej, The Romantic Theory of the Novel, 2-3 
200 Parlej, The Romantic Theory of the Novel, 3. Cf, Hans Eichner. 'Germany: Romantisch- 
Roniantik-Roniantiker' in 'Ronzantic-'and Its Cognates: The European Histon, of a Word (ed. Han-s 
Eichner, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972). 98-1-56. 
201 '. All the sacred plays of art are only a remote imitation of the infinite play of thc universe. 
the work of art \\ hich cterrially creates itself ane\\' (Schlegel, Dialogue on PoetrY. 89). 
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The beautiful, poetical, ideal naive must combine intention and 
instinct. The essence of intention in this sense is freedom, though 
intention isn't consciousness by a long shot. There is a certain kind of 
self-infatuated contemplation of one's own naturalness or silliness that 
is itself unspeakably silly. Intention doesn't exactly require any deep 
calculation or plan. Even Homeric naivete isn't simply instinctive. 
there is at least as much intention in it as there is in the grace of lovely 
children or innocent girls. And if Homer himself had no intentions, his 
poetry and the real author of that poetry, Nature, certainly did. 202 
Such, then, is the goal of Schlegel's proposed 'transcendental poetry', which Maurice 
Blanchot gracefully describes as the 'the site wherein poetry will no longer be content 
to produce beautiful determinate works, but rather will produce itself in a movement 
without term and without determination'. 203 Indeed, as Ernst Behler notes, this 
understanding of the term 'transcendental' is truer to its original Kantian sense than it 
was to Fichte. 204 Inasmuch as Kant regarded knowledge as 'transcendental' when it 'is 
occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge', 205 he 
effectively bound together the subject of knowledge and its object. Schlegel's 
contribution to the term is, thus, to remove any determinate distinction between 
philosophy and poetry, and pull into the latter the transcendental / reflective activity 
of the former. "' 
Hence, Schlegel writes in Athenaeum Fragment 238, 'There is a kind of poetry 
whose essence lies in the relation between ideal and real, and which therefore by 
202 Schlegel, 'Lucinde' and the Fragments, 167 [Athenaeum Fragment 51]. 
203 Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation (trans. Susan Hanson; Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993). 354. 
204 Ernst Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory (Nc\\ York: Cambridge University Press. 
1993), 138-39. 
205 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 59 (B25) 
206 (, f- 'Transcendental is what is, should be, and can be high up, transcendent what trics to be 
gh tip, but can't or shouldn't be. It would be slanderous nonsense to 
belcNe that humanjtý could hig 
exceed its own alm, o\ crtax its o\\ n powers, or that philosophy oughtn't to be able to do something it 
wants to do and can do' (Schlegel, 'Lucinde'and the Fragments. 225 [Athenaeum Fragment 388]). 
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analogy to philosophical jargon, should be called transcendental poetry'. 20' Such 
poetry, he continues, must 'represent the producer along with the product'. 
Consequently, he concludes, 'this poetry should describe itself, and always be 
simultaneously poetry and the poetry of poetry. ', 08 The emphasis, then, is on poetry as 
radicalised poesis (i. e., production), rather than poetry as simply a product. In this 
way, as Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy note in The Literary Absolute, 
Romantic poetry embodies the truth of poesis, and thus, too, the truth of its autopoesis 
/ self-production: 'And if it is true ... that auto-production constitutes the ultimate 
instance and closure of the speculative absolute, then romantic thought involves not 
only the absolute of literature, but literature as the absolute. Romanticism is the 
inauguration of the literary absolute. 11209 
Apropos the Romantic Absolute as a 'literary absolute', Schlegel's classic 
formulation of Romantic poetry is that of a 'progressive universal poetry'. 
Other kinds of poetry are finished and are now capable of being fully 
analysed. The romantic kind of poetry is still in the state of becoming; 
that, in fact, is its real essence: that it should forever be becoming and 
never be perfected. It can be exhausted by no theory and only a 
divinatory criticism would dare try to characterise its ideal. It alone is 
infinite, just as it alone is free; and it recognizes as its first 
commandment that the will of the poet can tolerate no law above itself. 
The romantic kind of poetry is the only one that is more than a kind, 
that is, as it were, poetry itself: for in a certain sense all poetry is or 
should be romantic. 210 
Here, the aim is not simply to find interesting connections and correlations between 
poetry, philosophy, and rhetoric which even today exemplifies the most banal sort 
207 Schlegel, 'Lucinde' and the Fragments, 195. 
209 Schlegel, 'Lucinde' and the Fragments, 195. 
209 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Lite ra rv ,I bsolute: The Theor. 11 of 
Literature in German Romanticism (trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester; Albany: SUNY Press. 
1989), 12. 
210 Schlegel, 'Lucinde' and the Fragments, 175-76 [Athenaeum Fragment 116]. 
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of interdisciplinarity - but actively to 'fuse poetry and prose, inspiration and 
criticism, the poetry of art and the poetry of nature; and make poetry lively and 
sociable, and life and society poetic, poeticize wit and fill and saturate the forms of 
and with every kind of good, solid matters for instruction, and animate them with the 
pulsations of humour. ''" 
For Schlegel, because it can, more than any other form, 'hover at the midpoint 
between the portrayed and the portrayer', the ideal form of Romantic poetry / poesis is 
that of the classical epic. 21' Elsewhere, Schlegel pronounces that where the lyrical is 
'only subjective', and the dramatic is 'only objective', the epic is 'subjective-objective' 
that is, neither purely subjective nor purely objective. 213 Only the epic, he writes, 
in accord with his presentation of the Absolute in Romantic poetry, is 'free of all real 
and ideal self-interest, and can raise that reflection again and again to a higher power, 
can multiply it in an endless succession of mirrors. ''14 The closest modern 
correspondence to the epic, in its self-realisation as infinite reflection, he continues 
elsewhere, is the novel. "' For indeed, 'just as our literature began with the novel, so 
the Greek began with the epic and dissolved in it'. 216 
I would suggest that Melville's inability to contain in the pages of Mardi the 
full scope of his intellectual development is perfectly in line with the infinite 
reflective aspirations of a Romantic novel. Concerning this, Elizabeth Foster's 
211 Schlegel, 'Lucinde' acid the Fragments, 175. 
212 Schlegel, 'Lucinde' and the Fragments, 175. 
213 Friedrich Schlegel, Literarv Notebooks, 1797-1801 (ed. Hans Eichner; Toronto. University 
of'Toronto Press, 1957), 48. Cf., Laco ue-Labarthe and Nancy, The Literan, Absolute, 91-96, and Peter 
Szondi, 'Friedrich Schlegel's Theory of Poetical Genres: A Reconstruction from the Posthumous 
Fragnicrits' in On Textual Untlerstanding and Other Essay (trans. Harvey Mendelsohn; %Minneapolis. 
Uni\ci-sity of Minnesota Press, 1986), 75-94. 
214 Schlegel, 'Lucinde' and the 1'ragnºents, 175. 
215 Szondi, 'Friedrich Schlegel's Theory of Poetical Genres', 89. 
216 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, 101. 
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comment is particularly apt: 
As Mardi deepened, in the travelogue chapters, into an intermittent 
symposium on religion, philosophy, science, politics, and the poet's art, 
on faith and knowledge, on necessity and free will, on time and death 
and eternity, Melville's reading and also his writing were rushing him 
into such an intellectual expansion and exhilaration that his i, ery being 
was ringing with the voices of the great dead. 217 
Consequently, Mardi is both about a fantastical journey and is a journey into itself. 
'From first to last', William Charvat very astutely writes, 'Melville was a trial-and- 
error experimental writer who never quite knew what he wanted to do - or did not 
want to do - until he did It. 
12 1X What begins, then, much like its predecessors, with its 
stated intention intact, i. e., a story of the whaling industry in the South Seas, "' 
becomes an open invitation for readers to join him on an exploratory voyage 
unfettered by the constraints of journalistic fact: "'Oh, reader, list! I've chartless 
voyaged. With compass and the lead, we had not found these Mardian Isles. Those 
who boldly launch, cast off all cables"'. 22° A journalistic travel narrative moored by 
the Aristotelian confines of beginning, middle, and ending is, thus, effectively 
replaced by an expedition through the uncharted 'world of mind; wherein the 
wanderer may gaze round, with more of wonder than Balboa's band roving through 
the golden Aztec glades. t22' As we noted in Nina Baym's argument discussed above in 
Chapter One, where Melville is regarded as breaching his 'genre contract' with 
217 Foster, 'Historical Note', 661 (emphasis mine). 
218 Charvat, The Profession of Authorship in Anierica, 223. In this Melville's journey as the 
author of Mardi is not at all unlike that of the poet Lombardo, as described in Mardi: 'When Lombardo 
sct about his work, he knew not what it would become. He did not build himself in with plans; he 
wrote on; and so doing, got deeper and deeper into himself-, and like a resolute traveler, plunging 
through baffling woods, at last was rewarded for his tolls' (Melville, Mardi, 595). 
2 19 Early in the writing of Mardi, Melville wrote to John Murray, indicating that he ýýas 
writing it scquei to Oinoo ('a bona-fide narrativc of my adventures in the Pacific, continued from 
"Ornoo'") (Mel\rille, Correspondence, 98,106). 
220 M1rl\villc. Mardi, SS6. 
221 Melville, Mardi, 557. 
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journalistic writing in Tvpee and Omoo, in Mardi we find him beginning a self- 
conscious trend of doing the same with that of fiction as well. 222 What Baym fails to 
note, however, is that this resistance to fictive protocol is, in the Romantic novel, the 
very mark of this fiction's truth. 
As Benjamin notes, if the Romantic novel is the 'comprehensible 
manifestation' [lassbare Erscheinung] of the Absolute, i. e., as both 'poetry and the 
poetry of poetry', it is so precisely because their notion of transcendental poetry 'has 
found its individuality 
... 
in the form of prose; the early Romantics know no deeper 
or better detennination for it than "prose"'. 223 On its most proper level, prose refers to 
ordinary speech not bound by meter or rhythm [ungebundene Rede]; and yet, as 
Gasche points out, on another, more figural / improper level, prose indicates that 
which is plain, ordinary, or prosaic. Importantly, though, for the Romantics there 
could be no such definitive differentiation. "' On the contrary, Gasch6 writes, 'it is this 
very lack of differentiation, this ambiguity of meaning, that predestines prose to 
become the comprehensible manifestation of the Absolute'. 225 In other words, 
inasmuch as prose marks the failed distinction of proper and improper / subject and 
object, the untold ambiguity of its self-becoming in the novel (i. e., a 'writing as 
infinite scripting (of) scripting itself) gives fonn to the Infinite reflection of the poetic 
Absolute. 226 
222 Baym, 'Melville's Quarrel with Fiction', 912-13. 
223 Benjamin, 'The Concept of Criticism', 173. 
224 Cf., Athenaeum Fragment 395: 'In true prose everything has to be underlined' (Schlegel, 
Tiwiflde'and the 1"ragments, 227). 
5 Gasche, 'The Sober Absolute', 65. 
226 Parlej, The Romantic Theory, of the Novel, 34. 
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5. Romantic Irony and the Duplicity of Self-Assertion 
Furthen-nore, in his subsequent declaration that every 'theory of the novel must 
itself be a novel which would reflect imaginatively every eternal tone of the 
imagination', "' Schlegel radicalises the existing concept of irony to the point of 
making it his own. "' Traditionally, irony had been merely the rhetorical trope 
whereby a speaker's meaning and intention are opposed to what he or she actually 
says . 
22" Aristotle, for example, highlights the irony of self-deprecating humour, 
regarding its use as both wise and polite . 
2" For him, in contrast to Plato, in whose 
presentation irony is often regarded as hypocritical or duplicitous, the quintessence of 
irony as a noble trope is the elusive and often humorous self-deprecation of 
Socrates. "' indeed, for Aristotle, it was precisely this ironic elusiveness that made 
Socrates such an effective, exemplary communicator. 
Schlegel would certainly affirm this, albeit with a twist; namely, that the full 
truth and nobility of Socrates' ironic rhetoric cannot be reduced simply to his ability to 
disguise himself and his intentions. "' On the contrary, apropos the problems of self- 
227 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetr v, 102-03. Piotr Parlej sums this up nicely: 'The romantic 
novel reflects (works) on itself to produce itself (the work) and, in this production, to accomplish itself 
as itself (The Romantic Theory of the Novel, 19). 
22 ' Behler, German Romantic Theor 
, v, 
141-43; cf., Ernst Behler, lronY and the Discourse of 
Modernitv (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1990), 73-110. 
229 Cicero, De Oratore, I (Loeb Classical Library; trans. E. W. Sutton; Cambridge, Mass.; 
Harvard University Press, 1942), 2.67.270-272.1 am for much that follows here indebted to Ernst 
Behler's elaboration of the historical rise and development of irony in his German Romantic Theorv. 
143-46. 
230 Cf., 'Some of the forms befit a gentleman, and some do not; irony befits him more than 
does bufoonery. The jests of the ironical man are at his own expense; the buffoon excites laughter at 
others' (Rhetoric of Aristotle [trans. Richard Claverhouse Jebb; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1909], 115 [3.18.14]9b7l); 'Irony is the contrary to boastful exaggeration, it is a self-deprecating 
conccalment of one's powers and possessions - it shows better taste to deprecate than to exaggerate 
one's virtucs (Niconzachcan Ethics [trans. Terence Irwin; Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 19851, 
1108a]9-23,1127a2O-26. 
Aristotle, Nic omaehean Ethics, 1 127b22-6. 
232 Such N\ as the explanation of Alcibiades, in Plato's Svniposhim: '[Socrates] spends 
his whole 
life pretending and playin-g with people, and I doubt whether anyone has c\cr seen the treasurcs that are 
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presentation already seen in the work of Hen-nan Melville, for Schlegel the truth of 
Socratic irony is precisely that self-reference / self-presentation necessarily carries 
one beyond oneself and one's intentions. He writes in Critical Fragment 108: 
Socratic irony is the only involuntary and yet completely deliberate 
dissimulation. It is equally impossible to feign it or divulge it. To a 
person who hasn't got it, it will remain a riddle even after it is openly 
confessed. It is meant to deceive no one except those who consider it a deception and who either take pleasure in the delightful roguery of 
making fools of the whole world or else become angry when they get 
an inkling they themselves might be included.... It contains and 
arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism between the absolute and 
the relative, between the impossibility and the necessity of complete 
communication. It is the freest of all licenses, for by its means one 
transcends oneself; and yet it is also the most lawful, for it is absolutely 
necessary. It is a very good sign when the harmonious bores are at a 
loss about how they should react to this continuous self-parody, when 
they fluctuate endlessly between belief and disbelief until they get 
dizzy and take what is meant as ajoke seriously and what is meant 
seriously as a joke. "' 
That is to say, Socratic irony mediates the Absolute, as a convergence of the 
impossible (i. e., stable self-reference) and the necessarv (Le., unavoidable self- 
reference), in a self-presentation whose truth is precisely that it is neither complete 
nor stable. Thus we have, he argues, novels like Tristram Shandy, Don Qiii'Xote, and 
Wilhelin Meister (and, we might add, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius), 
which attempt to present their own self-becoming, but realise it only as a structural 
excess that cannot be completely presented. Such novels, in fact, 'are the Socratic 
dialogues of our time; that is, the unendingly ironic accounts of their own self- 
revcýiled when he grows serious and exposes what he keeps inside'(Plato, Symposium [trans. 
Chrisopher Gill; New York: Penguin, 1999], 55 [216d]). 
233 Schlegel, Tucinde'and the Fragments, 15 5. Soren Klerkegaard characterises Socrates' 
ironic Sub , 
jectivity (i. e., 'I know that I do not know') similarly, as 'absolute infinite negati\ ity'. 'it is. ' he 
rites, 'negativity because it negates, it Is infinite because it negates not this or that phenomenon-, and it 
is absolute because it negates by N irtue of a higher which is not. Iron ,v establishes 
nothing, for that 
which is to be established hes bchind it' (The Concel7t of Irony [trans. Lee M. Capel; Bloomington: 
Indiana Uni\ci-sity Press, 1965], 278, emphasis mine). 
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production in the face of infinite reflectivity. and, thus, only truly themselves in the 
active critique of their constitutive failures. 2' 
It is in light of Romantic irony that the profound importance of Melville's 
review of Nathaniel Hawthorne's Mossesfrom an Old Manse becomes apparent. Of 
course, Melville's review, 'Hawthorne and His Mosses' [ 1850], is already enveloped 
by a certain mythos of importance that has been created for it by contemporary 
scholarship. 'The action of "Hawthorne and His Mosses"', Richard Brodhead 
suggests, 'is of Melville's first thinking a new idea of authorship, then, on the basis of 
that thought, emboldening himself to assert his own literary-prophetical vocation. "" 
Brodhead's assessment represents a norm, as is also the case regarding Mardi, to read 
the essay as a re-articulation of Melville's sense of independence as a writer. "' What I 
wish to suggest, though, is that to miss the complex irony of Melville's 'Independence' 
as a writer is also to miss most of what sustains the aesthetic vitality of his works. 
What we should not fail to notice in our reading offlawthome and His 
Mosses' is that even after having written five major novels Melville remains as though 
a character. Indeed, he is so immersed in his texts that one reviewer for The Home 
Journal notes: 'Herman Melville with his cigar and his Spanish eyes, talks Typee and 
Omoo, just as you find the flow of his delightful mind on paper. Those who have only 
read his books know the man - those who have only see the man have a fair idea of 
2ý4 Schlegel, Tucinde'and the Fragments, 14S [Critical Fragment 26]. 
235 Richard H. Brodhead, The School of Hawthorne (Nc\N York: Oxford Unkersity Press. 
1986), 29. 
23 " For traditional readings in this Ncin, see Gilliam Brown, Individualism: Iniagilling Self ill 
Niiieteetith-('(, iitiii-. i,,, Iitiei-i(-ei (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Unk crsity of California Press, 1990), 138- 
fI is inceton: 43, Wai-clice Dirnock, Empirejor Libertv: Melville and the Poetics o Ind'vidual' ill (Pri 
Princeton Uni\ ersity Press, 1989), 140-4 1, and James R. Mello\\, Nathaniel Hentthome in His Tunes 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980), 333-36. 
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his books. "" If Melville the author cannot be unambiguously differentiated f'rom the 
'Melville'of page and pen, the problems of beginning and ending highlighted in 
Chapter One recur endlessly, and his declarations of authorial / creative independence 
must necessarily be re-thought. 
Only with this in mind can we fully appreciate the irony of duplicitous self- 
characterisation in'Hawthome and His Mosses', whose purported author, 'A Virginian 
Spending July in Vermont', "' we know from letters to and from Evert Duyckinck, "' 
was Melville, a New Yorker living in Massachusetts. 240 We have seen this kind of 
behaviour in Melville before, of course, but nowhere is it as significant. For, indeed, 
as Ellen Weinauer points out, inasmuch as here Melville disguises himself when 
declaring his creative autonomy, he is also in essence 'disclaiming ownership of his 
own text'. 241 That is to say, we have Melville at a distant remove from his declared 
freedom - i. e., Melville playing 'Melville' playing 'a Virginian' declaring his 
authorial freedom. "' And thus returns the formative problem of all of Melville's 
237 Leyda, The Melville Log, 1: 320 (emphasis his). 
238 Melville, The Piazza Tales, 239. 
239 Melville, Correspondence, 165-68. Duyckinck published the two-part essay in the 17 
August and 24 August editions of the Literary World. 
240 Melville's identity remained a secret to Hawthorne for a few weeks after publication, until 
Melville admitted his authorship during his first visit to Hawthorne's home. Of this tendency of 
Melville to communicate more through silence and secrecy, see, Sophia Hawthorne's letter to her sister: 
[Melville] told me he was naturally so silent a man, that he was complained of a great 
deal on this account; ... He said Mr Hawthorne's great 
but hospitable silence drew 
him out - that it was astonishing how sociable his silence was.... He said 
sometimes they would walk along without talking on either side, but that even then 
they seemed to be very social. (Leyda, The Melville Log, 2.924-25) 
"' Ellen Weinauer, 'Plagiarism and the Proprietary Self. Policing the Boundaries of 
Authorship in Herman Melville's "Haxvthorne and His Mosses... American Literature 69 (Dec., 1997), 
701. 
242 Yet another layer of duplicity, or at least ironic ambiguity, is the Virginian's claim to have 
never met Hawthorne. Whatever one wishes to make of such a claim when it comes from a fictional 
narrator, the general consensus of Melville's biographers is that ,t most II kely was not true ot'him. 
Nlelville's meeting with Ha\\thorne has taken on epic proportions in %lei\ ille / Hawthorne studies. The 
iliceling took place on 5 August 1850, at a picnic on Monument Mountain, \0en Bert Duvckinck 
introduced him to Hawthorne and Oliver W'endell Holmes, among others. For the best discussion of 
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previous novels: to whom should we accredit a novel whose author suggests 'the 
names of all fine authors are fictitious ones'? 
For Schlegel, the infinite unfolding of this question - that of the relationship 
between propriety and impropriety, universal poetry and prose - is the task of a 
philosophical thinking that is also a progression of mind. "' Such irony, he adds 
elsewhere, is 'logical beauty'. "' As Andrew Bowie explains, this is because it Is 
dependent on an assertion (logos) that 'negates itself without leading to a final 
opposed positive position. The final position is, for Schlegel, only ever pointed to by 
the failure of attempts to ground a philosophical system. "" Therefore, for Schlegel 
and the early Romantics, it is only in an ironic failure of self-assertion that the world 
is ever meaningful at all. "' 
the events surrounding the composition and publication of the essay, see Hershel Parker, Herman 
Melville: A Biography: Volume 1,1819-1851 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 752- 
81. For a range of insights, see Merton M. Sealts, Jr., 'Historical Note', The Piazza Tales and Other 
Prose Pieces 1839-1860, by Herman Melville (eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas 
Tanselle; vol. 9 of The Writings of Herman Melville; Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University 
Press and The Newberry Library, 1987), 471-76; Leon Howard, Herman Melville: A Biography 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951), 154-58; Edwin Haviland Miller, 
Melville (New York: Venture Books, 1975), 19-36. Laurie Roberton-Lorant is one of the remaining 
voices of dissent who maintain that Melville wrote the essay prior to meeting Hawthorne; see her 
Melville: A Biography, 244-55. 
243 Melville, The Piazza Tales, 239. 
244 Cf., 'The philosophy of a human being is the history, the becoming, the progression of his 
mind, the gradual formation and development of his thoughts' (Friedrich Schlegel, Wissenschaft der 
Europäischen Literatur: Vorlesungen, Aufsätze und Fragment aus der Zeit von 1795-1804 in Kritische 
Friedrich- Schlegel-Ausgabe [cd. Ernst Behler; vol. 11; Munich: Sch6ningh, 1958], 118). Ernst Behler 
cites Platonic / Socratic 'dialectics' as the most technical example of this for Schlegel (German 
Romantic Literary Theory, 147). Indeed, Schlegel notes, for Platonever finished with his thought, and 
this constant further striving of his thought for completed knowledge and the highest cognition, this 
eternal becoming, forming, and developing of his ideas, he has tried to shape artistically in dialogues' 
(Schlegel, Wissenschaft der Europäischen Literatur, 120). 
245 Schlegel, 'Lucinde'and the Fragments, 148 [Critical Fragment 42]. 
246 Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theoq: The Philosopkv of German Literar. y 
Theorý, (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 86-87. Cf, 'A work is cultivated when it is 
everywhere sharply delimited but within those limits limitless and inexhaustible; when it is completely 
faithful to itself, entirely homogenous, and nonetheless exalted above itself (Schlegel, Tucinde'and the 
Fragments, 204 [Athenaeum Fragment 297]). 
247 Although they agree that it heralds the infinite unfolding of temporal meaningfulness, 
Schlegel's assessment of Socratic irony stands in significant contrast to that of Wayne Booth, for whom 
it is'infinite but somehow stable'. As 'the ironist of infinities', Booth asserts, the lesson of Socratic 
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As such, meaningfulness, beauty, and truth are bound together in the early 
Romantics' characterisation of irony as the continuous fluctuation 'between self- 
creation and self-destruction'. "' In a manner at first similar to what we have already 
seen in Chapter One regarding Melville's sense of self-assertion as self-violence, 
Schlegel holds this as the ideal (i. e., 'naive') counterpoint to the self-consciousness of 
intention or instinct, that'the most intense passion is eager to wound itself, if only to 
act and to discharge its excessive power'. "' Here, truth emerges only in its continual 
recontextualisation and the necessary rejection of any teleological notion of its being 
'absolute truth'. 
Truth arises when opposed errors neutralise each other. Absolute truth 
cannot be admitted; and this is the testimony for the freedom of 
thought and of spirit. If absolute truth were found then the business of 
spirit would be completed and it would have to cease to be, since it 
only exists in activity. "' 
irony is 'that there is, after all, a Supreme Ironist, truth itself, standing in his temple above us, observing 
all authors and readers in their comic or pathetic or tragic efforts to climb and join him' (A Rhetoric of 
Irony [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19741,268-69). Schlegel, however, cannot abide any 
sense of truth as an 'untouched' transcendence; on the contrary, it is either already involved in the ironic 
play of infinite reflectivity, or it is not truth at all. 
248 Schlegel, 'Lucinde'and the Fragments, 167 [Athenaeum Fragment 51]; cf, , 146-47 [Critical Fragment 37]. 
249 Friedrich Schlegel, Studien des Klassischen Altertums in Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel- 
Ausgabe (ed. Ernst Behler; vol. 1; Munich: Sch6ningh, 1979), 403. In other contexts, Schlegel 
describes irony as 'permanent parabasis', those digressive moments in ancient Greek dramas and 
comedies where the chorus interrupts the action of the play and addresses the audience (Philosophische 
Lehrjahre, 1796-1806: nebst Philosophischen Manuskripten aus den Jahren 1796-1828 in Kritische 
Friedrich- Schlegel-Ausgabe [ed. Ernst Behler; vol. 18; Munich: Sch6ningh, 1963], 85). As such, his 
comments on parabasis in the comedies of Aristophanes are especially appropriate to his overall theory 
of irony: 'This self-infliction is not ineptitude, but deliberate impetuousness, overflowing vitality, and 
often has not a bad effect, indeed stimulates the effect, since it cannot totally destroy the illusion. The 
most intense agility of life must act, even destroy; if it does not find an external object, it reacts against 
a beloved one, against itself, against its own creation. This agility then injures in order to excite, not to 
destroy' (Schlegel, Studien des Klassischen Altertums, 30). 
250 Friedrich Schlegel, Transcendentalphilosophie (ed. Michael Els5sser; Hamburg: F. Meiner. 
1991), 93. 
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As with the 'prosaic'nature of the Romantic Absolute discussed above, then, Schlegel 
describes 'all- highest truths' as 'thoroughly trivial'; that is, only absolute insofar as they 
are infinitely, and thus contradictorily, expressed anew. "' 
6. The Poet and Author as Romantic Ideal 
For Schlegel, the problem with modem literature is, in effect, that it had lost 
its soul. In his Dialogue on Poetry, he writes: 
I will go right to the point. Our poetry, I maintain, lacks a focal point, 
such as mythology was for the ancients; and one could summarize all 
the essentials in which modem poetry is inferior to the ancients in 
these words: We have no mythology. "' 
By 'mythology', Schlegel refers here to the 'firm basis' of poetic activity, i. e., a 
communal matrix of metaphor, image, and allegory through which an age 
communicates truth and beauty. The absence of this, he argues, is the saddest 
philosophical and cultural legacy of the Enlightenment. Inasmuch as it lost sight of 
infinite thought, he reasoned, it also lost the deep meaningfulness of beauty and truth. 
Schlegel, nevertheless, can but speak only in the broadest of terrns when it comes to 
his prophetic conviction that'we are close to obtaining one [a mythology]; or, rather, 
251 Schlegel, 'Llicinde'and the Fragments, 263 ['On Incomprehensibility']. This is illustrated 
perhaps best in the aphoristic nature of Schlegel's 'Critical Fragments', 'Athenaeum Fragments', and 
'Ideas'. Although many of the individual fraginents make universal claims, the Romantic Absolute can 
only be understood through the juxtaposition of such fragments with others that often intimate 
contradictory universal claims. Hence, Bowie points out, the Romantic philosophical disposition 
toward literature: 'Literature depends on the freedom of the imagination to move beyond any particular 
determination, without any obligation to arrive at a conclusion, and its goal ... is continually to render 
the world meaningful by connecting its aspects in new constellations' (Bowie, From Romanticism to 
Critical 7'heor 
, v, 
78). The obvious danger of this, of course, is that such an emphasis on indi ý iduality 
and freedom might degenerate into incoherence, whereby each person is freed to craft his or her own 
nicaning. Schlegel avoids the nihilism of this trap, however, by maintaining that Romantic poetry is 
focused on an aesthetic truth, whose infinite, active unfolding of itself asfragnientar ,v allows 
conflict 
or differentiation between meanings to be recognisable as such. Andrew Bowie likens this to the 
shattering of metaphysical correspondence theories of truth in the early Heideggerian sense of'world- 
disclosure'. See From Romanticism to Critical Theorv, 138-44,170-82. 
, -S2 Schlcgcl, Dialogue on Poetr. v, 8 1. 
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it is time that we earnestly work together to create one . 
'25' Later in his Dialogue on 
Poetr. N,,, he describes this hope for'an age of rejuvenation', that moment in time in 
which'all disciplines and all arts will be seized by the great revolution' : 
254 
And thus let us, by light and life, hesitate no longer, but accelerate, 
each according to his own mind, that great development to which we 
were called. Be worthy of the greatness of the age and the fog will 
vanish from your eyes; and there will be light before you. All thinking 
is divining, but man is only now beginning to realize his divining 
power. What immense expanse will this power experience, and 
especially now! It seems to me that he who could understand the age 
- that is, those great principles of general rejuvenation and of eternal 
revolution - would be able to succeed in grasping the poles of 
mankind, to recognize and to know the activity of the first men as well 
as the nature of the Golden Age which is to come. Then the empty 
chatter would stop and man would become conscious of what he is: he 
would understand the earth and the sun. 255 
Schlegel's goal in and for Romanticism, as such, is nothing less than the creation of a 
new heaven and a new earth. 
By the mid- I 830s in the United States no one took upon himself the 
revolutionary zeal of Romanticism quite like Ralph Waldo Emerson. Indeed, if 
Melville were to have an equal, and quite possibly a greater, in terms of his Germanic 
philosophical disposition, it would be found in Emerson. "' Drawing deeply from his 
readings of Coleridge and Carlyle, and then the likes of Kant, Schelling, Schlegel, and 
Hegel (amongst others), "' Emerson's Transcendentalism is a perfect embodiment of 
the Romantic spirit that would both attract and repel Melville. 
253 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, 8 1. 
254 Schlegel, Dialogue on PoetrY, 83. 
255 Schlegel, Dialgoue on Poetty, 88. 
256 Cf., Pochmann, German Culture in America, 158-207-, Gura, The wisdom of Words. 75- 
105. 
257 Pochmann, German Culture, 172. 
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As with Schlegel, Emerson's aesthetic inquiries are charged with his 
theologico-revolutionary language and intentions. He begins his essay'The Poet' 
[ 1844], for example, with a radical, aesthetic redefining of the Trinity: 
For the Universe has three children, bom at one time, which reappear, 
under different names, in every system of thought, whether by be 
called cause, operation, and effect; or, more poetically, Jove, Pluto, 
Neptune; or, theologically, the Father, the Spirit, and the Son, but 
which we will call here, the Knower, the Doer, and the Sayer. These 
stand respectively for the love of truth, for the love of good, and for the 
love of beauty. These three are equal. 258 
Emerson's point is reiterated throughout the essay: the poet is as Christ, and Christ is 
as the poet. Like Christ, the poet is 'the [sovereign] representative of man', the one 
who'stands among partial men for the complete man. "' While exploring this 
thought, as Philip Gura writes, 'Emerson sounds as though he were making a narration 
of the influence of saving grace upon his soul. "" For, indeed, as Emerson writes, 
poets are 'liberating gods', who 'in any forin, whether in an ode, or in action, or in 
looks and behavior, [have] yielded us a new thought. He unlocks our chains, and 
admits us to a new scene. '26' 
The purpose of Emerson's theologising, as such, remains very much in the 
vein of Schlegel's 'new mythology'. In contrast to the mystic, who mistakes 'an 
accidental and individual symbol for an universal one', the poet knows that 'all 
symbols are fluxional; all language is vehicular and transitive, and is good, as ferries 
25 8 Ralph Waldo Emerson, 'The Poet' in Self- Relim z ce and Other Essays (Ncýý York: Dover, 
1993), 67. 
'5() Emerson, 'The Poet', 66-67. 
2"" Gura, The Wisdom Words, 101. Cf., 'With what joy I begin to read a poem, which I 
confide in as an inspiration! And now my chains are to be broken-, I shall mount above these clouds 
and opaque airs in which I fiN c. -- opaque though they seem transparent, -- and 
from the heaNcris of 
truth I shall scc and comprehend my relations. That will reconcile me to life, and renovate nature, to 
scc trif1cs miniated by a tendency, and to kno\\ \\hat I am doing' (Emerson, 'The Poet', 69). 
261 Enierson, 'The Poet'. 77,78. 
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and horses are, for conveyance, not as fanns and houses are, for homestead. 1-262 As a 
result, then, the beauty and truth of poetry is not in its being written or spoken. 
For poetry was all written before time was, and whenever we are so 
finely organized that we can penetrate into that region where the air is 
music, we hear those primal warblings, and attempt to write them 
down, but we lose ever and anon a word, or a verse, and substitute 
something of our own, and thus miswrite the poem. "' 
As 'the Sayer', the poet represents primordial beauty. For it is not the case, Emerson 
writes, that God simply'made some beautiful things'. Rather, in line with his 
Trinitarian aesthetic, the world'is from the beginning beautiful', and thus'Beauty is 
the creator of the universe'. "' 
The parallel between Emerson'sThe Poet'and Melville's 'Hawthorne and His 
Mosses', like that between Melville's self-violent subjectivity and that of early 
Gen-nan Romanticism, is at first striking. For instance, regarding Hawthorne's short 
story'The Master Genius', Melville vmtes: 
May it not be, that this commanding mind has not been, is not, and 
never will be, individually developed in any one man? And would it, 
indeed, appear so unreasonable to suppose, that this great fullness and 
overflowing may be, or may be destined to be, shared by a plurality of 
men of genius? "' 
Here, both Emerson and Melville suggest a common, collective pool of originality. 
However, what 'The Poet' explores abstractly as a deferred Ideal, 'Hawthorne and The 
Mosses' anatomises materially as an immanent Reality. That is, while Emerson 
262 Emerson, 'The Poet', 79. 
263 Emerson, 'The Poet', 67. Cf., 'All the classical poems of the ancients are coherent, 
inseparable; they form an organic whole, they constitute, properly viewed, only asI ngle poem, the only 
one in which poetry itself appears in perfecfion. In a similar way, in a perfect literature all 
books 
should be only a single book, and in such an eternally developing book, the gospel of humanity and 
culture will be revealed' (Schlegel, 'Lucinde'and the Fragments, 249-50 [Idea 95]). 
2(, 4 Emerson, 'The Poet', 67. 
265 Melville, The Piazza Tales, 2-52 
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'look[s] in vain for the poet', declaring that'we have yet had no genius in America', "' 
Melville suggests the primordial pool of originality / genius actually makes it 
possible, advisable even, to regard Shakespeare and Hawthorne as'on the same page'. 
Melville, however, goes one step further, when he writes: 'There are minds that have 
gone as far as Shakespeare into the universe. And hardly a mortal man, who, at some 
time or other, has not felt as great thoughts in him as any you will find in Hamlet 
Believe me, my friends, that Shakespeares are this day being born on the banks of the 
Ohio. v267 In a sense of material immanence that Emerson's essay and sense of genius 
does not exhibit, "' Shakespeare is thus separated from his creations, and is replaced 
by a more generic sense of aesthetic autonomy that encapsulates individual acts of 
creative gen IUS. 
269 Which is to say, for Melville, we need not avt, ait the poetic or the 
genius, because it is already here. 
7. An Ambivalent Embodiment 
It is, in fact, what he regarded as their highlighting of immateriality that made 
Melville especially wary of whole-heartedly embracing either Emerson's 
Transcendentalism or Schlegel's Romanticism. Though he appreciated, for instance, 
the 'nobility' of Emerson's intellect, "' and obviously noted the similanty between their 
266 Emerson, 'The Poet, 80. 
267 Melville, The Plazza Tales, 245. 
268 Cf., 'if I have not found that excellent combination of gifts in my countrymen which I seek, 
neither could I aid myself to fix the idea of the poet by reading now and then in Chambers's collection 
of fivc centurics of English poets. These are wits, more than poets, though there ha\c been poets 
among then. But when we adhere to the ideal of the poet, we ha% c our difficulties even .ý ith Milton 
and Homer. Milton is too literary, and Homer too literal and historical' (Emerson, 'The Poet', 80). 
269 Ellen Weinauer makes this explicit in her excellent essay on the 'proprietary self, that is the 
sense of identity wrought by possession. See Ellen Weinauer, 'Plagiarism and the Proprietary Self . 
697-717. 
2'0 1n the margins of his copy of 'The Poet', N lei vi IIe Nýrites: 'All this is nobly \ýritten, and 
proceeds fi-oni noble thinking, and a natural sympathy \\It h greatness' (qtd. \U I am Bras\\c IL\. I cI ýi IIe 
as Critic Offinersol"Amet-icaii Litei-ature 9 [Nov. 1937]: 32 1). 
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respective philosophical dispositions, he could not help but find him cold and SMUg. 271 
In a letter to Duyckinck, whose disdain for every shade of Transcendentalism caused 
him to revile Emerson, Melville's ambivalent response ('I was very agreeably 
disappointed') upon hearing Emerson lecture in Boston is stark. "' 
[flor the sake of the argument, let us call him a fool; - then had I 
rather be a fool than a wise man. -I love all men who dive. Any fish 
can swim near the surface, but it takes a great whale to go down stairs 
five miles or more; & if he don't attain the bottom, why, all the lead in 
Galena can't fashion the plummet that will. "' 
Notwithstanding this, Melville continues, the'gaping flaw'of this'Plato who talks 
thro' his nose' is all too apparent; namely, the insinuation 'that had he lived in those 
days when the world was made, he might have offered some valuable suggestions. Q74 
Just as damning for Melville, though, is Emerson's emotional stuffiness and absolute 
absence of any 'convivial' spirit. He writes: 
271 Once again, in the marginalia of his copy of'The Poet', Melville writes: 'This is admirable, 
as many other thoughts of Mr. Emerson's are. His gross and astonishing errors & illusions spring from 
a self-conceit so intensely intellectual and calm that at first one hesitates to call it by its right name. 
Another species of Mr. Emerson's errors, or rather blindness, proceeds from a defect in the region of his 
heart' (qtd. Braswell, 'Melville as. Critic of Emerson', 33 1). 
272 Like the debate surrounding Melville's relationships to Duyckinck and Hawthorne, no less 
ink has been exhausted detailing Melville's opinion of Emerson. Though the two men apparently never 
met or corresponded, weaned as he was by Evert Duyckinck and his New York coterie, Melville could 
not have avoided the former's sometimes hyperbolic dislike for Transcendentalism. For a discussion of 
Melville's relationship to Emerson see Braswell, 'Melville as Critic of Emerson', 317-34; Merton M. 
Sealts, Jr. 'Melville and Emerson's Rainbow'ESQ: A Journal of the American Renaissance 26 (2 nd 
Quarter, 1980): 53-78; Hershel Parker, 'Melville's Satire of Emerson and Thoreau: An Evaluation of 
the Evidence'American Transcendental Quarterly 7 (Summer 1970): 61-67; Elizabeth Foster, 
Introduction and'Explanatory Notes'in The Confidence Man: His Masquerade, by Herman Melville 
(New York: Hendricks House, 1954), lxxv-lxxxii, 350-52; and Watson Branch, et al, 'Historical Note', 
257-59,285-90. 
273 Melville, Correspondence, 121. 
274 Melville, Correspondence, 12 1. Cf. ,a similar criticism of philosophers 
like Plato, Spinoza, 
and Goethe, who, in their claims to have found the 'Talismanic secretof life, which would reconcile 
the world with one's soul: ' Certain philosophers have time and again pretended to have found it; but if 
they do not in the end discover their own delusion, other people soon discover it for themselves.... 
Plato, and Spinoza, and Goethe, and many more belong to this guild of self-imposters, with a 
preposterous rabble of Muggletonian Scots and Yankees, whose vile brogue still the more bestreaks the 
stripedness of their Greek or German Neoplatonical originals. That profound Silence, that only Voice 
of our God, which I before spoke of; from that divine thing without a name, those imposter 
philosophers pretend somehow to have got an answer; which is as absurd, as though they should say 
they had got water out of stone, for how can a man get a Voice out of Silence' (Melville, Pierre; or, 
The Ambiguities, 208) 
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You complain that Emerson tho' a denizen of the land of - ingerbread, 
is above munching a plain cake in company of jolly fellows. & swiging 
[sic] off his ale like you & me. Ah, my dear sir, that's his misfortune, 
not his fault. His belly, sir, is in his chest, & his brains descend down 
into his neck, & offer an obstacle to a draught of ale or a mouthful of 
cake. "' 
In short, there remains in Emerson a very problematic lack of anything resembling the 
vitality and intensity of humanity and life. 
And yet, we should note once again, Emerson is merely exemplary of the 
greater malaise Melville sees in the very philosophical disposition even he often 
entertains. Like the preacher in Melville's White-Jacket, Melville, too, had tasted'the 
mystic fountain of Plato'; his head, as well, 'had been turned by the Germans', and, 
indeed, with Adler at his side, one could well imagine him walking the deck of a ship 
with Coleridge's Biographia Literaria in hand. Perhaps, then, there is little surprise 
that Mardi had proven as unpalatable to its readers as the preacher's sermons had been 
'111 calculated to benefit the crew'. 276 Ultimately, however, Melville bristles at the 
blindness to the material realities of life exhibited in Romantic maxims like that of 
Goethe's'Live in the all'. He writes in a letter to Hawthorne: 'What nonsense! Here is 
a fellow with a raging toothache. "My dear boy, " Goethe says to him, "you are solely 
afflicted with that tooth; but you must live in the all, and then you will be happy! 
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As Lewis Mumford notes, the disembodied idealism of writers like Emerson and 
Goethe was naturally at odds with Melville's first-hand experience of nature's horrific 
and violent design, where 'though in many of its aspects this visible world seems 
275 Melville, Correspondence, 122. 
276 Herman Melville, White Jacket: or, The World in a Man-of-War, in The Writtligs of 
Herman Ifelville (eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thoma's Tanselle-, wl. S. Evanston 
and Chicago: Northwestcrn UnIvcrsIty Press, 1970). 155, cf, Sealts. Jr., 'Melville and Emerson's 
RainhoW, 66. 
277 j%lel\lllc. Cori-cspondence. 193-94. 
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fori-ned in love, the invisible spheres were formed in fright'. "' Mumford writes* 
Emerson was the perpetual passenger who stayed below in bad 
weather, trusting that the captain would take care of the ship. \Iel\ ille 
was the sailor who climbed aloft, and knew that the captain was 
sometimes drunk and that the best of ships might go down. '79 
Melville's complex relationship with the aims of Romanticism and Transcendentalism 
is, we will see more fully in Chapter Three, strictly parallel to that of Ahab, in his 
monomaniacal desire to strike through the 'pasteboard mask' of reality to reveal 'some 
unknown but still reasoning thing [that] puts forth the mouldings of its features from 
behind the unreasoning mask. ' For indeed, as Ahab admits, 'Sometimes I think there's 
naught beyond. "" 
Where Emerson's reading of Gennan philosophy led him to affirm the 
transcendental unity of Yes, Melville found in it the ironic materiality of No. 2" 'What 
plays mischief with the truth', he concludes of Goethe, 'is that men will insist upon the 
universal application of a temporary feeling or opinion'. "' As such, then, in 
'Hawthorne and His Mosses', authorial identity is neither wholly affirmed nor denied, 
but is instead regarded as authorial identity only inasmuch as it is materially 
embodied in the necessarily duplicitous oscillation between his self-assertion and self- 
denial. Why duplicitous? For if the story of its composition and publication shows 
anything clearly at all, it demonstrates Melville's unease about being divided too far 
from his own work. The surviving fair-copy manuscript of the essay, for instance, 
'78 1 Melville, Moby-Dick, 195. 
279 Lewis Mumford, Herincin Melville: A Study of His Life and Vision (London: Secker and 
Warburg, 1929), 143. 
280 Melville, Moln-DIck, 164. Cf., By vast pains we mine Into the pyramid, by horrible 
gropings we come to the central room, with joy we espy the sarcophagus; but we 
lift the lid - and no 
hody is there! - appallin. gly vacant as vast is the soul of a man! 
' (Melville, Pierre, 285). 
281 Ilochniatin, German Culture in America, 439-40. 
Nlci\illc, Correspondence, 194. 
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indicates that Melville's mysterious 'Virginian' was actually an afterthought included 
only after a draft had already been written. "' Moreover, even within the text itself, 
the narrator, fictive or not, cannot help but maintain his priority. Most notable Is his 
admission: 'I have more served and honored myself, than him [Hawthorne] '. 2" An 
author, be it Melville or a Virginian, cannot, in spite of and because of such a self- 
conscious desire, complete the separation from / self-denial of his or her texts. 
Indeed, pivotal to'Hawthome and His Mosses' is the nationalistic expression of pride 
that American writers are as good as, if not better than, those of the rest of the ývorld. 
[W]e want no American Goldsmiths; nay, we want no American 
Miltons. It were the vilest thing you could say of a true American 
author, that he were an American Tompkins. Call him an American, 
and have done; for you can not say a nobler thing of him. - But it is 
not meant that all American writers should studiously cleave to 
nationality in their writings; only this, no American writer should write 
like an Englishman, or a Frenchman; let him write like a man, for then 
he will be sure to write like an American. Let us away with this 
Bostonian leaven of literary flunkeyism towards England. If either 
must play the flunkey in this thing, let England do it, not US. 285 
Consequently, James Mellow notes that inHawthome and his Mosses' Melville's 
attempts at a universally-accepted common pool of originality is tempered 
considerably by his desired inclusion in the inner circle of the American literary 
masters he was touting. 
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The important insight to be gained from this discussion of irony, duplicity, and 
disguise is that Melville himself goes out of his way to highlight it. The complexity 
of his assurances and suggestions about Hawthorne - and thus, too, about himself 
are self-consciously masked in an intricate and ultimately paradoxical scheme. 
2'3 Merton M. Sealts, Jr. 'Historical Note', 471. For a detailed analysis of extant copies, see 
the 'Notes On Individual Prose Pieces' section in Meh-ille, Pjazza Tales, 652-690. 
'84 Melville, Piazza Tales, 249. 
'8i Nickille, Piazza Tales, 248. 
286 Nlcllo\N, Nathaniel Hawthorne in His Times, ', 36. 
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Consider the following two sentences: 
7, lie truth seems to be, that like many other geniuses, this Man of 
Mosses takes great delight in hoodwinking the world, -- at least, with 
respect to himself' 
'[I]t is certain that some of [Hawthome's titles] are directly calculated 
to deceive - egregiously deceive, the superficial skimmer of the 
pages. 1'87 
Melville, as we have seen, is deeply aware of the necessity of self-presentation in any 
conception of subjectivity. In the self-presentation of his own genius, then, Mel-ville 
is not unlike the proverbial Cretan liar, who confesses that the only certal I in truth is that 
he is in fact a liar. As an author, Melville is tom: he wants to assert his genius by 
freeing his text, but never so much that it is no longer his text to free. Moreover, as 
readers of Melville, we have no sure way of knowing where or how to enter his texts; 
or, for that matter, which texts are truly his own. Which is to say, the reader, too, is 
tom: she needs a text to engage in order to be a reader, but can engage a text of 
Melville only insofar as she is uncertain where or how to begin it. As we will see in 
Chapter Three, this paradoxical dilemma, that of the niaterialistic genesis of self- 
becoming (i. e., as a reader or as an author), situates our understanding of Melville 
very close to the theologically explosive philosophy of Fnedrich Schelling. 
297 Nick Me, Piazza Tales, 250-51 (my emphasis). In December 1849, in a letter to 
Mlyckinck, one can see Nilel\ ille's progression to such an admission. as \\ ell as his understanding of the 
implications: 'What -a madness & anguish it is, that an author can ne\ er - under no circumstances - 
be at all frank \\ ith his readers (Correspondence, 149). 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM OF MELVILLE AND SCHELIANG 
1. The Decision to Begin 
Thus far, we have established a striking symmetry, however ambivalent, 
between the ironic literary manoeuvres of Hennan Melville and the phIlosophical 
ambitions of early Gen-nan Romanticism. We have not yet, however, explicitly 
addressed the key theological implications of Melville's contnbution to that 
symmetry. I am here referring specifically to the apocalyptic self-presentation that 
unfolds in most of his novels. Such an inquiry, we will see below, is profoundly 
theological in its scope, if not in its genre. We will recall Thomas J. J. Altizer, who 
identifies theological thinking not as a discipline, but as that which 'truly re-thinks the 
deepest ground of theology, a re-thinking which is initially an unthinking of every 
established theological ground'. Only in this 'unthinking', he adds, 'can a clearing be 
established for theological thinking, and that is the very clearing which is the first goal 
of radical theology. "" In this, apropos the ironic dissolution of genre In Romanticism, 
radical theological thinking is not confined strictly to religious or confessional 
discourses, but defined by its implications for the thinking of theology's self- 
becoming / self-presentation as theology. 
Religion, so goes the common wisdom, is siti generis, and is thus inherently 
distinguishable from modem, secular culture. Edward Said, for example, asserts 
without any supplemental argument that 'beginning is basically an activity which 
ultimately implies return and repetition rather than simple linear accomplishment, that 
2X'S' Mtizcr, 'Doing Radical Theology', 2. 
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begintung and beginning-again are historical whereas origins are divine'. "' Not 
content with Said's simplistic privileging of the secular, Catherine Keller argues that 
theology, too, has classically abided by the same logic, albeit with a reversal of its 
binary fortune. According to traditional theology, she argues, the divinity of origin 
subordinates and ontologically precedes the historicity of 'beginning', thus securing 
'God's unfettered sovereignty'. "' For her part, Keller finds this notion of origin ex 
nihilo, the whim of a wholly autonomous, omnipotent God, as problematic as Said's 
secular reductionism: 
This dogma of origin has exercised immense productive force. It has 
become common sense. Gradually it took modem and then secular 
form, generating every kind of western originality, every logos creating 
the new as if from nothing, cutting violently, ecstatically free of the 
abysms of the past. But Christian theology, I argue, created this ex 
iiihilo at the cost of its own depth. It systematically and symbolically 
sought to erase the chaos of creation. Such a maneuver ... was always doomed to a vicious cycle: the nothingness invariably returns with the 
face of the feared chaos - to be nihilated all the more violently. "' 
As noted above, this tragic, absolute originality is not exclusive to theology proper. 
Contemporarily, the secular and the sacred blur. most clearly In the modem 
conceptions of the artistic genius and the avant-garde, wherein'the purer, the more 
abstract, the creativity, the more fully it replaces the divine originality, the freedom of 
a creator a se, unconstrained by creaturely interdependence. "" On this issue Clement 
Greenberg is even more explicit: 
It has been in search of the absolute that the avant-garde has arrived at 
'abstract' or 'nonobjective' art - and poetry, too. The avant-garde poet 
or artist tnes in effect to imitate God by creating something valid 
solely on its own terms, in the way nature itself is valid, in the way a 
289 EdNý ard Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (Neýý York: Columbia Um ý ersity Prcss, 
1985), xiii (emphasis mine). 
2')" Keller, Face of flie Deep. 159. 
291 Kellci-, Face of the Deep, xvi. 
2"2 KcIler, Face (? fthe Deep, 160. 
91 
landscape-not a picture - is aesthetically valid; something given, 
increate, independent of meanings, similars or originals. Content is to 
be dissolved so completely into form that the work of art or literature 
cannot be reduced in whole or part to anything not Itself... 
Arising from, and perfect unto, itself and its own purpose, absolute / divine originality 
has made an indelible claim on our understanding of beauty and art. "' it is, however, 
a claim that, before we can proceed further, we must vigorously challenge. 
In contrast to origins, be they divine, secular, or both at once, beginnings are 
an exercise in learning how to lose. Indeed, when we attempt to think beginning and 
theology together, the loss at first may seem irreparable. The decision to begin, to 
exist, Keller counsels, is one of profound, inevitable violence and guilt: 'A cloud of 
missed possibilities envelops every beginning: it is always this beginning, this 
universe and not some other. Decision lacks innocence. Around its narrations gather 
histories of grievance: what possibilities were excluded? "" In the face of the 
unthinkable absolute singularity that beckons us to begin, the decisions we make cut 
us off from all the other decisions and stories that might have been enacted or narrated 
with the best of intentions. "' Nevertheless, what we find in Melville is that the so- 
293 Clement Greenberg, 'Avant-Garde and Kitsch' in The Collected Essays (ed. John O'Brian; 
vol. I -, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 8. 
294 See Immanuel Kant on the work of art as'self-propagative' and organic 'purposiveness 
without purpose' in his The Critique of Judgement (trans. J H. Bernard; New York: Hafner, 1951), 218- 
31. 
295 Keller, Face of the Deep, 160. 
296 Cf., Jacques Derrida's description of the ethical dilemma at the core of religious and secular 
responsibility and decision-making: 
I am responsible to the other as other, I answer to him and I answer for what I do 
before him. But of course, what binds me thus in my singularity to the absolute 
singularity of the other, immediately propels me into the space or risk of absolute 
sacrifice. There are also others, an infinite number of them, the innumerable 
generality of others to whom I should be bound by the same responsibility, a general 
and uni \ ersal responsibility (what Kierkegaard calls the ethical order). I cannot 
respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or c\ en the love of another ý% ithout 
sacrificing the other other, the other others.... As soon as I enter into a relation \% Ith 
the other, I kno\ý that I can respond only by sacrificing ethics. that is. by sacrificing 
\\ lime\ er obliges me to also respond, in the same way, in the same instant. to all the 
others. (The Gift (? f Death, 68) 
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called 'undecidable' violence of his beginning (i. e. his self-presentation) is not merely 
a description of infinite ethical uncertainty; rather, at its most primordial, it is the 
active, albeit necessanly repressed, condition for the creative / poetic possibility of 
beginning at all. 
2. An 'UnfoldedSubjectivity 
As we noted in Chapter One, if it is true for Melville that, from the age of 
twenty-five, 'three weeks have scarcely passed ... that I have not unfolded within 
myself, this is only possible in the unfolding of himself without in the act of writing. "' 
The result of this'unfolded' subjectivity is a latent violence, which, as we have already 
hinted, leads him perilously close to the self-destructive condition of several of his 
most famous characters. 
For instance, we learn at the beginning of Moby-Dick that Ishmael, like 
Melville, is drawn to the water. When he recounts the suicidal thoughts that lead him 
to sea and his dangerous flirtations with the fate of Narcisuss, 'who because he could 
not grasp the tonrienting, mild image he saw in the fountain, plunged into it and was 
drowned', "' it is important to recall that Ishmael's confession is that of a narrator 
distanced from himself as a narrated character. Much of the enduring significance of 
Moby-Dick, in fact, is missed if one overlooks the paradox of its reflective 
complexity, whereby Ishmael -as-character retroactively / anachronistically informs 
his own characterisation by Ishmael-as-narrator. Hence the latter's Yealisation' as he 
begins his tale that the same perception of self that draws him to the water is also 'the 
IQ7 
Cf., 1). 18. 
'" Mckille, Alobv-Dick, 
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image of the ungraspable phantom of life; and this is the key to it all. "" Which is to 
say, the phantom of life for Ishmael-as-narrator, that which makes him vvhat he is, is 
the incessant, suicidal return to the sea of his story's retelling. Ishmael-as-narrator 
(i. e., as Subject) is truly'alive', then, only inasmuch as he is characterised (i. e., as 
Object) as plunging toward his death. 
Indeed, it is the miraculous 'resurrection' of Ishmael-as-character in the novel's 
epilogue that effectively conditions the possibility of his suicidal narration in the 
novel's beginning. Moreover, it marks the site of Ishmael's subjective autonomy as a 
production / eruption of excess from the self-violent circularity of his necessarily 
being a Subject that is also an Object. Suicidal desire hints at this subjective surplus, 
though, not because it somehow precedes or motivates Ishmael-as-narrator. In 
Ishmael, rather, such a desire itself is the Subject's sublimation of the immanent self- 
violence that emergesfrom, but cannotfinally be cowained its (subjective) 
narration. It is, in fact, precisely the excessiveness of his narrated (suicidal) desire, 
and thus the absolute necessity of its failure as such, that makes Ishmael-as-narrator 
what he is in and through his endless self-narration. 
A similar dynamic is at work in Pierre; or The Ambiguities, Melville's follow- 
up to Moby-Dick, whose eponymous protagonist attempts to write the story of his life, 
in order to fill the void left after he rejects the memory of his formerly idealised father 
and his mother rejects him as a son. The first half of the novel is a slow-burning dark 
Romance. Here, the idyllic love between the rich, handsome Pierre and the equally 
Z, rich, beautiful Lucy is suddenly darkened by the revelation that a broodim-, brunette 
299 Peter Bellis and John lr\\ in read this passage similarly. See Peter Bellis. No AlYsterl . es Olt/ 
of Oursehvs. - Went1tv wid Form in the Novels Herman Meh, "Ite (Philadelphia: UniNersity of 0, 4r 
Pciinsyk ania Press, 1990)\ W4, and John T. lr\\ In, Amch . can Hierogývplucs: The Symbol of the 
Egypitan Hterogývphws bi theAmerican RenalSsatice (\i'c\\ Ha\en: Yale Unjvcr, ýIt\ Press, 1980). 288 
89. 
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named Isabel is the illegitimate daughter of Pierre's revered father. Rationalising that 
he must make reparations for his father's sin, whilst protecting his family's name, 
Pierre rejects Lucy and takes upon himself the protection of his sister, albeit in the 
disguise of their being instead husband and wife. Rejected by his mother, Isabel and 
Pierre move to the city, where the narrative takes an abrupt turn and Pierre endeavours 
to write a novel like no other, that is, a trite one. 
Pierre's's melodramatic attempt to re-construct his identity in tritth, in lieu ot 
the identity and self-presentation that he had discovered was false when faced with the 
revelation about his father, is fraught with problems. The narrator, for instance, notes 
that in trying to rewrite himself, at times both figuratively and literally, Pierre must 
first break ground so that he might mine the marble for the temple of the self: 
[I]t is often to be observed, that as in digging for precious metals in the 
mines, much earthy rubbish has first to be troublesomely handled and 
thrown out; so, in digging in one's soul for the fine gold of genius, 
much dullness and common-place is first brought to light. Happy 
would it be, if the man possessed in himself some receptacle for his 
own rubbish of this sort: but ... [n]o common-place is ever effectually 
got rid of, except by essentially emptying one's self of it into a book; 
for once trapped in a book, then the book can be put into the fire, and 
all will be well. "' 
Pierre's writing, in other words, is nothing but the emptying of the rubbish that does 
tiot compose his identity. And yet when the narrator surreptitiously peers over 
Pierre's shoulder to see what he is wnting, the frenzy of wet ink reveals that'he seems 
to have directly plagiarized from his own experience. " Inasmuch as plagiansm, the 
stealing of words, is related to abduction, Ellen Weinauer points out, Pierre's self- 
300 WIN 111c, Plcrre, 258. 
301 Nlckillc. Pierre, 3022. 
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plagiarism is an attempt to write himself away. "' The narrator, however, is quick to 
see the inherent problem this creates: 
For though he naked soul of man doth assuredly contain one latent 
element of intellectual Productiveness; yet never was there a child born 
solely from one parent; the visible world of experience being that 
procreative thing which impregnantes the muses; seýflreciprocall. y 
efficient hennaphrodites being but a fable. "' 
That is to say, when the representative self (i. e., Pierre-as-narrator-as-abductor) is 
generated by self-abduction, one's sense of self is simultaneously trapped and made 
free in an apparent tautology that knows no end. "' 
In Melville's essay'Hawthome and His Mosses, the excess that is a void 
generated by this inherent, paradoxical tautology Is characterised as the 'blackness of 
darkness beyond', around which even Hawthorne's most diaphanous allegorles'but 
fringe, and play upon the edges of thunder-clouds'. "' Michael Bell describes the 
writing of Hawthorne similarly: 
302 Weinauer, 'Plagiarism and the Self, 699. Plagidre, Weinauer points out, is the Latin verb 
meaning 'to kidnap', and a plagidrius is a kidnapper or seducer. 
303 Melville, Pierre, 259 (emphasis mine). Cf., 'If a man be told a thing wholly new, then - 
during the time of its first announcement to him - it is entirely impossible for him to comprehend it. 
For - absurd as it may seem - men are only made to comprehend things which they comprehended 
before (though by in the embryo, as it were). Things new it is impossible to make them comprehend, 
by merely talking to them about it. True, sometimes they pretend to comprehend; in their own hearts 
they really believe they do comprehend; outwardly look as though they did comprehend, wag their 
bushy tails comprehendingly; but for all that, they do not comprehend. Possibly, they may afterward 
come, of themselves, to inhale this new idea from the circurnambient air, and so come to comprehend 
it-, but not otherwise at all (209). 
304 See Parlej, The Romantic Theory of the Novel, 114-56. Melville's tautology, Parlej 
suggests, 'no longer follows the metaphysical model of language; it reveals, as repetition, the subject of 
repetition as such. This subject occurs only in repetition, as the non-objective content of the act of 
repetition'(] 2 1). 
305 Melville, The Piazza Tales, 243. Traditionally, Melville and Hawthorne are contrasted, 
with Melville representative of the symbolist, and Hawthorne the allegorist. For classic examples, see 
F. 0. Matthiessen, Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (New York: 
Oxford UP, 1941), 242-315; and Charles Fiedelson, Jr., Symbolism and American Literature (Chicago: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953), esp. pp. 14-15,32. Michael Bell's discussion of the proposed contrast 
is one of the most helpftil at questioning what had become an assumption. See his The Development of 
American Romance, 130-42. 
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His plots are not didactically generated by his efforts to tell us what his 
symbols mean, what abstract notions they picture forth; they grow 
instead out of his characters' efforts to find out what the symbols mean 
or at all events to make them mean something. It is these characters 
who are, in intention, the allegonsts. Moreov, er, their allegorical 
tendency almost alvt, a 
, vs 
leads to a distortion of life, a reflisal tojace it 
directlY in itsfidl complexit 
, 
N,. Hawthorne thus apparently adopts the 
allegorical mode in order to turn it against allegorical intentions. 306 
For Melville, it is from this darkness and distortion of life that characters like Hamlet, 
Timon, Lear, and lago emerge. In them, Melville celebrates tlie'sane madness of vital 
truth' and the outlet they offer Shakespeare to say or insinuate those thing,,, 'we feel to 
be so terrifically true, that it were all but madness for any good man, in his own 
proper character, to utter, or even hint of them. "" 
What I wish to suggest in what follows is that Melville's emphasis 
(particularly in Moby-Dick and Pierre) on embodiment, i. e., his sense that there is no 
free Subject prior to its being 'plagiarized'/ to its materialisation as such, and his 
consequent realisation of the 'sane madness' at the heart of this paradox, brings out his 
close affinity to Friedrich's Schelling's 'dialectical materialism'. 
3. The Real as Spoken Unspeakability 
From his earliest days as a teenage philosopher, Schelling's philosophical 
reflections were infonned by his theological concerns. By the early 1840s, though, 
while teaching at the Berlin lectern that made Hegel famous, his theological bend had 
become even more apparent. Here, as recorded in The Philosophy of Rei, elation, he 
described to his students the aim of what he called'positive philosophy': 
I do not begin with the concept of God in the positive philosophy, as 
former metaphysics and the ontological argument attempted to, but I 
must drop precisely this concept, the concept of God, in order to begin 
30" Bcll, The Development ofAinerican, 134 (my emphasis). 
307 NICIý, I lie, I'lic Piazza Tales, 244. 
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with that whichJust exists, in which nothing more is thought thanjust 
this existing - in order to see if I can get from it to the di'vinity. Thus 
I cannot really prove the existence of God (by, for instance, beginning 
with the concept God) but instead the concept of that which exists 
before all possibility and thus without doubt - is given to MC. 308 
Much of Schelling's philosophy at this point of his life and career was Justly criticized 
by many of his contemporaries, such as Soren Kierkegaard (I have totally given up on 
Schelling') and Karl Marx's friend Arnold Ruge ('To still consider Schelling as a 
philosopher is the dumbest thing one could do'). "' The aim of the positive philosophy 
was truly ambitious: to develop a philosophically viable religion by radically 
reengaging and refuting the ontological proof of the existence of God (in the spirit of 
Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone), and thus also reinterpreting the 
historical / mythological development of Christianity. "' Nevertheless, as Andrew 
Bowie notes, 'it was not least Schelling's failure to achieve this latter aim that led to 
many of the valid aspects of the later philosophy's being ignored. ""' And yet, it must 
be asked ftirther, to what extent might it be possible to say that Schelling's lasting 
insight - i. e., 'that philosophy cannot arrive at a conceptually determinate prii 
IS, 312 _ 
actually emerges from this very failure? 
As early as 1804, in his Philosophy and Religion, Schelling had already 
introduced the problem that would beset him the rest of his career and still faces us 
today: 
308 F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung, in Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von 
Schelling's Sämmtliche Werke (ed. Karl F. A. Schelling; vol. 13 [Part 2, band 3]), Stuttgart: Cotta, 
1856-61), 158. 
309 F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung, 1841142 (ed. Manfred Frank, Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 455,464. 
31 0 For one of the best assessment of Schelling's late philosophy, see Andreýý Bowic, 
Introduction to On the HistorN, of Modern Philosophy, by F. W. J. Schelling (trans. Aridrexý Bowie; 
Nc\ý York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1-37. 
311 BoNN 1c, Introduction to On the Histon, of Modet-n Philosophy, 3 
3 12 llo\N ic, Schelling awl Modeiw Em-opean Philosophy, 18 1. 
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[T]here is no constant transition from the Absolute to the Real, the 
origin of the world of the senses can only be thought as a complete 
breaking off from absoluteness, by a leap. If philosophy is to deduce 
the origin of real things in a positive manner from the Absolute, then 
there would have to be a positive ground in the Absolute. ... Philosophy only has a negative relationship to things that appear, it 
rather proves that they are not than that they are.... The Absolute is 
all that is real: finite things, on the other hand, are not real; their 
ground cannot lie in a communication of reality to them or to their 
substrate, which would have emanated from the Absolute, it can onlýý 
lie in a move avva. v, In afall [Abfall] from the Absolute. ' 13 
What makes this explication of the Absolute so theologically profound is the 
materialistic spin Schelling ultimately puts on its most fundamental terrns in his 
largely unfinished masterpiece, Die Weltalter [Ages of the World] [ 1811/15]. The 
question he poses here, apropos what we have seen repeatedly in Melville, is that of 
the self-becoming / self-presentation of the Absolute. For Schelling, as for Melville, 
the most fundamental question is 'Where to begMT 
Schelfing's 'creation myth', as Judith Non-nan appropriately calls it, begins in 
the primal chaos of 'potencies'. "' In the potency Schel ling calls 'A= B', the being of 
primordial Freedom (A) can only be realised as Absolute Indifference (B) -- or, as 
Schelling calls it, potentiality In-Itself"' That is to say, the In-itself of Freedom qua 
Absolute Indifference cannot tolerate any positive, developmental content; and, 
moreover, is itself only in a 'will-to-contraction' that wants nothing. For this potency 
to play itself out, however, the will-to-contraction that wants nothing is necessarily 
countered by a latent'will-to expansion'that actively wants this 'nothing', which 
31 1 F. W. J. Schelling, Sihnintliche Werke, 1804 (ed. K. F. A. Schelfing; vol. 6 [Part 1, Band 6]. 
Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-61), 38. 
314 Judith Norman, 'The Logic of Longing: Schelling's Philosophy of Will'British Journalfor 
.f 
Mulosol)hy 10.1 (2002): 91-922. the Histoi-v o 
315 F. W. J. Schel I ing, , I, i,, cs of the lVorld [2nd draft] (trans. Judith 
Norman-, Ann Arbor: 
Uni \ ersity of NI ichigan Press, 1997). 13 1-33,143. Unless noted othem ise, rný citations of 
Ages of the 
1ý orld are fi-oni tile second &i ft. 
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232 Schelling calls A. " The clear, contradictory antagon'sm between A=B and A, and 
thus between the affirmation of Freedom as Indifference (A) and the negative force of 
Freedom actually being as Indifference (B), he explains, is overcome by their 
2) 
1 necessary unity in A'. " Once 'predicative being' (A is established, though, the 
'pronominal being' of A=B becomes the negative force, inasmuch as the aim of the 
latter is to maintain Absolute unity against the differentiation implicit in the will-to- 
expansion (i. e., the Fichtean necessity of 'not-A' for the assertion of W) 
Consequently, the unity of A3 is one of inherent, necessary conflict, whereupon the 
I result is the primordial madness of rotary repetition. As a result, in Slavoi Zi2ek's 
graphic description, God (or the Absolute Subject, the True, etc. ) 
repeatedly dashes himself against His own wall: unable to stay within, 
He follows His urge to break out, yet the more He strives to escape, the 
more He is caught in His own trap. Perhaps the best metaphor for this 
rotary motion is a trapped animal which desperately strives to 
disengage itself from a snare: although every spring only tightens the 
snare, a blind compulsion leads it to make a dash for it again and again, 
so that it is condemned to an endless repetition of the same gesture. "' 
With regard to this impasse, the problem of beginning is not that of classic Idealism, 
whereby the Absolute In-Itself, sans detenninate phenomena, is somehow (mystically 
/ philosophically / eschatologically) ascertained as such; Schelling's, rather, is the far 
more material, 'flesh and blood', "' question of how and why the Absolute split from 
316 Schelling, Ages of the World, 176-78. 
317 To avoid possible confusion, Judith Norman points out, it is helpful to remember that, 'in a 
sense, the potencies really are identical, but appear under different powers (hence the term 'potency'); 
their differences consist not in their compositional structure so much as which aspect they manifest. 
(To state the case in terms of Schelling's formulae, the potencies are all A. The first potency ... posits 
the one cssciicc (A) in concealment, the second potency, (A), posits the essence (A) in expansion, and 
so forth)'(Nornian, 'The Logic of Longing, 92 n. 5). 
119 slm o1 Mek, The Indivisible Rema i title r. - An Essav on Schelling and Related Alam rý 
(London: Vcrson, 1996), 23. 
319 F. W. J. Sclicl ling, Philosophical Inquiries Into the Nature of Hunian Freedom and Matters 
Connected Therewith [ 1809] (trans. Jarnes Gutman, Chicago: Open Court, 1936). 30, 
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itself in the first place. "o 
Such, then, is the pertinence of dialectical materialism as articulated in the 
philosophy of Schelling and the fiction of Herman Melville. For both are concerned 
with, in the words of Schelling, the singularity of the'primordial [i. e., groundless] 
deed', in which the Absolute Subject contracts (in the double sense of 'condenses' and 
'catches' [as though a disease]) its individual, contingent consciousness of being: " 
That primordial deed which makes a man genuinely himself precedes 
all individual actions; but immediately after It Is Put into exuberant 
freedom, this deed sinks into the night of unconsciousness.... For 
man to know of this deed, consciousness itself would have to return 
into nothing, into boundless freedom, and would cease to be 
consciousness.... Likewise that will, posited once at the beginning 
and then led to the outside, must immediately sink into 
unconsciousness. Only in this way is a beginning possible, a beginning 
that does not stop being a beginning, a truly eternal beginning. For 
here as well, it is true that the beginning cannot know itself. ffiat deed 
once done, it is done for all eternity.... If, in making a decision, 
somebody retains the right to reexamine his choice, he will never make 
a beginning at all. "' 
The crucial thing here is that the deed is accomplished in the 'beginning that does not 
stop being a beginning, a truly eternal beginning'. That is to say, that which is done as 
the very foundation of the present is eternally (i. e., always-already) done; moreover, it 
belongs to a past that was itself as such never present. The free Subject (Self / God) 
that emerges from the maddening deadlock of the rotary drive, via the primordial 
deed, effectively speaks itself into Existence. Indeed, for Schelling, it is only in'the 
Word', or deed, that God and humanity are at all. Consequently, prior to the Word of 
God, i. e., the 'disclosure' of Creation, and thus prior to Existence as such, there is only 
320 Zi2ek, Pic Indivisible Remainder, 14. 
'2' Scliciling, . Iiýcs (? 
f the World. 12 3-14. 
Schel ling, A gcs of the Wor/d, 181-82. Cf., Schelling, Philosophical Inqu'r'es Into the 
Nature (? f Human Freedom, 63-04. 
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'the will that wills nothing', "' the non-subjective, Dionysian void and inert 
indifference of absolute freedom. Stnctly speaking, prior to the Word, God, as the 
Absolute In-Itself, does not exi St. 
324 
When in search of Truth unvarnished, we are not unlike Pierre, who seeks his 
identity outside the authority of his father's name: 'we mine into the pyramid; by 
horrible gropings we come to the central room; with joy we espy the sarcophagus; but 
we lift the lid - and no body is there! - appallingly vacant as vast is the soul of a 
man! "" Which is to say, like Ishmael of the Whale, the In-Itself of that which is 
sought is but a 'vague, nameless horror'. "' And yet, unlike Pierre, Ishmael is 
compelled to explain himself- 'But how can I hope to explain myself here; and yet, in 
some dim, random way, explain myself I must, else all these chapters might be 
naught'. "' What distinguishes Ishmael from the tragic passivity of Pierre, then, and 
thus ultimately keeps him creating himself / becoming himself anew in the telling of 
his tale as mirrator, is his understanding that the formless abyss must be given shape; 
or, in the case of the Whale, colour. 
Ishmael begins by describing the whiteness of the Whale with a litany of 
1 -length positive metaphors denoting beauty or grandeur. But, by the end of his page 
sentence, we learn what he has in mind is in fact none of these: 'yet for all these 
accumulated associations, with whatever is sweet and honorable and sublime, there 
yet lurks an elusive something in the innermost idea of this hue, which strikes more of 
; 23 Schel ling, A ges of the World, 132. 
324 Schelling-Ages of the World, 149-50,156. 
325 Nlek ille, Pierre, 284-85; cf., 339. 
'2" McIville, Mobv-Dick, 188. 
1,7 
N Icl \II le, Aloln-Dick, 188. 
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panic to the soul than the redness which affrights in blood. "" For Ishmael, the 
ultimate horror of the Whale's whiteness is that it is simultaneously surface and depth, 
emptiness and fullness, life and death; both the'very veil of the Christian's deity'and 
the defining mark of this deity's absence: 
Is it that by its indefiniteness it shadows forth the heartless voids and 
immensities of the universe, and thus stabs us from behind with the 
thought of annihilation, when beholding the white depths of the milky 
way? Or is it, that as in essence whiteness is not so much a color as the 
visible absence of color, and at the same time the concrete of all colors, 
is it for these reasons that there is such a dumb blankness, full of 
meaning, in a wide landscape of snows -a colorless, all-color of 
atheism from which we shrink? "' 
As Peter Bellis argues, the whiteness of Moby Dick is analogous to the empty page on 
which the purportedly ineffable Whale is described assitch. "' In this, Ishmael 
realises what neither Ahab nor Pierre can accept: that the truth itself is not elusive, 
i. e., hidden behind the'pasteboard mask'of reality and phenomena, but is precisely 
the immanent, intensifying excess of its charactensation as elusive. 
Likewise, Schelling describes'the Real'not as some noumenal Thing-as-such, 
but as 'the incomprehensible basis of reality in things, the irreducible remainder which 
cannot be resolved into reason by the greatest exertion but always remains eternally in 
the depths'. "' The provocative thing to note here is that the materiality of Ishmael's 
sense of whiteness and Schelling's sense of the Real are similar in their dialectical 
materiality: that is, both are ineffable voids that emerge in realitY, rather than an 
external limit somehow divined by mystical silence or eschatological solicitation. 
I Z12ek's clarity is particularly helpful in this regard: 
328 Melville, MobY-Dick, 189. 
IN Nlcl\, Ille, Mobv-Dick, 195. 
330 Bcllis, No Alysterics Out of Ourselvcs, 124-25. 
331 Schelling. Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom. 34. Cf. Sclielling, 
I , ý, cs of Ille 
I'Vo rld, 15 1 
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[T]he Real is not the abyss of the Thing that forever eludes our grasp.. 
and on account of which every symbolization of the Real is partial and 
inappropriate; it is, rather, that invisible obstacle, that distorting screen, 
which always 'falsifies' our access to external reality, that 'bone in the 
throat' which gives a pathological twist to every symbolization, that is 
to say, on account of which every symbolization misses its object. Or 
with reference to the notion of the Thing as the ultimate traumatic 
unbearable Referent that we are unable to confront directly, since its 
direct presence is too blinding: what if this very notion that defusiVe 
everyday reality is a veil concealing the Horror of the unbearable 
Thing is false, what if the ultimate veil concealing the Real is the -,,, cry 
notion of the horrible Thing behind the veil'. )"' 
When the Real is the inherent excess of reality, i. e., when the 'radical antinomy that 
seems to preclude our access to the Thing already is the Thing itse 
1f, 333 the very bases 
and media of one's monomaniacal quests (be they of Ahab, Pierre, or the late- 
Schelling) are always already perverted from within. In this way, the Unspeakable 
end of such quests emerges only after it is first spoken. 
4. A Necessaty Madness 
According to Schelling, at least before his confessional turn later in life, this 
perversion of ontology goes beyond the scepticism of Kant and is the basis for'the 
veil of sadness' he espied 'spread over all of nature, the deep, unappeasable 
melancholy of all life'. "' And yet, for Schelling and Melville alike, the failure to own 
up to life's deep melancholy provoked by the general insanity at the heart of reality 
and reason is symptomatic of the walking dead. Schelling writes: 
Nothing great can be accomplished without a constant solicitation of 
madness, which should always be overcome, but should never be 
utterly lacking. One might do well to assess people as follows. One 
should say that there is a kind of person in which there is no madness 
112 Sln oj 7-i2ek, The 1"lippet and the Dwaif. - The Penvi-se Core of Christianit. v (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2003). 67. 
333 Mck, Ae Puppet and the Dwaýf 77. 
334 Schelling. Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom, 79. 
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whatsoever. These would be the uncreative people incapable of 
procreation, the ones that call themselves sober spints.... But where 
there is no madness, there is certainly no proper, active, living intellect (and consequently there is just the dead intellect, dead intellectuals.... 
Hence the utter lack of madness leads to another extreme, to imbecility 
[Bl5dsinn] (idiocy), which is an absolute lack of all madness. "' 
Melville, of course, had been flirting with such darkness since his earliest novels. By 
April 1849, one year prior to the ironically self-assertive 'Hawthorne and His Mosses', 
his flirtations had become overt advances. Here, in a letter to Duyckinck discussing 
the insanity of Charles Fenno Hoffman, Duyckinck's short-term successor as editor at 
The bterarýy World, Melville's pity is infused with Schellingian understanding and 
empathy. He wntes: 
Poor Hoffman -I remember the shock I had when I first saw the 
mention of his madness. - But he was just the man to go mad 
imaginative, voluptuously inclined, poor, unemployed, in the race of 
life distanced by his inferiors, unmarried, - without a port of haven in 
the universe to make.... This going mad of a friend or acquaintance 
comes straight home to every man who feels his soul in him, - which 
but few men do. For in all of us lodges the same fuel to light the same 
fire. And he who has never felt, momentarily, what madness is has but 
a mouthful of brains. 336 
As would be demonstrated further later in Melville's life, the artistic greatness 
described by Schelling comes at a potentially high pnce. For indeed not only do his 
next two novels, Moby-Dick and Pierre, feature two of the most memorable madmen 
of the American Renaissance, rivalling those even of Poe, it would not be long before 
335 F. W. J. Schelling Ages of the World [Third Draft] (trans. Jason Wirth; Albany: State 
University of New York, 2000), 103. As Jason Wirth points out, though, Schelling's point is not to 
advocate 'an utter surrender to madness', but that 'Reason remains at the disposal of madness, enchanted 
by it, humbled by it, continually solicitous of it, but not such that this drunken ground annihilates 
Reason (Jason Wirth, Introduction to The Ages of the World [Third Draft], xiv). Cf, 'Stupidity is not 
error or a tissuc of errors. There are imbecile thoughts, imbecile discourses, that are made up entirely 
of truths, but these truths are base, they are those of a base, heaý y and laden soul.... In truth, as in 
error, stupid thought only disco\ ers the most base - base errors and base truths that translate the 
triumph of the sla\ c, the reign of petty \ alues or the power of an established order' (Gilles Deleuze, 
Niet, -, sche and Philosol)hy [trans. Hugh Tomlinson, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)]. 
105). 
336 NI cINII Ic. Correspondence, I"8- 
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Melville himself was feared insane. "' Though it is questionable he was ever 
examined for mental illness, as was once suggested by Merton Sealts, Jr., "' his wife's 
fears for her own safety were all too real. If the actual evidence of Melville's spousal 
abuse remains highly circumstantial, the relative silence on the subject until recently, 
as in many instances of modem abuse, was not wholly indicative of domestic bliss. "' 
For instance, though she refused to participate in a fake kidnapping scheme in May 
1867, which was intended to get her away from what she had described in previous 
letters to Rev. Henry Bellows as her husband's insanity and ill treatment, that there 
was such a plan at all speaks volume. "' Although the full extent of this treatment and 
the manifestation of his purported insanity are not at all definite, alcohol likely played 
a significant role. "' 
337 While most reviewers of Moby-Dick simply did not know how to take it, and thus wrote it 
off as bad fiction, many reviewers of Pierre went several steps further and regarded it as the work of an 
insane author. Of the latter, one reviewer writes: 'That Herman Melville has gone "clean daft", is very 
much to be feared; certainly, he has given us a very mad book.... The sooner this author is put in ward 
the better. If trusted with himself, at all events give him no further trust in pen and ink, till the present 
fit has worn off. He will grievously hurt himself else - or his very amiable publishers' (Branch, 
Melville, 31). 
338 See Merton M. Sealts, Jr. 's classic essay on Melville's possible mental examination just 
after completing Pierre in 'Herman Melville's "I and My Chimney"' American Literature 13 (May, 
1941): 142-54. Also see his rejoinder to two decades of scholarship that took his suggestion as rock- 
solid fact in 'Melville's Chimney, Reexamined' in Themes and Directions in American Literature: 
Essays in Honor of Leon Howard (ed. Ray B. Browne and Donald Pizer, Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue 
University Studies, 1969), 80-102. According to Lewis Mumford, one of Melville's early twentieth- 
century critics, Pierre marked the beginning of a full-blown psychosis. See his Herman Melville, 17 1, 
176. 
339 Parker, Herman Melville, Volume 2,628-35. 
340 Dr. Henry Whitney Bellows was the minister of the All Souls Unitarian Church in New 
York City, where the Melvilles had been renting a pew since 1849. See Walter D. Kring and Jonathan 
S. Carey, 'Two Discoveries Concerning Herman Melville',. in The Endless, Winding Wqv in Melville: 
New Charts b*N, Kring and Care 'v 
(eds. Donald Yanella and Hershel Parker. Glassboro, N. J.: Melville 
Society, 1981), 11-15. The two letters from Samuel S. Shaw and Elizabeth Melville to Bellows are 
reprinted in Herman Melville, Correspondence, 857-60. Elizabeth Renker's treatment of the letters is 
easily the most comprehensive to date. See Strike Through the Mask, 49-68. 
34 ' After the failure of Mobv-Dick, Melville's increasing consumption of alcohol became more 
of a silent 'solace' than it was social. See Eleanor Melville Metcalf, Herinall Mell'ille: O'cle and 
Epic 
, vele 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), 215-, and Edwin Haviland Miller, 
Herman MeNille, 32 1. 
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As much as Schelling always ultimately privileges Reason over madness, due 
to the fact that madness can never be actualised as such without being embodied in 
Reason, i. e., as Reason's ground, at times Melville (in his life and in his fiction) 
exemplifies the potential danger of this logic. In characters like Ahab and Pierre, 
Melville thinks the Truth of this'world of lies' as only ever caught in glimpses, 
perhaps even in madness - be it clinically or chemically induced. 3'2 And yet, I argue, 
the significance of Melville's sense of madness arises from his related notion of the 
'Great Art of Telling the Truth', and thus the mark of true genius like that of 
Shakespeare, as the art of the mask. "' In this, the 'sane madness of vital truth' 
described above is not simply the Truth that eludes. On the contrary, the very 
elusiveness of this Truth deferred is but a retroactive projection of a Truth far more 
harrowing: 
And perhaps, after all, there is no secret. We incline to think that the 
Problem of the Universe is like the Freemason's mighty secret, so 
terrible to all children. It turns out, at last, to consist in a triangle, a 
mallet, and an apron, - nothing more! We incline to think that God 
cannot explain His own secrets, and that He would like a little 
information upon certain points Himself We mortals astonish Him as 
much as He us. But it is this Being of the matter; there lies the knot 
with which we choke ourselves. As soon as you say Me, a God, a 
Nature, so soon you jump off from your stool and hang from the beam. 
Yes, that word is the hangman. Take God out of the dictionary, and 
you would have Him in the street. "' 
142 For more on Melville and madness, as a theme in his literature and his life, see especially 
Paul McCarthy, 'The Twisted Mind': Madness in Herman Melville's Fiction (Iowa City: University of 
Iowa Press, 1990). See also, Allsa von Brentano, 'Herman Melville and "The Sane Madness of Vital 
Truth... in Dion vsus in Literature: Essays on Literary Madness (ed. Brammir M. Rieger; Boýý ling 
Green, Oh.: Popular, 1994). 149-67-, Marty Roth, 'Melville and Madness', Arizona Quarterl , ý.. - 
A 
ýIoiirnal ofAmerican Literature, 
Culture, and Theory 41 (Summer 1985): 119-30; Jean Magretta, 
'RadicA Disunities: Models of Madness in Pierre and The Idiot', Studies in the Nove/ 10 (1978): 234- 
50-, Bellis, No MYsteries out of Ourselves, 136-40. 
,41NIcI\II le, The Pitizza Tales, 244. 
144 Mcklile, Correspondence, 186. 
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It is here that the 'sane madness' of Melville and Schelling meet. For, indeed, in the 
words of Perry Miller, writers like Melville and Hawthome'do not inaugurate a 
11renaissance" in American literature: they constitute a culmination, they pronounce a 
fitneral oration on the dreams of their youth, they intone an elegy of 
disenchantment. 1 ; 45 
Moreover, I argue, they represent in literature the explosive theological 
implications of Schelling's thinking. For here the eternal suie qua non of God, the 
Absolute, or the True, as it were, only is inasmuch as it'contracts' (finite) Existence in 
the act of freedom; that is, the decisive moment of 'eternity in time' that thus opens 
time and represses the egoistic madness of its Ground. In radical contrast to the 
traditional notions of time (i. e., as the distortion of an eternal Order, or as a particular 
mode of temporality) 'eternitY begets time in order to resolve the deadlock it becaine 
entangled m. "' This is to say, using David L. Clark's succinct unpacking of the 
'fantastic logic' that structures this entanglement: 
[PIrimal longing excites in 'man' and 'animal' a craving for that which 
they already need to be in order to respond to its call: namely, 
creatures. 'It' - primal longing - somehow triggers in the creature a 
desire to become what it in fact is. The creature surges up, stirs into 
life, but this upsurgence and stirring must always, in some minimal 
way, have already happened and thus is always happening - an 
originary event that beckons from the 'future' because it recedes into a 
'past' that could never be present as such. 347 
ý, 4 5 Perry Miller, Natitre's Nation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 255 
(emphasis mine). 
, 4o 2i2ck, The Indivisible Remainder, 3 1. Cf., It is therefore misleading to conce]N e the 
constitutive displacement of man as the division between the finitude of his bodily existence and the 
infinity of the Spirit. The Infinite becomes actual, living Spirit only when it 'attains itself, when it 
becomes aware of itself, in a finite creature 'raised from the creaturely to the super-creaturely'. That is 
to say: \\hat is Spirit'! The domain of signification, of the symbolic; as such, it can emerge only in a 
creature that is neither constrained to its bodily finitude nor directly infinite, but in bemeen. a finite 
entity in N\ hich tile Infinite resounds in the gulse of a shado\ý y phantasmagoria, a presentiment of 
Another World' (00-61). 
147 I)imd L Clark. 'Heldeggcr's Craving Being-On- Schell i ng' Diacritics 27.3 (1997). 19. 
I- 
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Fhe groundless deed, then, is the actualisation of Absolute potentiality and freedom; 
in this unconscious act that always already precedes and conditions any self- 
generative presentation or characterization, the free subject is witness to and 
necessarily represses the Ungaind (the Non-Ground, Void) of Absolute 
Indifference. "' With this in mind, Melville and Schelling come face-to-face with the 
self-characteri sing / self-embodying materialism at the heart of natural theology. 
5. Self-Creation as an Act of Love 
The key difference we are descnbing here is that between desire and love. For 
Schelling, as noted above, at the heart of the insane cyclical movement that precedes 
the Beginning of being and time is 'mere craving or desire', that is, the desire for / 
addiction to the In-itself of contractive identity . 
34' Before the Word or Logos, David 
Clark notes, 'there was the hunger for the Word';... or, alternatively, what 
psychoanalysis would designate 'the drive whose true aim is the endless reproduction 
of its circular movement'. "' Drive, then, is desire In-Itself, unactualised in the 
'subjectless' ftiry of the Absolute, in which there is only the indifferent flux of 
348 Cf ., '[I]t is a well-known 
fact that nobody can be given character, and that nobody has 
chosen for himself the particular character he bears. There is neither deliberation nor choice here, and 
yet everyone recognizes and judges character as an eternal (never-ceasing, constant) deed and attributes 
to a man both it as well as the action that follows from it. Universal moral judgment thus 
acknowledges that every man has a freedom in which there is neither (explicit) deliberation nor choice 
[Grulltfl.... But most men shy away from this freedom that opens like an abyss before them, just as 
they are frightened when faced with the necessity of being wholly one thing or another.... They feel 
themselves crushed by this freedom, as by an appearance from an incomprehensible world, from 
eternity, from a place entirely devoid of any ground at all [ Ungrund]' (Schell ing, Ages of the World, 
175-76). 
,49 Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom, 38. 
'-ýO Clark, 'Craving Being-On- Schell ing', 16. Cf., '[T]he Logos appears mysteriously and 
precipitously out of this longing like a word out of the random lettering of an anagram, the latter a 
figure for the meaningicss, differential markings that form the condition of the possibilit\ of language. 
(it is as If God \\ crc always, already hooked on phonics. )' (n. 10) 
;51 ? 
-Ikk, Pic Indivisible Remainder, 87 n. 69. 
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Freedom, but no free Subject as such. "' With theeternally past'advent of the Word, 
the embodied spirit (Self) that emerges is free only inasmuch as it is not completely 
itself; it is, rather, an embodied spirit, marked by finitude, death, and decay. "' Insofar 
as it is not itself, the spirit is made ravenous flesh: 
The spirit is consequently nothing but an addiction to Being.... The 
base form of the spirit is therefore an addiction, a desire, a lust. 
Whoever wishes to grasp the concept of spirit at its most profound 
roots must therefore become fully acquainted with the nature of desire 
.. for [desire] is a hunger for Being, and being satiated only gives it 
renewed strength, i. e., a more vehement hunger. "' 
Constituted as a free subject by virtue of its inherent lack of self-presence, the 
desirous-Self cannot be satisfied. On the contrary, its desire, embodied in history and 
subjectivity, is 'always and by definition unsatisfied, metonymical, shifting from one 
352 Cf., 'Drive ... involves a kind of inert satisfaction that always finds its way; drive is 
nonsubjectivized (acephalous'). Perhaps its paradigmatic expressions are the repulsive private rituals 
(sniffing at one's own sweat, sticking one's finger into one's nose, etc... ) that bring us intense 
satisfaction w/out us being aware of it, or, insofar as we are aware of it, w/out us being able to do 
anything about it, to prevent it' (Slavoj 2i2ek, 'The Abyss of Freedom' in The Ages of the World, by F. 
W. J. von Schelling [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997], 80). 
353 This perspective is not limited to its philosophical articulation in Schelling and literary 
embodiment in Melville. Indeed, even that most sentimental of Romantics, Goethe, is ambivalent 
about the nature he had very nearly divinized: 
Nature! We are surrounded and embraced by her - without being able to exit from 
her or to enter into her more deeply. Unasked and unwarned, we are taken up into 
the circuitry of her dance; she has her way with us, until we grow weary and sink 
from her arms.... 
We live in the midst of her and are foreign to her. She speaks to us 
ceaselessly and does not betray her secret to us. We work our endless effects on her, 
yet have no dominion over her. 
She seems to have invested all her hopes in individuality, and she cares 
nothing for the individuals. Always she builds, always she destroys, and we have no 
access to her workshop. 
She lives in a profusion of children, and their mother, where is she? - 
She squirts her children out of nothingness, and does not tell them where 
they came from and where they are going. Their task is to run; hers is to know the 
orbit (qtd. in David Farrell Krell, Contagion: SexualitY, Disease, and Death in 
German Idealism and Romanticism [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 19981, 
3). 
354 F. W. J. Schelling, 'Stuttgart Seminars' in Idealism and the Endganle of Theory: Three 
Essa 
, vs 
b*vFWJ. Schelling (trans. and ed. Thomas Pfau; Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1994), 230. 
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object to another since I do not actually desire what I want. " Be careful of what you 
wish for, so the saying goes, because youjust might get it. The same logic is at work 
here: 'What I actually desire is to sustain desire itself, to postpone the dreaded 
moment of its satisfaction. "' 
If desire is related to Schelling's will-to-contraction, and thus to the impossible 
singularitY of one's desire, i. e., identity and wholeness, love is related to the will-to- 
expansion, the emergence of the free Self that is not itself Or, as /12ek explains: 
[L]ove is to be opposed here to desire: desire is always caught in the 
logic of 'this is not that', it thrives in the gap that forever separates the 
obtained satisfaction from the sought-Jbi- satisfaction, while love 
FULLY ACCEPTS that'this IS that'- that the woman with all her 
weaknesses and common features IS the Thing I conditionally love; 
that Christ, this wretched man, IS the living God. Again, to avoid a 
fatal misunderstanding: the point is not that we should 'retioLince 
transcendence' and fully accept the limited human person as our love 
object, since 'this is all there is': transcendence is not abolished, but 
rendered ACCESSIBLE - it shines through in this very clumsy and 
miserable being that I love. 1357 
In love, according to Schelling, the impossible, the wholly other, is what cannot be, 
what never has been, nor never will be; and yet, nevertheless, it remains the 
paradoxical excess, the Real, which emerges from the contingency of reality. 
Schelling's point is not nearly as obscure as it may at first seem. Again, we 
need only think back to the insane rotary repetition described above, wherein the pure 
will that wills nothing (God) contracts being: 
[T]here were from the very beginning two different though not 
distinguishable aspects of the will that willed nothing. First, It was 
pure will in itself, but as such, it was also the will that willed nothing. 
Now only this second aspect has become a positively negating will; 
besides this, it still remains a pure will, and this quality of being a will 
cannot be destroyed. It is even impossible that another, opposed, ýýrill 
355 ýIýck, 'The Abyss of Freedom'. 80. 
356 ? 
-Iýck, Mic Abyss of Freedom', 80. 
. 157 212ek, On B(, Ii(: I', 90. 
not produce itself in it, to the extent that it remains a will, and precisely 
because it became a positively negating will. This opposed will is one 
that actually wills itself as what-is, and as being., it is, in a word, an 
affirming will, a ývill of love that does not will nothing blit rather vvill 
something. "' 
The insanity of the rotary motion Schelling describes here is that of a 'psychotic' God 
unable to tolerate any Otherness; such is theTury of his egotism'that this includes, 
especially, any actualised notion of Himself as either Free or Creator. For Schelling, 
however, the groundless deed, 'as a will of love, disrupts the contractive dominance 
of the egoistic Ground, "' thereby actualising, in the 'Word', the Groundless, 
inexpressible potentiality and freedom that unites the contradictory potencies of will- 
to-contraction and will-to-expansion. "' Schelling's logic is a paradox of materiality: 
It is apparent that none of these - not the negating, not the affirming 
will, and not the merely potentially extant will that is their unity - is 
that absolute I of divinity as it was before the activation; but precisely 
because it is none of these and yet is all three, precisely thereby it 
appears as actual, as what is in principle inexpressible. "' 
In other words, the God of Creation is not the Absolute In-Itself, the purity of 
indifferent and undifferentiated freedom. For God to create freely, divine freedom 
itself must be actuallsed as such. It is only in the pnmordial deed that the Absolute 
actualises itself as the free Creator-God; and thus, consequently, actuallses the abyssal 
void of Absolute Freedom inherent to self-creation. The In-and-For-Itself endeavour 
of Freedom's autopoetic self-becoming, according to Schelling, is the quintessential 
359 Schelling, Ages of the World, 169 [emphasis mine]. 
359 (7f ., 'if the force of individuality \ý ere alone, there would 
be nothing but the eternal state of 
closing oneself off and being closed off. Nothing could live in this state, created things would be 
impossible, and the concept of a being of beings would be lost. For this force of self-riess or 
individuality in God is ciiptured in that barbaric term aseitY. This force is the white heat of purity, 
intensified to all created things, and would rage against every creature like ruinous firc. an eternal 
\\ nith that tolerates nothing, fatall ,v contracting 
butfor the resistance of love' (Schell ing, Ages of the 
World, 171 [emphasis mine]). 
300 Schel ling, A, ý,, cs of the World, 129-30,169-78. 
36 1 Schelling, Ages o J'the World, 170. 
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act of love. "' 
Of course the comedy of love here is that, in the Word, God is no longer 
(simply) Himself. In fact, in even more theologically scandalous terms, It Is only in 
loriginal sin' (qua the decision to act) -- the Fall of God, as it were - that God is at 
all. Schelling is unambiguous on this point, at least in this period of his philosophy. 
The God that makes reality intelligible in the decisive act of love, i. e., of free creation, 
he reasons, must also relate to the 'contracted' Ground of his own existence. 
Therefore, the God of Creation'is not God viewed as absolute, that is, insofar as he 
exists. For it [the Ground of existence contracted by the deed] is only the basis of His 
existence, it is nature - in God, inseparable from him, to be sure, but nevertheless 
distinguishable from Him'. 363 In short, then, after the primordial deed, the 
quintessential, eternally past moment of love and freedom, the (contractive) desire for 
wholeness can only ever be frustrated by the (expansive) love that must, in effect, 
lose. It is in this sense of love as loss that we find the basis of a truly radical gospel, 
in which salvation of self is theologically less redemptive than the fall that sets it free. 
The latter is a only slightly more provocative way of rearticulating the critical 
implications of Schelling's related discussion of Evil. Evil, he argues, is only truly 
possible in a free subject that 'loses' itself, as such, Evil must be freely chosen. "' For 
302 Schelling, Ages of the World, 137-38. 
361 Schelfing, Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Hunian Freedom, 32. As 2,2ek aptly 
notes in his commentary on Schelling's understanding of Freedom, 'either a thing is not yet itself and 
dwells in the state of virtual proto-existence, or it becomes itself, is "posited as such", but this positing 
is achic\ ed by the supplernent of the Word - that is, the thing is already re-marked, no 
longer merely 
itself (Die Indivisible Remainder, 60). Cf., Andrcvý Bowie, Introduction to On the History of Modern 
PhilosophY, 20. 
364 Cf-., 'On the one hand, nature can spiritualize itself, it can turn into the medium of Spirit's 
self-manifestation, on the other hand, with the emergence of the Word, the obscure principle of. Ground 
ýind Selfhood which hitherto acted as an anonymous, impersonal, blind force is itself spiritualized, 
illuminated, it becomes a Person aware of itself, so that we are now dealing with an Evil which, in 
full 
im-arencs's of itself, wills itself as Evil - \ýhich is not merely indifference toward,, the 
Good but an 
ýicn\ c striving for F\ il'(2i2ek, The Indi0sible Remainder, 64). 
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Schelling, the possibility of this choice vconsists in the fact that, instead of kcepln-, -, his 
selfbood as the ground or the instrument, man can stnve to elevate it to be the ruling 
or universal will, and, on the contrary, try to make what is spiritual in him into a 
meansi. 365 Evil, therefore, emerges from the Subject's misguided sense of having 
'fallen' from (the truth of) itself, and thus believing It has lost something that can be 
regained. This, Schelling notes, is the root of the free Subject's 'spiritualized' desire to 
'return' to its status as (contractive) Universal / Ideal: 
For even he who has moved out of the center retains the feeling that he 
has been all things when in and with God. Hence there springs the 
hunger of selfishness which, in the measure that it deserts totality and 
unity becomes even needier and poorer, but just on that account more 
ravenous, hungrier, more poisonous. 366 
Thus, Schelling effectively explodes from within the traditional notion of Evil as 
imperfection or privation. For, on the contrary, Evil is constitutive of the free 
Subject's actual (sinful) existence, insofar as this existence is the material embodiment 
of the Subject's ongoing duplicitous attempt to present as 'essential truth' that which is 
necessarily a retroactive characterisation / projection. "' 
365 Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom, 68. 
366 Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom, 69. Cf., 
212ek, The 
Indivisible Remainder, 63-70; Clark, 'Heidegger Being-On- Schel ling', 21-23. 
367 On this point Schelling could not be any more clear: 'the mere consideration of the fact that 
man, the most perfect of all visible creatures, is alone capable of evil, shows that [the ground of evil] 
can by no means consist of insufficiency or deprivation'. (Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the 
Nature of Human Freedom, 44). Cf., Jean Baudrillard's similar thoughts in an intcrý 1cw with 
Der 
Spiegel: 'Good and evil are inextricably bound together, this is fatal in its original meaning: an integral 
part of our fatc and destiny.... Evil was interpreted as misfortunate because misfortune can 
be fought 
against: povertv, injustice, oppression, etc. This is how the humanitarian , iexN-s things, the emotional 
and sentimental vision, the permanent empathy for the suffering. Evil is the world as it is and 
has 
always been. Misfortune is the Ný orld as it never should have been. The transformation of eN il into 
misfortune is the most profitable business of the twentieth centurv' (Das ist der vierte 
%\*eltkrieg' Der 
Spicgel Onlinc [1 -5 June 20021: paras. 50,52. 
PURL: 
http:,, \\N\\\. sI)icg, el. dc ktiltur/geselischaft/0,151,, ', 177013,00. htnil) 
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6. Khora and the Masquerade of Femininiýv 
The repercussions of Schelling's and Melville's dialectical materialism become 
radically apocalyptic in the complex relationship they describe bevveen the embodied 
Self / Absolute and that which is more profound than Good or Evil (and thus, too, 
God). Schelling writes: 
If we wish to bring this Being nearer to us from a human standpoint, 
we may can say: It is the longing which the eternal Onefieels to gille 
birth to itself. This is not the One itself, but is co-etemal with it. This 
longing seeks to give birth to God, i. e., the fathomable unity; but to 
that extent it has not yet the unity in its own self... Man is fon-ned in 
his mother's womb; and only out of the darkness of unreason (out of 
feeling, out of longing, the sublime mother of understanding) grow 
clear thoughts. We must imagine primal longing in this way - turning 
toward reason, indeed, though not yet recognizing it. ... This primal longing moves in anticipation like a surging, billowing sea, similar to 
the'matter'of Plato, following some dark, uncertain law, incapable in 
itself of forming anything that can endure. "' 
Schelling's maternal imagery in this passage is not unlike that of Plato's Timaelts, on 
which Schelling had provided a commentary in 1794. "' 
In the Timaeus Plato calls this characterless non-place from which everything 
that exists arises - in thought as well as in material form - khora, 'the receptacle 
and, as it were, the nurse of all becoming and change'. "' As such, he continues, 
that which is going to receive properly and uniformly all the likenesses 
of the intelligible and eternal things must itself be void of all character. 
Therefore we must not call the mother and receptacle of visible and 
sensible things either earth or air or fire or water ... 
but we shall not 
be wrong if we describe it as invisible and formless, all embracing, 
possessed in a most puzzling way of intelligibility, yet very hard to 
grasp. 371 
Khora, in short, is 'eternal and indestructible', 'provides a position for everything that 
368 Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Huniall Freedom 35. 
369 Sec David Farrell Krell, 'Female Parts in Tiniaeus'Arion 2/3 (1975): 400-2 1. 
370 - Plato. Timaeus tiIIII Critias (trans. Desmond Lcc, London. Pengwn, 1965), 49. 
, .71 Plato, Timaeus, 50-51. 
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comes to be', and'is apprehended without the senses by a sort of spurious reasoning 
and is so hard to believe in - we look at it indeed in a kind of dream'. "' 
Schelling's anthropomorphic images of'pnmal longing'- such as'womb', 
'billowing sea', 'gravity' (Schvt, ere), 'feeling', 'the ruleless'(das Regellose), 'the sublime 
mother of knowledge', 'the darkness of unreason'- are striking in their similar 
intertwining of femininity, violence, and mystery. "' Though I it would be fooli sh to 
attribute it solely and directly to Schelling, such images are highly suggestive of 
Isabel's role - as sister, as wife, as enigma - in Melville's Pierre. In her, the 
narrator suggests, Pierre finds the most fundamental question of litC, placing the 
'unraveled plot' of her life on par with all other mysteries throughout the ages, of all 
history and all peoples, even that of 'the unravelable inscrutableness of God' . 
37' As 
she tells the inquisitive Pierre, who wishes to discover and uncover the truth, 'far 
sweeter are mysteries than sunnises: though the mystery be unfathomable, it is still 
the unfathomableness of fullness; but the surmise, that is but shallow and unmeaning 
emptiness. "" Her words not only foreshadow Pierre's failure, but forrn the basis of 
his love for Isabel - be it that of a brother or that of husband. "' 
Is Isabel victim or victimizer; passive or active; knowing or unknowing; sister 
372 Plato, Timaeus, 52. 
373 See Clark, 'Heidegger Being-On-Schelling', 14. For a more thorough analysis of 
Sclicl I ing's anthropomorphizing of the Ground, including that derived from the Tiniaeus, also see David 
L. 
, 
Clark, "'The Necessary Heritage of Darkness": Tropics of Negativity in Schelling, Derrida, and de 
Man' in Intersections: Nineteen th- Ceti tit r"N, Philosoph *v and 
Contemporar-N, Theorý, (eds. David L. Clark 
and Tilottama Rajan, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 79-146. Also see, John 
Sallis, Chorology: On Beginning in Plato's Tiniaeus (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998). 
374 Melville, Pierre, 141. 
375 Mel% ille, Pierre, 153. 
376 Cf., Pierre's description of love built on the necessary bedrock of secrecy: 'For, ývhate,, er 
sonic IoN ers may sometimes say, love does not always abhor a secret, as nature is said to abhor a 
N acuuni. Love is built upon secrets, as lovely Venice upon inN isible and incorruptible piles in the sea. 
Love's secrets, being mysteries, ever pertain to the transcendent and the infinite: and so thcN are as airv 
bridges, by Ný hich our further shadows pass o\ cr into the regions of the golden mists and exhalation,,. 
N\ hen all poetical. lovely thoughts are engendered. and drop into us, as though pearls should 
drop from 
raltibo\\s' (Nlcl\ille, P'wrre, 81). 
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or wife? Ultimately, neither Pierre nor the narrator is ever quite sure. As Wilma 
Garcia writes: 
As for their blood relationship, and the suggestions of incest that 
possibility raises, Isabel seems to believe she is Pierre's sister, and 
Pierre believes it enough to forsake his mother and his bright future for 
her sake, or perhaps his sacrifices are for the sake of his own heroic 
self-image.... He is never so sure of the truth of her story again. But 
Isabel does not change; she follows Pierre wherever he leads her, even 
to the grave. In her mysterious being are the merging images of the 
prize of the hero's quest - helpmate, lover, damsel in distress, perhaps 
even passive temptress - yet all of these imaoes are so tinged with 
irony and ambiguity that we are never really sure of who or what she 
is. 177 
In revealing herself as his half-sister, no matter how ambiguous the evidence, Isabel 
marks the femininity of the decisive moment and mysterious ground of Pierre's tragic 
self-presentation. "' That is to say, upon her revelation and his decision, neither he nor 
Pierre is recognizable as what had come before. Consequently, one need not appeal 
strictly to biographical details to understand the sudden change of course that occurs 
in the novel; it is, in fact, explained within. "' For in Isabel remains the absolute 
mystery of Self, from which emerges Pierre's (and Melville's) disastrous decision to 
claim her as his own : 
390 
Ay, Pierre, now indeed art thou hurt with a wound, never to be 
completely healed but in heaven; for thee, the before undistrusted 
moral beauty of the world is forever fled; for thee, thy sacred father is 
no more a saint; all brightness hath gone from thy hills, and all peace 
from thy plains; and now, now, for the first time, Pierre, Truth rolls a 
377 Wilina Garcia, Mothers and Others: M' whs of the Feniale in the Works of Melville, Twain, 
and Heiningwav (New York: Peter Lang, 1983), 85. 
379 Indeed, even Isabel says of her mother: 'I never knew a mortal mother. If, indeed, mother 
of mine hath livcd, she is long gone, and cast no shadow on the ground she trod.... I seem not of 
wonian born'(Mel\ ille, Plerre, 114). 
379 Brian Higgins and Hershel Parker make the convincing argument that this inexplicable and 
cry cynical turn in Pierre is primarily attributable to the very poor sales and savaging re\ ie\ýs of 
Mob 
' 
v-Dick, \N hich probably came to light while Melville was writing his follow-up novel. See their 
Tlic I-']a\\ ed Gr. indeur of Nlel\ ille's Pierre', 162-96. 
390 Judith Fryer, Ae h'tlces of Eve: Women in the Niiieteetith-Cetititi-ý,,, Inierl(-titi Novel (Ne\ý 
York: O\ford Uni\ersity Press, 1976), 49-50. 
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black billow through thy soul! Ah, miserable thou, to whom Truth, in 
her first tides, bears nothing but wrecks! "' 
Her dying words, thus, are a fitting final assessment of Pierre's poisoned self- 
presentation: 'All's o'er, and ye knew him not! "" 
It is, I would argue, regarding this notion of the mysterious Ground of self- 
presentation (or khora) as an undifferentiated femininity that Richard Kearney's 
otherwise brilliant critique of the postmodern fetish of absolute Otherness is 
inadequate. "' Khora is, Kearney suggests, 'neither identical with God nor 
incompatible with God but marks an open site where the divine may dwell and heal', 
moreover, this is why 'God and khora, like theism and atheism, are two sides of the 
same coin. If God without khora risks dogmatism, khora without the possibility of 
God risks desolation. Perhaps khora could be reinterpreted as the primordial matrix 
of the world which God needs to become flesh. "" Kearney's motivation for such a 
position is his deep suspicion of the 'postmodem obsession with absolutist ideas of 
exteriority and otherness', which he finds in the likes of, amongst others, Lyotard, 
Baudrillard, Derrida, Zi2ek, and, in passing, Schelling. Theirs is, he argues, an 
obsession that ultimately leads to an ethically problematic idolatry: 'that of the 
immemorial, ineffable Other', in which there Is no discernible difference between the A 
divine Good and the horrific Abject. "' The key, on the contrary, is to acknowledge 
the division between the self and the other without separating them so far that there is 
no relation at all. To do otherwise is to make ethical, responsible - and, for Kearney, 
ticcessarY -- discemment impossible. 
-181 Melvillc, Plerre, 65. 
382 Mel\ ille, Pierre, 362. 
383 Keanicy, Strangers, Gods and Monsters, 193-211. 
Kc-, imey, Strangers, Gods and Monsters, 194,211. 
, 't "5 Kcamey, Strangers, Gods andllonstcrs, 229. 
118 
The problem with this lies not in Kearney's ethical appeal to'diacritical 
hen-neneutics', wherein the other is not 'so exterior or so unconscious ... that it cannot 
be at least minimally interpreted by a self. (In fact, his hermeneutical spirit resonates 
in my own project here. ) Neither does he necessarily privilege the redemptive desire 
of wholeness and salvation; for him, rather, otherness is a debt 'inscribed within me as 
an uncontainable call from beyond'. 386 The weakness, on the contrary, is most 
strikingly apparent in Kearney's odd claim that neither Plato's notion nor its 
psychoanalytic (and thus, implicitly, Schellingian) reappraisals, specifically those of 
Z12ek and Julia Kristeva, regard khora 'as an explicit player in the religious drama. ""' 
Kearney's rationale for this assessment is based on the crucial difference between his 
privileged notion of a disembodied God who simply'may be'and Schelling's 
dialectically embodied God who'actually is'. "' For the former, God is Good a priori, 
and thus knowable only in a hermeneutic / interpretive engagement; whereas, for the 
latter, God is Good only in the primordial pronouncement of His Word that creates 
order out of chaos, and can thus only be known in and as a materialistic self- 
presentation, i. e., 'as God'. "' In this precise sense, God / the Absolute Subject, as 
motherly khora, gives birth to itself 
The effects of this on our thinking about sexual differentiation and gender are 
386 Keamey, Strangers, Gods and Monsters, 8 1. 
397 Kearney, Strangers, Gods, and Monsters, 204; cf. 194-97. On Schelling's profoun 
id influence on aspects of crucial aspects of psychoanalysis, especially his notion of the Unconscious and 
Uncanny, see Dale Snow, 'The Role of the Unconscious in Schelling's System of Transcendental 
Idealism' Idealistic Studies 19.3 (1989): 23 1 -50. Cf., Bowie, Schelling and Modet-n European 
Phllosoj)hy, 96-97,156. 
389 Cf., Richard Kearney, The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion (Bloomington: 
Indiana Uni%crsity Press, 2001). 
389 This is the important difference bctNýeen God and humanity. that God, as cN idenced by the 
unconsciOLIs deed of Creation, inc\itably chooses the (expansive) Good, \ýhereas humanity 
inewably 
suffers tile Fall (sin). As 2i2ek puts it, in both cases, the choice is sjmultaneouslý free and 
"forced... 
(The Indivisible Reniainder, 33). 
119 
by no means peripheral. This comes to light most clearly in the sharp sexual 
distinction Schelling seeks to make between his dialectical materialism and the strict 
Idealism of, for instance, Hegel. "O In this, he agrees with Friedrich Schlegel, his 
brother-in-law once removed, who writes in Lucinde: 'Mystenes are female, flicy like 
to veil themselves but still want to be seen and discovered. "" In effect, as has been 
well rehearsed by David Farrell Krell, both regard femininity as fullness aiid lack, 
fecundity and emasculation, the In-Itself of Absolute Freedom and the sign of 
necessary weakness. Femininity, as such, is regarded as a lack - i. e., inasmuch as it 
must be actualised, made real, in the (male) Word, it'still wants to be seen'- and as 
the inaccessible ('veiled), fecund Ground of its own being. 
Schelling's point is easy to misunderstand. On the one hand, 212ek points out 
'[I]nsofar as "subject" is the Ground that asserts itself "as such", in the very medium of 
Existence, against every detenninate fonn of actual existence, subject is a potentiality, 
never fully actualized, and the feminine Ground asserted against the "masculine" 
existence -logos. "" On the other hand, insofar as femininity can only ever be 
actualised / embodied, and thus desired, as that which is not itself, it is itself only in 
the masquerade of masculinity. "' In its disavowal of corporeal nature and desire for a 
390 The following discussion is indebted to David Farrell Krell, 'The Crisis of Reason in the 
Ninctcenth-Century: Schelling's Treatise on Human Freedom' in The Collegiuni Phaenomenologicuni: 
Dic First Teti Years (eds. John Sallis, Giuseppina Moneta, and Jacques Taminiaux; Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1988), 13-32, and David L. Clark, 'Mourning Becomes Theory: Schelling and 
the Absent Body of Philosophy' Romantic Circles Praxis Series: Scheffing and Romanticisni (June 
2000): 16 pars. PURL: http: //www. i-c. ui-nd. edu/praxis/schelling/clark/clark. html 
39 1 Friedrich Schlegel, Tucinde'and the Fragments, 253. For more on Schlegel's sense of 
femininity and its rclation to that of Hegel's, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, 'The Unpresentable' in 
The 
Subject (11'Philosophy (trans. Claudette Sartiliot; Minneapolis: Uni\ ersity of Minnesota 
Press, 110-57. 
392 21ýck, The Abyss of Freedom', 7-8. 
301 ? 
-i2ek, Ae Indivisible Remainder, 
158-67. Cf., Judith Butler's argument that desire, the 
very heiirt of this masquerade, jis marked by a pursuit of mastery (through consumption or negat, on) of 
'\\hat is different or unassimilable in the Other', and is typically engendered as masculine 
Mesire' in 
0-ifical T(Ymsfior Litcrar. v Stud. v feds. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin-, Chicago: 
University of Chicigo Press, 1995], 377,379). 
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spiritual Absolute that reflects itself back to itself, Schelling reasons, Idealism 
renounces its own actualisation / embodiment. "' Consequently, as Krell points out, 
'precisely when the (masculine) philosopher ignores (feminine) nature he sacrifices 
his own (masculine) nature"" - i. e., by excluding the feminine potency of nature, the 
manly men of Idealism actually reveal themselves to be decidedly 'girly'. 
Mark Lloyd Taylor illustrates this brilliantly in his analysis of gender and the 
theological roles of God and Jesus in Moby-Dick. " Ishmael's narration, Taylor 
argues, blurs the distinction between Reformed Christianity and Emersonian 
Transcendentalism. 
In the former, one has a God of absolute doing; in the latter, a God of 
absolute being. In both cases, the world and the human self cease to 
have any real meaning or value. The God of absolute doing and the 
God of absolute being collide, merge, and cancel each other, leaving 
the all-powerful, all-present, indefinite blackness that swims behind 
Moby Dick, both the whale and the book. This white God is 
existentially useless, for no inferences concerning human life can be 
drawn from such indifferent power and inscrutable presence. "' 
In Ahab's inscrutable God, for instance, there is but the inevitability of destruction, 'of 
being rammed or crushed or penetrated', whereas the Transcendentalist God of 
absolute being, that which preys on those who idealise the 'gentle, dreamy 
participation of the individual self in the divine, oceanic All as the source of human 
equality and the banishment of discord and evil', destroys by'swallowing or 
dissolving or drowning the human self in its awful reality. "' Although both forms of 
destruction in Moby-Dick are repeatedly identified as masculine, in contrast to the 
394 Much of what I say here owcs a debt, n sp, rIt if not in \ý ord, to David Farrell Krell's 
discussion of hermaphroditism in Hegel. See Krell, Contagion, 126-44. 
395 Krell, 'The Crisis of Reason', 18. 
396 Mark Lloyd Taylor, 'Ishmael's (ni)Other: Gender, Jesus, and God in Me] % ille's 'Alobý- 
Dick... Jow-nal (ýf Relýql()n 72 (July 1992): 325-50- 
397 Taylor, 'Ishmael's (m)Other', 146. 
39' Taylor, 'Islimael's (m)Other', 346. 
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stifling weakness of femininity of life on the shore, Taylor notes Ishmael's 
unwillingness to abide by either. As a matter of fact, in his transition to the sea, 
Ishmael is not so much moving away from women as he is, in the words of Jennifer 
Wing, 'delving deeper into his own struggle to create a definitive image of "woman" 
that like the 'pasteboard' mask does not exist. """ That is to say, an unthinkable image 
of Woman as hermaphroditic 'Other-as- Same', as that which 'exists solely as a nurror 
to reflect back the image of the male self to himself. ""' 
The 'manly' descnption of the Idealist philosopher/ seeker of truth in 
Schelling and Melville is once again not unlike the young protagonist of Licinde, 
Julius, who in the act of writing sublimates (through what is described by Martha 
Helfer as 'an ideational erection") his 'mental lust' and 'sensual spirituality' for his 
beloved Lucinde: 
These words are dull and turbid. ... A great future beckons me to rush deeper into infinity: each idea opens its womb and brings forth 
innumerable new births. The farthest reaches of unbridled lust and 
silent intimation exist simultaneously in me. I remember everything, 
even my sufferings, and all my former and future thoughts bestir 
themselves and arise against my will. Wild blood rages in my swollen 
arteries, my mouth thirsts for union, and my imagination, alternately 
choosing and rejecting among the many forms of joy, finds none in 
which desire can finally fulfil itself and be at peace at last. 'O' 
What at first appears as strict, 'straight' heterosexuality, however, is really anything 
399 Jennifer Wing, 'Defining Women in Moby-Dick'in Misogynism in Literature: AnY Place, 
AnY Thne (ed. Britta Zangen; Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2004), 122. 
400 Taylor, 'Ishmael's (m)Other', 348 (emphasis mine). Taylor regards the presence of Jesus in 
Mob 
, v-Dick as an alternative 
to the traditional male-female binary. Nevertheless, his interpretation of 
\ý hat this means is not radical enough to be adequate for our purposes here. Taylor is content that this 
Jcsus remain 'subversive of the God of absolute power and absolute presence'by playing the functional 
rolc of 'Othcr-ýis-Same; but, in truth, he is 'truly other, never merely our reflection, and thus ne\ er 
rezilly Other, nevcr Separated from us, since she is beyond the structures that constitute such reflecti \ ity 
and separation in the first place' (350). Ultimately, Taylor cannot submit to the scandalous implications 
of the diaicctically materialistic Christ, whose functional, subversive role cannot be differentiated from 
his being as such. 
401 Martha B. Helfer, "'Confessions of an Improper Man": Friedrich Schlegel's Lucinde' in 
Outing Goethe and His, A, ýc (ed. Alice A. Kuzmar, Stanford: Stanford Univers1tv Press, 1996), 177. 
402' Tucinde'and the Fragments, 46-47. 
1'" 
but. Julius' 'autoerotic narcissism'is unabashed: "' 'I'm not afraid to admire and love 
myself in such a mirror [i. e., Lucinde]. Only here do I see myself complete and 
han-nonious, or rather, see all of humanity in me and in you. ""' Helterdrav,, sour 
attention to a surprisingly stark homoeroticism that runs throughout ba-inde, where 
Julius continually wishes, in both senses of the phrase, tofind himself inside the 
female : 1115 
[H]Is narcissism is an expression of the self-positing subject, 'I am F, 
he overcomes the male subject's limitations both by defining itself 
homoerotically as a woman and by extending his self-love to Lucinde, 
hence rewriting the male subject's self-positing as'l am woman'. This 
homoerotic substitution ... allows Julius to conclude 'I am mother', 
therefore'l am poet'and' I can define myself as poesy. ... His 
vicarious appropriation of Lucinde's matemal status then allows him to 
complete his apprenticeship with the statement that just as his painting 
has reached perfection, his life has become 'a created story', a 'work of 
art': in the self-reflexive act of writing his autobiography, Julius 
actually transforms himself into poesy. "' 
In his provocative 'camp reading' of Pierre, James Creech finds Pierre's 
apparently heterosexual, incestuous relationship with Isabel following a similar 
path. "' From the beginning of the novel, Creech notes, Pierre proleptically mourris 
for the sister he never had, "' when in fact his life's real loss was that of his father 
403 Helfer, "'Confessions of an Improper Man"', 177. 
404 Schlegel, Tucinde'and the Fragments, 46. 
4()s 'Almost paradoxically, Julius' self-love becomes synonymous with homoerot, cism when he 
engages in heterosexual intercourse with Lucinde' (Helfer, "'Confessions of an Improper Man"', 189). 
For a similar reading of Novalls' Heinrich von Ofterdingen, see Alice A. Kuzmar, 'Labor Pains: 
Romantic Theories of Creativity and Gender' in The Spirit of Poes , v: 
Essa 
, Nýs on 
Jewish and German 
Literature and Thought in Honor of Gýza t, on Mollicir (eds. Richard Block and Peter Ferives, 
Evýinston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2000), 74-88. 
406 Hefler, "'Confessions of an Improper Man"', 190. 
407 James Creech, Closet Writing / Gay Reading: The Case of Melville's Pierre (Chicago: 
UniNci-sity of Chicago Press, 1993), 114-18. 
409 Cf., 'So perfect to Pierre had long seemed the illuminated scroll of his life thus far, that 
only hiatus N\ ýis disco\ crable by him in that s\\ cctly-\ýrlt manuscript. A sister had been ornitted 
from 
the text. He mourned that so delicious a feeling as fraternal love had been denied him' (Nlcl\ dle. 
Merre' 11). 
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when he was twelve. '09 Pierre's 'strange yearning for a sister', the narrator suggests, 
had part of its origin in that still stranger feeling of loneliness he 
sometimes experienced, as not only the solitary head of his family, but 
the only surnamed male Glindinning extant. A powerful and populous family had by degrees run off into the female branches; so that Pierre found himself surrounded by numerous kinsmen and kinswomen, yet 
companioned by no surnamed Glindinning, but the duplicate one 
reflected to him in the mirror. "' 
Creech does not fail to notice that Pierre's desire for a sister is built around his desire 
for a male companion. "' As such, 'homosexuality is explored from the perverse 
perspective of its impossible place, and thus its closeted space, within the still-sacred 
configuration of the family. "" 
Nevertheless, by the end of both Lucinde and Pierre, heterosexuality 
overcomes the seductive force of homoerotic self-creation / self-presentation. 
Because men are obviously not women and cannot bear children, Schlegel's 
Bildungsroman concludes, the narcissism of homoeroticism leaves one utterly alone 
and barren. "' For his part, too, Melville was deeply aware (if subtly critical) of 
societal nonns and institutions, and ultimately serves up in Pierre a dark, cautionary 
409 Creech, Closet Writing, 115-16. 
410 Melville, Pierre, 12. 
411 Creech's reading ultimately assumes Melville's own repressed incestuous desire and its 
origin in the desire for homosexual incest. This argument, however, is neither necessary nor assumed 
in my development here. For other accounts of homosexuality in Pierre, see Henry A. Murray, 
Introduction to Pierre; or, the Ambiguities, by Herman Melville (New York: Hendricks House, 1949), 
xci-xcii; John D. Seelye, "'Ungraspable Phantom' Reflections of Hawthorne in Pierre and The 
Confidence-Man', Studies in the Novel I (Winter 1969): 436-43. 
412 Creech, Closet Writing, 120. Cf., 'The straight mind continues to affirm that incest, and not 
homosexuality represents its major interdiction. Thus, when thought by the straight mind, 
homosexuality is nothing but heterosexuality' (Monique Wittig, The Straight Mind and Other Essay 
[Boston: Beacon, 1992], 28). 
413 Compare to Schelling's discussion of'sexless bees'in the university: 'Whatever cannot be 
incorporated into this active, living whole [i. e., the ideal university] is dead matter to be eliminated 
sooner or later - such is the law of all living organisms. The fact is, there are too many sexless bees in 
the hive of the sciences, and since they cannot be productive, they merely keep reproducing their own 
spiritual barrenness in the form of inorganic excretions. (F. W. J. Schelling, On University Studies 
[trans, E. S. Morgan, ed. Norbert Guterman; Athens, Oh.: Ohio University Press. 19661,11. (Qtd. Clark, 
'Mouming Becomes Theory', n. 6) 
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tale of the disembodied, solipsistic end of finally 'finding' the truth. Indeed, in a 
perverse twist of ambiguous morality, Pierre's innocence - i. e., his desire to follow 
his heart, to find and assert the truth of himself - ultimately incites moral 
indignation, social and familial exile, economic downfall, professional failure, and 
even death. "' 
The difficult point being made here is that because the feminine is, in effect, 
the subject par excellence, the Absolute Ground from which the subjective decision to 
begin emerges, she has never been spoken as such. For, as Schelling writes: 
Uninhibited being is always that which does not know itself, as soon as 
it becomes an object to itself it is also already inhibited. Apply these 
remarks to the issue in hand and the subject is, in its pure 
substantiality, as nothing - completely devoid of attributes - it is 
until now only Itself, and thus, as such, a complete freedom from all 
being and against all being (Seyn); but it inescapably attracts itself 
[sich aii-Jeht, with the sense of 'putting on' and thus being inauthentic, 
and of'drawing itself to' itself]. ... But the subject cannot grasp itself 
as what it Is, for precisely in attracting itself (im sich Anziehen) it 
becomes an other, this is the basic contradiction, we can say the 
misfortune, in all being - for either it leaves itself, then it is as 
nothing, or it attracts itself, then it is an other and not identical with 
itself "' 
Which is to say, then, in a crucial supplement to its presentation in Plato, the 
'uninhibited ground'/ motherly khora can only ever be when as 'characterized by an 
original "masquerade", in so far as all her features are artificially "put on". "' This is 
not, though, a case of simple male chauvinism. Rather, what we find in Schelling and 
Melville is the primordiality of duplicitous self-charactensation - of the masquerade 
parexccllence. Consequently, from the emergence of 'straight' males like Pierre, who 
ferninise themselves in the course of their male, heterosexual pursuits, to the 
... Creech, Closet Writing, 122-23. For a slightly different perspecfive, focusing on Pierre", 
inability to'fulfill the promise of his manhood', see Garcia, Mothers and Others, 80-86. 
415 Friedrich W. J. Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy: Munich Lectures [ca. 
IN3.14S., '41 (trans. Andrew Bo\\ ic, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1994), 115-16. 
"" ? 
-12ck, Ae Indivisible Remainder, 160. 
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masculine characterisation of femininity as 'Other' and 'veiled', the modem Subject is 
marked as such by its constitutive contingency and artifice. "' 
As we will see in Chapter Four, it is precisely in his recognition of the inherent 
duplicity of the Subject's search for the truth about itself that Melville most fully 
embodies the aesthetic vitality and intensity immanent to theological thinking. My 
contention will be that the full, most radical implications of the apocalypticism of 
MobY-Dick and Pierre are fully realised only in his final novel, The Cmifiden ce-Man: 
His Masquerade. As we will see, in this Masquerade all self-presentation is as though 
a disguise, but one that conceals no hidden truth or identity. In Melville's 
Masquerade, we find a theological thinking attuned to the creative duplicity of self- 
presentation, whereby the'apocalypse of self immanent to self-presentation in his 
earlier novels carries with it the potential of a self-becoming that is a self-creation. 
Here, the radical theological vision of Melville becomes-itself in and as the intensity 
of an aesthetico-theological awareness of an immanent freedom to make all things 
new. 
417 In this way, 212ek adds, the female is, in fact, 'more subject than man, since according to 
Schelling, Ný hat ultimately characterizes the subject is this very radical contingency and artificiality of 
her cvcry posit]\ e feature, that is, the fact that 'she' in herself is a pure void that cannot be Identified 
with any of tlicsc features' (Ae Indivisible Remainder, 160-61). 
1 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
MELVILLE AND AESTHETIC THEOLOGY 
1. Secrecy and Self-Becoining 
Enveloped in its pseudonyms, plagiarism, and hoaxes, Melville's fiction, from 
its beginning to its end, bears the dubious marks of that which has secrets to tell and 
faces to disclose. His is, we have seen in the previous chapters, something like a 
puppet-show proscenium, a perfon-nance with strings attached; or, more fittingly, the 
secretive silence of a masquerade. 
Before fully considering the theological implications of Melville's 
Masquerade, though, it is important also to recall Jacques Derrida's famous discussion 
of secrecy, In all its ambiguity, in his essay 'D, &ýgations: Comnient ne pas parler' 
[Denials: How to Avoid Speaking]. "' Here Derrida asks: 'How not to divulge a 
secret? How to avoid saying or speaking? "" That is to say, how does one speak a 
secret in such a way that it maintains its secrecy? A secret does not remain a secret as 
such if it is untold; and yet the condition of its possibility, i. e., the telling of the secret, 
undermines its secrecy. In light of his essay's title, what exactly is Derrida trying to 
'deny'? Indeed, is he denying anything at all? 
As Mark C. Taylor points out, perhaps the problem is in the translation. "O 
... Jacques Derrida, 'How to Avoid Speaking: Denials' in Derrida and Negatiý, e Theology 
(eds. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay; trans. Ken Frieden-, Albany, N. Y.: State University of New 
York, 1992), 73-142. 
419 Dcrrida, 'How to Avoid Speaking', 94. 
420 For Derrida, what isn't a problem of translation'? Philosophy is, he contends 'tile fixation of 
a certain concept and project of translation.... What does philosophy say'! What does the philosopher 
say when fie is being a philosopher? He says: What matters is truth or meaning, and since meaning is 
t1cfore or beyond language, it follo\ý s that it is translatable. Meaning has the commanding role, and 
conscquently one must be able to fix its univocality or, in any case, to master its plurivocality. If this 
plun \ ocality can be mastered, then translation, understood as the transport of a semantic content into 
another signlfý ing form, is possible. There is no philosophy unless translation in this latter scnsc is 
possible' (Jacques Derrida, Ae Ear of the Other: Otobtograph. v, Transference, Translation: tind 
01scus, vtol's with Jacques Ocrrithi [cd. Christie V. McDonald, trans. Pcgggý KamLif-. NeýN York: 
S'cllockcil Books, 1985], 120) (emphasis mine). 
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D&ýgations, Taylor explains, is also the French translation of Freud's Verneinting, 
which is typically translated into English as 'negation'. The latter translation, 
however, is also problematic because Verneinung suggests both the presence and 
absence of negation, or'an affirmation that is a negation and a negation that is an 
affirmation'. "' Consequently, Taylor is not alone in his contention that it mi,, ht be 
better to follow the French translation and render it simply 'denegations'. "' 
To de-negate is to un-negate, a peculiarity that in his essay Derrida argues 
differentiates it from the implicit apophasis of'negative theology. His point is that 
we are left confounded by the 'impossibility' of the secret. It is, on the one hand, that 
which cannot be spoken if it is to remain a secret; and yet, on the other hand, without 
it having always already been spoken, i. e., mediated by language as a secret, there is 
no secret to keep. As such, for Derrida, the final / phenomenological truth of the 
secret effectively annuls the secret, unsaying all saying by rendering all spaces empty 
and all words hollow. "' In this, Derrida locates his provocatively theological point: 
[A]t the moment when the question 'How to avoid speaking' arises, it is 
already too late. There was no longer any question of not speaking. 
Language has started without us, in us, and before us. This is what 
theology calls God, and it is necessary, it will have been necessary to 
speak. This'it is necessary' (ilfaut) is both the trace of undeniable 
necessity - which is another way of saying that one cannot avoid 
denying it, one can only deny it - and of a past injunction. Always 
already past, hence without a past present. Indeed, it must have been 
possible to speak in order to allow the question 'How to avoid 
1 Mark Taylor, Nots (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 36. 
422 Cf, Jean-Luc Marion: 'I have chosen to render the French "D&6gations" as "Denegations" 
rather than "Denials" because this seems to better capture the sense intended by the author of the 
present study-, namely, it is not simply a matter of denying that one, be it deconstruction or "negative 
thcology", does something, be it predicates God or "negative theology"; rather, at issue is ýN liether or 
not in claiming not to speak about X, or in denying that they do Y, negative theology and/or 
deconstruction are in fact speaking about X, doing Y' (Jean-Luc Marion, 'In the Name: Hoýý to Avold 
Speaking of "Negative Theology... in God, the Gift, and PostnioderniSin [ed. John D. Caputo and 
Robert Scanlon; Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1999], 48-49 n. 7). 
423 N lark C. Taý lor, About Religion: Economies of Faith in Virtual Culture (Chicago: 
Uni\ ersity of Chic. too Press, 1999), 42: sec also Jacques Derrida, Disscinination (trans. Barbara 
Johnson, ChIcal-o. University of Chicago Prcss, 1981), 168. 1 
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speaking? 'to arise. Having come from the past, language before 
language, a past that was never present and yet remainS unforgettable 
- this 'it is necessary' thus seems to beckon toward the event of an 
order or of a promise that does not belong to what one currently calls 
history; the discourse of history or the history of discourse. "' 
Appropriate to my discussion in this chapter, therefore, Derrida ultimately ends up 
critiquing onto-theology, specifically negative theology, but only by attempting to 
avoid doing so. 
Ultimately, however, Derrida's notion of the secret as'impossible' is 
weakened by the disembodied status of his phenomenological requirements, in a 
manner not unlike Schelling's criticism of Idealism. For the more strictly materialistic 
Melville, though, where there is an inequality of knowledge between two or more 
parties, there is a secret. Such is the difference between playing a game and being 
played for the fool. As we have seen in the previous chapters, even the complex 
masquerade of subjective consciousness Melville enacts in his novels does not 
preclude the happening (or becoming) of cognition and sensibility. On the contrary, 
the character T emerges as the unavoidable, retroactive agent of its own self- 
characterisation. We are, in the words of Philip Goodchild, who is drawing deeply 
from Gilles Deleuze, 
already immersed in fields of subjectivity, where thoughts and passions 
are shaped by dominant strategies of subjectification, xe are immersed 
in fields of signification, where meanings are regulated by hegemonic 
discourses; and we are immersed in fields of organization, where 
segments of bodies and materials are distributed through machinic 
interactions with segments of discourse. "' 
In short, Melville's masquerade of subjective consciousness is a giving and a taking, 
truth and lie, disclosure and duplicity. Moreover, in agreement with Derrida, it is thus 
424 Derrida, flow to Avoid Speaking', 99. 
425 Philip Goodchild, Ctipitalism and Religion: The Price of Piety (London and \e\ý York: 
Routledg, 2002), 159-, Gilles Dcleuze and Filex Guattarl-A [housand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
ýchizophrcnia (trans. Brian Massumi, London: Athlone, 1988), 159. 
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closely parallel to the character, i. e. the being-itself, of theology, and thus the 
condition of confidence and faith in others, in oneself, and in one's God. Contra 
Derrida, though, it is also the immanent, materialistic condition of theology's self- 
characterisation / self-becoming, whose aesthetic potency and truth is precisely the 
intensity of its creative potential to make all things new. "' 
Such is, I wish to suggest, the aesthetico-theological impulse that propels the 
steamship Fidýle down the Mississippi River in Melville's final novel The 
Corifildence-Man: His Masquerade, towards the city of the American Mardi Gras, 
New Orleans. The novel begins on April Fool's Day, with a blinclingly white stranger 
boarding the FiMe, and ends in an uncertain, by no means absolute darkness, as the 
steamer's final candle is snuffed out for the evening. But this is a day in the life of a 
black and white world only insofar as it arises from Melville's paper and pen. Asits 
seemingly random episodes of peddlers and beggars of uncertain character and intent 
accumulate, one's confidence is strained. That is to say, although Melville's novel 
ostensibly pulls the wool over its readers' eyes, with nothing ever fully denied or 
affirmed, completely stable or unstable, his reader is never entirely sure who the joke 
is on, or whether there is in fact ajoke at all. In this way, Melville takes on the 
equivocal character of character itself: that of the nature of his novel, of himself as an 
author, as well as that of those on board his fictional vessel. What one discovers in 
the midst of the novel's multifaceted irony and reflective vertigo is that the very mask 
Melville had self-consciously suffered behind for years is now shared by his reader. 427 
421, Cf-'Frorn "impossible TO HAPPEN" we thus pass to "the impossible HAPPENS ... I 
2i2ek 
pronounces. 'This, and not the structural obstacle forever deferring the final resolution, is the most 
difficult thing to accept' (Mek, On Belief, 84). 
4 -' 7 See Baviiiý 'NICI\ 111C'S QLiarrel \N ith Fiction', 917-918. In her essay on its'unreadibility'. 
Elizabeth Renker's summation of The Confulence-Man's place in Melville's oeuýre 1. s apt: 'The 
Coqflelence- A 1, in ... presents a fundamental reconception of the author's relation to 
his text and. in 
tLirn, to his rcýidcrs. Nlcl\ ilic no lon,, cr burns, with Ahab, to strike through the mask of the dead. blind 
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Though loving his novel and his role as its author, as we saw in'Ha-ýý, thorne and His 
Mosses', Melville now would set both adrift down the mighty Mississippi Riý'cr, and 
neither it nor his contemporary readers would ever return. Indeed, with The 
Cot#idence-Man Melville effectively ends his professional writing career, 
notwithstanding the novel's final words: 'Something ftirther may follow of this 
Masquerade. "" 
In Melville's Masquerade, similar in some ways to Derrida's analysis of the 
secret, we find asked the all-too-often neglected question of a truly modem theology: 
What is the character of'theology? Such a question, of course, is riddled by its 
equivocality, for the 'of may just as well be objective as subjective genitive. Is this 
the question asked of theology, or is it the question theology asks? When one dares to 
think about the character of theology theologicalýy, a radically 'transcendental' 
analysis in so far as we are thinking about the beginnings and endings that condition 
our understanding of subjectivity and objectivity, and thus when the questions we ask 
in and of this enquiry proliferate beyond their neo-Platonic / Kantian tethers, how do 
we begin at all?... Divorced from its metaphysical stability, the question of theology 
functions like a Melvillian masquerade of faith, and can only ever beg to be asked 
wall; instead, he turns the mask on a bewildered reader and delights in its obscuring powers' ( ... A 
! ": Unreadibility in The Confidence-Man'in The Cambridge Companion to Herman Melville 
[ed. Robert S. Levine; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 116-17). 
429 Melville, The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, 251. For a few commentators, Melville's 
esoteric conclusion suggests his hope to write a sequel. See Howard Horsford, 'Evidence of Melville's 
Plan for a Sequel to The Confidence-Man'American Literature 24 (March 1952): 85-89. 
429 Immanuel Kant defines the 'Transcendental Analytic' in the First Critique as 'the hitherto 
rarely attempted dissection of theJacult ,v of 
the understanding itself, in order to inNestigate the 
possibility of concepts a priori by looking for them in the understanding alone, as their birthplace, and 
by analysing the pure use of this faculty. This is the proper task of a transcendental philosophy' 
(Critique of Pure Reason, 103 [A65-66-, B90-91 In other words, the analysis of the mind's 
necessarily unifying contribution to the intelligibility of sensual experience. Kant distinguishes this 
fi-oni the Transcendental Aesthetic, which concerns itself with the a priori conditions ofsensation (i. e. 
time and spacc), and the Transcendental Dialectic, NN hose object is the unconditioned metaphysical 
realities outside 'pure' human sensation, experience, and understanding (i. e. the nouniena - God, the 
\\ orld, the Self). 
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again. Such is, we might suggest, the dilemma of theological reflection's creative 
consideration of its problematic beginning: i. e., it finds itself, like the early Gen-nan 
Romantics mentioned above, beginning in the middle, 'like an epic poem'. "' But, as 
we will see below, theology is neither stymied nor rendered absolutely (or mystically) 
silent in the face of its impossible task; it is, on the contrary, radically opened to the 
creative awareness and freedom of theology speaking-itself / becoming-itself. 
2. The Character of The Conridence-Man 
For a book so decisively rejected by readers, the earliest English reviews of 
The Confidence-Man were actually not as negative as one might imagine. The 
Athenwimi, for instance, pronounced it'full of thought, conceit, and fancy, of affection 
and originality', calling Melville the master of his'luxuriously picturesque' 
narrative. "' The Leader, though not as lavish in its praise, regarded the book as 
channing and original, due to 'its constant flow of descriptions, character- sketching, 
and dialogue, deeply toned and skilfully contrasted. 1132 The Westminster and Foreign 
Quarterl-v Review eagerly awaited the story's continuation, hailing 'the first part' as a 
'remarkable work', and praised Melville as the quintessence of American writing. 433 
Melville's countrymen, however, were neither as enthusiastic nor as thoughtftil 
in their assessments. Indeed, all but three of the reviews are fewer than three 
sentences long, while the rest seem to have been based upon the reading of other 
reviews rather than the book itself For example, one month after the Boston Puritan 
Recorder suggested that the book was a possible cure for dyspeptics, the Newark 
430 Schlegel, Tucinde'and the Fragments, 171 [Athendeum Fragment 84]. 
43 1 Branch, Melville, 371-72. 
43 2 Branch, Melville, 172-73). 
33 Branch, Melville, 
-185-86. 
11)" 
Dally Advertiser suspiciously suggested that Melville himself had dyspepsia when he 
wrote it. According to Philadelphia's North American, actually finishing the book is 
regarded as the equivalent of 'being choked off ... like the audience of a Turkish 
story teller'. "' And The Chicimiati Enquirer minces no words nor pulls any punches: 
[Melville's] last production, "The Confidence Man, " is one of the 
dullest and most dismally monotonous books we remember to have 
read, and it has been our unavoidable misfortune to peruse, in the 
fulfillment of journalistic duty, a number of volumes through, \ý hich 
nothing but a sense of obligation would have sustained us. "Typee, " 
one of, if not the first of his works, is the best, and "The Confidence 
Man" the last, decidedly the worst. So Mr. M's authorship is toward 
the nadir rather than the zenith, and he has been progressing in the 
form of an inverted climax. 435 
If the book's English and Amencan reviews were a mixed bag, its receipts 
certainly were not. Of the one thousand copies published in England, only 343 were 
sold during the first fifteen months. After two years, 386 copies were sold, thirty-two 
presented (three to Melville), sixty-six disposed of at a trade sale, and 5 16 sold as 
scrap paper - and even then its English publisher did not break even. 436 In America, 
however, things were even direr. Less than a month after cheekily releasing The 
Confidence-Man on Apnl Fool's Day in 1857, its American publisher, Dix, Edwards, 
& Co., went out of business, taking with it what little chance of success the novel ever 
had. 437 
414 Branch, et al, 'Historical Note', 319. The three most complete sources of reviews are 
Branch's Melville, 369-87 and Hetherington's Melville's Reviewers, 255-64. 
435 Hershel Parker, ed., 'Reviews' in The Confidence Man: His Masquerade, by Herman 
Me] % dle (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1971), 279. 
43o For the most thorough research on publishing records in England, see Branch, et al., 
'H istorical Note', 3 17. In an interesting note that I have not seen corroborated anywhere else, the 
editors of this edition note: 'These figures account for the full 1,000, but after the Longman's buildings 
in Paternoster Row were burned down in 1861 someone added a memorandum to the closed-OUt ledger: 
"6 Copies cl[oth] Burnt. " If these were not phantom copies, they had at least an apter fate than the 
ýN asted quires - si \ heretical N olumes consumed in flames. ' 
, 
financial panic of 1857' as the reason for the firm's 437 Elizabeth Foster citcs the 'gathering 
dissol\ ing; N\ hereas John Seelyc. more proN ocatl\ cly, and perhaps more fittingly. suggests it \% as 'due 
to the 1-1nýn-din- of one of the partners'. See her Introduction to The Confltlent-c-Alan ( 1954),. xxxi. and 
13) 3 
The revival of interest in Melville that began in the 1920s did ý'ery little at first 
to change the book's fortunes. For his first biographer, Raymond Wee-ver, it was a 
'posthumous work'; "' for John Freeman, not only was it 'negligible in quality' and a 
'failure in intelligence', but it was also 'an abortion'. "' Once again, as It were, Melville 
is unable to escape the prematurity of death. "' Indeed, if Melville was dead before his 
time, for Newton Arvin he most likely was also damned, for he had penned'one of the 
most iiýfidel books ever written by an American, one of the most completely nihilistic, 
morally and metaphysically. "" And so went the funeral march of critical comments 
for at least half of the twentieth-century. 
Richard Chase, in his simply titled Herman Melville, almost single-handedly 
changed the course of Melville's sunken ship of a novel. According to Chase, The 
Confidence-Man was unquestionably Melville's 'second best book'Oust behind MobY- 
Dick), for 'more than any of his other writings, it establishes Melville's claim to moral 
intelligence'. 442 Chase's assessment subsequently proved to be a rallying cry for a new 
generation of scholars in the last half of the twentieth century who sought to vindicate 
John Seelye, Introduction to The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, by Hen-nan Melville (San 
Francisco: Chandler, 1968), xiv. 
43 8 Raymond Weaver, Hernian Melville: Mariner and MAstic (New York: George H. Doran, 
192 1), 348. Fourteen years hindsight would do little to change Weaver's opinion of the book, as he 
then regarded it as an instance of Melville's 'perverse self-indulgence of the "spontaneous Me"' 
(Introduction to Journal up the Straits: Oct. 11,1856 - May 5,1857 [New York: The Colophon, 1935], 
xx. ). 
439 John Freeman, Herman Melville (London: Macmillan, 1926). 62,141. One year later, Van 
Wyck Brooks would echo Freeman, calling the book 'an abortion ... broken off in the middle, 
apparently, but not before the author has lost the thread of his original idea', which is nothing less than 
the 'product of premature artistic senility' (Emerson and Others [London: J. Cape, 1927), 177-79). 
"" Interestingly, the pessimism of these early critics may be more understandable than one 
today might \v ish to credit it. After all, as late as 1953 the novel had yct to be reprinted in America, 
and only once in London, in 1923, as Volume X11 of in the Constable Edition of %lelville's WOrks. 
44 1 Newton Ar\ in, Herman Melville (London: Methuen & Co., 1950). 250-5 1 
442 Richard Chase, Herman Melville: A Critical StmA, (New York: Macmillan, 1949). 185, 
20-5. 
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the novel's place in America's literary canon. 
443 
No sooner was The Conjidence-Man highly valued as an important piece of 
literature, and thus worthy of academic appreciation, than this value was assessed and 
declared most fervently by a 'standard line' of scholarship, led by its doyenne 
Elizabeth Foster. Hershel Parker first invoked this label to describe those like himself 
who subscribe to Foster's assumption 'that Melville tried to write a coherent book 
and [who] look for interpretations that satisfy every detail of the text and fit into a 
self-consistent whole'. "' While the editors of the Northwe stem -Newberry edition, 
which has been generally considered the authoritative edition of the text since its 
publication in 1984, attempt to represent faithfully the divergent, non-standard lines of 
interpretation that have arisen since the late 1960s, they remain openly whimsical 
about the good old days. 'The single most important study to date is that of Elizabeth 
S. Foster, in the comprehensive introduction and notes to her 1954 Hendricks House 
edition', they conclude, just before drawing a strict line of distinction between the 
'scholarship' of old and the 'critical commentary' that has since tended to margmalize 
Foster's commentary. 
445 
Clearly, for Melville's contemporaries as much as his modem commentators, 
The Confidence-Man is many things to many different people. For some of its earliest 
critics, it was not even a novel. 'A novel it is not', the LiterarN, Gazette wryly notes, 
unless a novel means forty-five conversations held on board a steamer, 
conducted by personages who might pass for the errata of creation, and 
so far resembling the Dialogues of Plato as to be undoubted Greek to 
443 The apotheosis of this contemporary reassessment is likely that of Roelof Overmeer, who 
asserts without any hint of apparent hyperbole that The Confidence-Man is'a novel whose modernity 
no twentieth-century novelist has yet surpassed' ( ... Something Further": The Confidence Man and 
Writing as Disinterestcd Act' Etudes de Lettres 4 [1987]: 43). 
444 - cf., Parker, Foreword to Ille Foster, Introduction to The Confidence-Man ( 1954), x I\ 1, 
Cotifidence-Man (1971 ), ix. 
445 Branch, et al., 'Historical Note', 335. 
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ordinary men. "' 
The reviewer for London's Iffitstrated Times sums up the only real agreement to 
which most of the novel's readers could come, that is, that they found it incoherent 
and unreadable. The frustration of the reviewer in London's Illustrated Times, for 
example, is palpable: 
We can make nothing of this masquerade, which, indeed, savours "'ery 
much of a mystification.... After reading the work forwards for 
twelve chapters and backwards for five, we attacked it in the middle, 
gnawing at it like Rabelais's dog at the bone, in the hopes of extracting 
something from it at last. But the book is without form and void. 447 
The temptation of the contemporary reader of The Confidence-Man, however, is to 
conclude much the same about the modem scholarship and criticism that now 
surrounds the novel. Like many works that have been deemed 'Important' or 
'canonical', most of the contemporary scholarship on The Confidem-e-Man is in fact 
about the scholarship itself... This, however, is hardly surprising, and indeed perhaps 
ultimately even appropriate, for as William Ramsey notes, though'Melville failed to 
find a popular 'audience' for the book ... he succeeded cleverly in capturing multiple 
and divergent "audiences". ... [W]hat Melville's 
book has to say to us is what we say 
about it. "" Which is to say, whatever one brings to Melville's most duplicitous of 
44 ' Branch, Melville, 373. 
447 Branch, Melville, 379,380. The decidedly mixed review in Mrs. Stephens'Nevv Monthl. v 
Magazine would also make use of this image of a confused beginning and ending, and come to a very 
similar conclusion: 'The book ends where it begins. You might, without sensible inconvenience, read it 
backwards. You are simply promised in the last line, that something further shall be heard of the hero-, 
until which consummation, the riddle must continue to puzzle you unsolved'(384). 
Elizabeth Foster, 
too, notes the same thing, but regards it as a positive tautology. See her Introduction to 
The 
Cmifidence-Man (1954), xci-xcii. For more on Melville and tautology, see Renker, Strike Through the 
Mask, 178-99. 
... For txN o of the most explicit examples of this, see Lawrence Graunian, Jr.. 'Sugucstions on 
tile Future of The Coiifitleii(-(, -A4tiii'Ptil)ei-s on English 
Language and Literature I (Summer 1965). 
`4 1-49-, and Marc Dolan, 'Four Faccs of the Confidence Man: An Academic 
Blind Man's Zoo' ESQ: A 
Journal oftheAnierican Renaissance 39 (2 
nd and 3 rd QuartCF 1993): 133-60. 
449 William M. Raniscy, 'Audicilces of The Coifidence-Man: Consensus %er-, U-s Ititerpretativc 
Communities' Melville Society Extracts 72 (February 1988): 9. 
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texts ultimately determines what one finds there. 
Ramsey's observation in his short article has more critical importance than he 
likely intended. By privileging the reader's observations, assumptions, and 
expectations about the book, the priority of the most significant interpretive questions 
is reversed. In a traditional mystery novel, for instance, the operaw, ýe question is 
'Who did it"' The mystery is not the nature of the crime, be it murder or theft or 
otherwise, but the identity of he or she who committed the act. Here, the author 
and/or narrator have privileged information that the reader is attempting to glean by a 
careful reading. Only from the identity is it finally possible to know the true nature of 
the crime, the criminal, and the mystery itself - i. e., was the crime that of passion, of 
revenge; how did the criminal hide his or tracks, etc.? When priority is switched to 
the reader, though, so too is the priority of the questions switched. No longer is the 
secret information of an author or narrator primary; the onus, rather, is on the reader 
to locate the nature of the mystery itself, that is, whether and/or where there is a 
mystery at all. With regard to The Confidence-Man, then, the operative question is no 
longer 'Who is the Confidence Man? 'but 'What is the Confidence ManT. 
As already noted, Ramsey's analysis itself does not explore the critical 
significance of his observation. Far more adequate to the task are the respective 
readings of Roelof Ovenneer and Edward Mitchell. "' For Ovenneer, the Confidence 
Man is identified as such - if not wholly identified'as whom'- 
by the use of 
duplicitous stratagems, in which 'speech acts are strategies of a role'. 
'5' In this way, 
450 ON crmeer, "'Something Further"', 43-53, Edward Mitchell, 'From Action to 
Essence: Some 
Notes on the Structure of Melville's The Coizfi(leti(, e-Altiti'Atitericati Literature 40 (March 
1968): 27- 
37. For variations on this emphasis see Charles Feidelson, Jr., SYmbolisin andAmerican 
Literature 
(Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1953), 207-211, John Wenke, Melville's Wusc: Literar), 
Creation and the Fornis (? f Philosophical Fiction (Kent, Oh.: Kent State 
UmN ersity Press, 1995). 205- 
16. 
4ý1 0\ crnieer, 'Sonieth, ng, Further', 51- 
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and much in keeping with the standard line interpretation, Overmeer identifies as 
swindlers a variety of characters from the first half of the novel, regarding each as 
'avatars of the Confidence Man'. Such, then, is the power of the Confidence Man, that 
he alone recognises that language is always strategic, and not the representation of an 
essence. "' Oven-neer writes: 
That which makes the Confidence Man a sign: his name, his dress, his 
speech, his actions, never give his interlocuter access to a kno\\, Iedge 
of how he will act. He, on the contrary, once he has found out what a 
prospective victim takes himself to be a sign of, knows exactly what it 
will take to have him or her act in the way that he desires, and he plans 
his strategy accordingly.... The different avatars of the Confidence 
Man are signs whose appearances do not correspond to an essence but 
to a strategy; his victims, on the other hand, are all appearances from 
- 453 which it may be deduced what they think their essence i S. 
Inasmuch as these stratagems and signs can be isolated as such, and thus make it 
possible to identify the different appearances of the Confidence Man, Overmeer very 
subtly maintains a significant level of characteristic stability in spite of his objections 
to isolating a correspondent essence. 
For Edward Mitchell, too, 'the attempt to define or describe the confidence 
men, or their victims either for that matter, in terms of their essence is an Impossibility 
in this novel. "" Rather, he continues, there are two types of characters in The 
Confidence-Man, confidence men and victims, and they are distinguishable only in 
terms of their actions; that is to say, there is 'constancy of activity rather than 
constancy of character "" On the one hand, anyone who puts confidence in another 
452 'This is why', O\crmeer concludes, 'in the no\ el he [the Confidence 
%laill is often likened 
to the serpent of the allegory, for his role is also a consc, ous-creatng role' 
('Something Further', 5 1). 
For three often neglected but profound readings in this vein see 
R. W. B. Lc\\ is, Aftem ord to The 
Coi! fi(lencc-Man: His Masquermle (Ne\v York: Signet, 1964). 261-76, Wadlington, 
Pie Confidence 
Game mAnicrican Literature, 137-70. 
45 " 0% crnicer, 'Something Furthcr', 49-50. 
454 Mitclicll, Trom Action to Fssciice', 12. 
455 \1 litclicil, Troni Action to Essence', 30. 
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person is a potential victim; on the other hand, anyone who solicits confidence from 
another is a potentlai confidence man. "' Moreover, inasmuch as 'essence is 
determined by action' and the social exchange of confidence is rarely one-directional, 
the roles of conman and victim are interchangeable. 
In Melville's novel we see this most clearly in the example of the ostensibly 
pure-hearted country merchant, Henry Roberts. In Chapter Four, a mournful-looking 
stranger with a long weed in his hat approaches Roberts, insisting that he is an old 
acquaintance. 
'Can I be so changed? Look at me. Or is it I who am mistaken? - 
Are you not, sir, Henry Roberts, forwarding merchant, of Wheeling, 
Virginia? Pray, now, if you use the advertisement of business cards, 
and happen to have one with you, just look at it, and see whether you 
are not the man I take you for. ' 
If Why, a bit chafed, perhaps, 'I hope I know myself. ' 
'And yet self-knowledge is thought by some not so easy. Who knows, 
my dear sir, but for a time you may have taken yourself for somebody 
else? Stranger things have happened. ' 
The good merchant stared. 
'To come to particulars, my dear sir, I met you, now some six years 
back, at Brade Brothers & Co. 's office, I think. I was travelling for a 
Philadelphia house. The senior Brade introduced us, you remember; 
some business-chat followed, then you forced me home with you to a 
family tea, and a family time we had. Have you forgotten about the 
um, and what I said about Werter's Charlotte, and the bread and butter, 
and that capital story you told of the large loaf A hundred times since, 
I have laughed over it. At least you must recall my name - Ringman, 
John Ringman. ' 
'Large loaP Invited you to tea? Ringman? Ringman? Ring? Ring"' 
'Ah sir', sadly smiling, 'don't ring the changes that way. I see you have 
a faithless memory, Mr. Roberts. But trust in the faithfulness of 
mine. 14S7 
'56 Mitchell, 'From Action to Essencc', 33. 
157 Mck ille, Ae Coi! fidence-Alon. 19, 
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As soon as Roberts hesitatingly trusts the memory of Ringman over his own, 
however, thus aligning him squarely within Mitchell's designation above as'potential 
victim', the roles are seemingly reversed. Seeing that Roberts is not at all comfortable 
with his request for a shilling, Ringman reverses the roles and begs for patience and a 
friend in whom he might confide his sorrowful state: 
'For God's sake don't leave me. I have something on my heart - on 
my heart. Under deplorable circumstances thrown among strangers, 
utter strangers. I vi, ant affiend in ýt, honi I ina 
- 
N, confide. Yours, Mr. 
Roberts, is almost the first known face I've seen for many weeks.... I 
need not say, sir, how it cuts me to the soul, to follow up a social 
salutation with such words as have just been mine. lknowthatl 
jeopardize your good opinion. But I can't help it: necessity knows no 
law, and heeds no risk. 1459 
Of course, in keeping with the reflective complexity of The Coiifidetice-Mati, 
the story of Ringman's plight itself can be accepted only through faith. It is, after all, 
not actually narrated for the reader at all until Chapter Twelve, and even then only 
after certain details have been filled in for Roberts by yet another character (the 'man 
in the gray coat' introduced in Chapter Six, who, according to the standard-line 
interpretation, may be the same character as Ringman in disguise) seeking the 
confidence and charity of other passengers on behalf of widows and orphans of the 
Seminole Indian tribe. "' Nevertheless, this serves only to strengthen Mitchell's point 
151 Melville, The Confidence-Man, 2 1. (emphasis mine) 
4SI) Melville, The Confidence-Man, 60-63. As noted above with regard to the reading of 
Overmeer, the novel's eponymous Confidence Man is traditionally regarded as appearing in a variety of 
avatars, most of who are foreshadowed in Chapter Three by the crippled beggar, Black Guinea. When 
accused of faking his deformity for the sake of procuring the charity of others, Guinea affirms his 
innocence by appealing to the testimony of other passengers, should they find them on board: 
'Oh yes, oh yes, dar is aboard here a werry nice, good ge'mman wid a weed, and a 
ge'mman in a gray coat and a white tie, what knows all about me; and a ge'mman ýý Id 
ýi big book, too; agd a yarb-doctor-, and a ge'mman in a yaller west, and a gc'mman 
\\ Id a brass platekwiolet robe; and a ge'mman as is a sodjer; and ever so many good, 
kind, honest ge'mm, 4i more aboard what knows me and wIll speak for me. God bress 
lem; yes, and \\ hat Vno\\ s me as well as dis poor old darkie knows hisself, God bress 
him' Oh, find'cm .-. and let'em come quick, and show you all, ge'mmen, 
dat dis 
poor ole darkic is \\crry well wordy of all you kind ge'mmen's kind confidence' 
(NIel\ ille, The Coiýfidence-Alan, 13). 
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regarding the inevitability and the interchangeable malleability of confidence in social 
exchange. A character's coherence or constancy, his or her essence, then, is available 
to the reader only by way of repetition or constancy of a certain type of action - e. g., 
whether one consistently solicits confidences from others or one places confidence in 
others. "' 
Nevertheless, it is precisely this essential coherence qua constancy that David 
W. Maurer's classic study of the confidence game deeply undercuts. Indeed, 
according to Maurer, for one to be conned, he must already have 'larceny in his veins': 
In other words, he must want something for nothing, or be willing to 
participate in an unscrupulous deal. If a man with money has this trait, 
he is all that any con man could wish. He is a mark. 'Larceny', or 
'thieves' blood', runs not only in the veins of professional thieves; it 
would appear that humanity at large has just a dash of it - and 
sometimes more. And the con man has learned that he can exploit this 
human trait to his own ends; if he builds it up carefully and expertly, it 
flares from simple latent dishonesty to an all-consuming lust which 
drives the victim to secure funds for speculation by any means at his 
command. "' 
There is no end to the problems of accepting Guinea's list alone as definitive evidence of any one 
character being a confidence man or in cahoots with Guinea, not least of which being its ambiguity. In 
Chapter Six, for example, we find a short conversation between 'a well-to-gentleman in a ruby-colored 
vest'(i. e., 'a ge'mman in a wiolet robe'? ) and'a man in a gray coat and a white tie'(i. e., 'a ge'mman in a 
gray coat and a white tie? ). Using the perspective offered by Mitchell, the essential difference is that 
the man in the ruby-colored vest disdains the giving or accepting of charity, whereas the man in the 
gray coat clearly does not. The fact that the former is presented as 'hard-hearted' would seem in 
keeping with Mitchell's concluding claim that humanityis itself distinguishable in terms of the one, 
single, constant activity which is the sine qua non of its existence, which in turn suggests that any 
individual who can neither solicit nor place confidence is outside the realm of humanity' (Mitchell, 
'From Action to Essence', 36). 
460 For a similar emphasis upon thematic repetition in The Confidence-Man see Walter Dubler, 
'Theme and Structure in Melville's The Confidence-Man'American Literature 33 (November 1961): 
307-19. John Bryant presents Melville's ruptured repetition as the key to any discussion of Melville's 
breakdown of allegory in 'Allegory and Breakdown in The Conflidence-Man: Melville's Comedy of 
Doubt' Philological Quarterly 61 (Winter 1986): 113-30. 
46 1 David W. Maurer, The Big Con: The Story of the Confidence Man (rev. ed; New York: 
Anchor Books, 1999), 117. We again see this exemplified in The Confidence-Man by Mr. Roberts. In 
gratitude for his charity, Ringman tells Roberts that the transfer-agent of the Black Rapids Coal 
Company is also aboard the steamer, and that Roberts would be wise to purchase the currently 
depreciated stock immediately: 
'A month since, in a panic contrived by artful alarmists, some credulo 
i 
us stock-holders 
sold out; but, to frustrate the aim of the alarmists, the Company, prev, ously advised 
of their scheme, so managed it as to get into its own hands those sacrificed shares, 
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The effectiveness of many cons is, thus, dependent not only on the greed of the 
victim, but his or her desire to scheme and connive against those who introduced the 
potential for easy, illicit fortune. The aim, then, is to empower the victim as a 
potential victimizer, whereby the giver of confidence feels like its recipient. 
While I am sympathetic to efforts such as those of Overmeer and Mitchell to 
disrupt the basis for (if not the manifestation of) stable identification of character in 
The Confidence-Man, their shared inadequacy is that neither takes seriously enough 
the complex interplay between reader, interpretive circle / agenda, and text as itself a 
play of confidence. Much is to be gained from their rejection of unequivocally 
following vanous strands of the standard-line interpretation, and thus avoiding all 
manner of ingenious identifications of the Confidence Man - e. g., as God, "' or 
Satan, "' or Death, "' or even Melville" - but this is only the first step. Such, then, is 
the value of Gustaaf van Croumphout's philosophical assessment of the 
'theatrical i zation' in The Cmifidence-Man. " There is, Cromphout contends, a strained 
resolved that, since a spurious panic must be, the panic makers should be no gainers 
by it. The Company, I hear, is now ready, but not anxious, to redispose of those 
sharesl and having obtained them at their depressed value, will now sell them at par, 
though, prior to the panic, they were held at a handsome figure above. ' (Melville, The 
Confidence-Man, 22) 
Per the standard line interpretation, while the sure-bet tip may be spurious, and the transfer-agent yet 
another disguisc, the point we are making is simply that the motivation set before Roberts is that of 
unnaturally easy money. 
4(, 2 Merlin Bowen, 'Tactics of Indirection in Melville's The Confidence-Man' Studies in the 
Noi, el I (Winter 1969), 406. 
463 Watson G. Branch, 'The Genesis, Structure, and Composition of The Conf-idence-Man' 
Nine teen th - Ceti tu ry Fiction 27 (1973): 424-48; James E. Miller, 'The Confidence-Man: His Guises' 
1"uhlication of the Modern Language AssociatiOn 74 (March 1959): 102-11, Hershel Parker, 'The 
Metaphysics of Indian-Hating' Publication of the Modei-n Language Association 18 (September 1963): 
323-31. 
4"' Dan G. Hoffman, 'Melville's "Story of China Aster"' American Literature 22 (Nlay 1950), 
148. 
465 Wýidllngton, The Confidence Game in American Literature, 55.61.62. 
46' Gustaaf v. in Cromphout, 'The Confidence-Man and the Problem of Other-s' Studies ill 
Inwrictin I iction 21 (Spring 1993): 37-50. 
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'cognitive relationship of the subject (reader, narrator, character-as-perceiver, 
Melville) to others, which takes the form of depersonalisation. "' He wntes: 
Melville repeatedly, on the level of characterization, draws his readers' 
attention to the utter inaccessibility of the characters to each other and 
to the narrator. Melville's perceivers cannot interpret the facts because 
they cannot get hold of the facts in the first place. They are prevented 
from doing so by the impenetrable thicket of mystery, incongruity, and 
alienness isolating every character. "' 
It is, then, no accident that the word 'stranger' is used over fifty times in the no%, el. "' 
Melville can sustain this level of characteristic estrangement, Cromphout continues, 
through his use of dialogue: 
In a novel largely made up of dialogues, Melville repeatedly resorts to 
dialogue as a means of blocking the reader's access to the characters 
and the characters' access to each other. Melville's interlocutors do not 
achieve meaningful identity, and hence mutual knowability, because 
their dialogues never allow them to do what dialogue at its best 
requires of its participants, namely, to engage their true self and to be 
willing both to reveal their true self and to recognize the true self, that 
is, the real humanness, of the other(s). "' 
In Cromphout's estimation, the Confidence Man takes advantage of this 
theatricalization by'remain[ing] throughout the man of many masks, the unrivaled 
obfuscator. Like God's, his essence remains "past finding out. " From beginning to 
end, his "Masquerade" conceals him, and ultimately the concealment was as 
impenetrable to Melville as it is to his readers. "" 
Again, though, this notion of an advantage gained seems problematic. The 
Cromphout, 'The Confidence-Man and the Problem of Others', 38. 
"" Cromphout, 'The Confidence-Man and the Problem of Others', 38. 
469 John Bryant, 'Citizens of a World to Come: Melville and the Millemal Cosmopolite' 
Inichcan Litei-atut-e 59 (Mar. 1987). 29. 
470 Cromphout, 'The Confidence-N/lan and the Problem of Others', 39. Cf., 'By not making 
oursel\cs present to other people, we theatricalize them, turning their fives into a spectacle and their 
world into it stage that wc (only) \ ic\\' (N/lIchael Fisher, Stanle. v Cavell and Li*terarY Skepticism 
[Chlcýigo: Chicago Uni\ersity Prcss. 1989], 96). 
471 Cromphout, 'The Confidence-N/lan and the Problcm of Others', 48. 
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tother', as descnbed by Cromphout, does not simply stand against the Subject, but also 
withiii. That is to say, the Subject itself has been made the stranger. In this way the 
identification / differentiation of Subject and Object is a necessarily masked, and thus 
theatrical, affair - whereby essence is not concealed by the mask but is itself 
precisely only insofar as it is masked. As we have seen in Chapter Three, it is 
Cromphout's assumption of an ineffable essence or Truth on the far side of realitv 
deception that I contend Melville ultimately comes to find deeply problematic. 
Consequently, even the common identification of the Confidence Man as, if 
nothing else, a swindler is all-too-easily rendered. "' It is this tendency, however, that 
lends an early commentator like Philip Drew - who was bucking the standard-line 
interpretation long before it was common to do so - such an important place in our 
thinking about The Confidence-Man, and perhaps even Melville's career as a whole. 
Of the novel he writes: 'Every incident narrated is innocent in itself and innocent to a 
trusting eye, but filled with dubious circumstance to the reader who is himself [sic] 
without confidence. "" In other words, the reader of The Confidence-Man does not 
have the privileged view of the past or the future - the twin conditions of the 
constancy Mitchell seeks above - that would bear out his or her suspicion that 
anybody in the novel is ever actually deceived. As a result, the degree to which 
Melville deceives the reader, through his ironic manipulation of her confidence in 
472 Other identifications of the title character include: the Devil, God, Christ, Antichrist, 
ti-ickstcr god, avatar of Vishnu, and a host of other less specific appellations. The common thread of 
cach (be it of an insidious or ultimately benevolent identity, 'essence', or'function') is duplicity. For a 
dated, though helpful rc\ lew of identifications, see Mary K. Madison, 'Hypothetical Friends: The 
Critics and the Confidence Man'Melville Societv Extracts 46 (May 1981): 10-14. For two examples 
that propose a problcinatised sense of identity but in the end fail to own up to the implications of their 
insights scc Leon Seltzer, 'Carnus's Absurd and the World of Melville's The Confidence -Man' 
PubliCation qf the Modern Language. Issociation 82 (March 1967): 14-27; and John G. Ca\N elti, 'Some 
Notes on the Structure ol'The Confidence Man'Anierican Literature 29 (NoN. 1957): 278-88. 
473 Philip Drew, 'Appeai-ances and Reality in Mek ille's The Confidence-Man' ELH: I Journal 
ofl`nglish 1, itcrai-%, HistorY 31 (1964): 44 1. 
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both her capacity as a discerning reader and in Melville as a coherent author, remains, 
as it were, undecidable. "' 
Nevertheless, as noted in Chapter Three, the undecidable is decidedýy opposed 
to indecision. In characterisation, as much as in consciousness, one cannot escape 
identification; a coherent role (if not a stable, correspondent identity) Is necessarily 
and retroactively assumed. What I contend is that the undecidability of Melville's 
theatrical role-play marks the aesthetico-theological intensity and freedom of the 
decision to become. Indeed, what Cromphout (amongst others) regards as Melville's 
passive acceptance of uncertainty, we find instead to be a creative awareness that 
carries the potential of recasting theology from its traditional transcendental repose to 
the materialistic evaluation of its aesthetic / poetic immanence in the Masq1terade. 
3. The Character of Theology 
In much the same way as in The Conjidence-Man, then, the operative question 
of a truly modem theology is not 'Who is the character (or Subject) of theologyT On 
the contrary, for reasons that are parallel to Melville's concerns, it is 'What is the 
character of theologyT Of course, the poly-valence of the question, i. e., identifying 
where it might begin and end, is as dizzying as its profound implications. Such is the 
inten-ninable depth of the question of beginnings and endings that has loomed 
throughout the preceding chapters. One may well wish to reach the heavens, so as to 
extend one's purview, and thus to afford a divine vantage from which to ascertain 
where the truth of all character-isation begins and invariably ends; but the lesson 
474 For a similar ýisscssnient, in regard to Melville's final novels, see Yvor Winters: 'In Pierre 
and The Coiýfidence-Man alike it is assumed that valid judgment is impossible, for eN ery c\ ent. c\ ery 
fact, cvery person, is too fluid, too unbounded to be kno\ý n' (Maide's Curse: Seven Studies fit the 
lhsioný ofAinerican Obscurantism [Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions, 1983], 79). 
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taught by Melville is that when neither depth nor height escapes the dialectical 
circularity that renders one dizzy, the assumed vantage point of a transcendent or 
symbolic meaning is as rent and elusive as the breath or the echo of a dead god's 
laughter. 
While reflecting on the Jewish proverb, 'Man thinks, God laughs', Milan 
Kundera cannot help but wonder why God might be laughing. His conclusion is 
appropriate to the dilemma described above: because 'man thinks and the truth 
escapes him. Because the more men think, the more one man's thought diverges from 
another's. And finally, because man is never what he thinks he is'. "5 Which to say, in 
its expectations of beginnings and endings that stabilise meaning and significance, 
and thus seek to fill an absence, humanity misses the joke, and thus, too, the 'sudden 
transfon-nation of a strained expectation into nothmg' that Kant ascribes to laughter. "" 
As we will see, though, the intensity of this excessive 'nothing' is a joke that gets out 
of hand. The punch line of reality is simply too much, leaving us in stitches on the 
floor with our most insane of laughs, screaming'No! Stop! No more! '- unsure 
whether we mean it or not. 
For Charles Winquest, the most proper characterisation of theology attuned to 
such intensity is that of a 'lover's discourse. He writes: 
Love is an intense valuation of specificities in the finite display of 
experience. It is precisely because finite experience is highly 
variegated that the "yes" to the importance of any specific person or 
object is meaningful. In Love, we are making life meaningful, but it is 
a meaning that can be neither contained nor controlled. Love makes 
475 Milan Kundera, for one, is plcýiscd by the thought 'that the art of the novel came into the 
orld as the echo of God's laughter'('Jerusalem Address: The Novel and Europe' in TheArt of the 
Novel [London: Faber S-, Faber, 1988], 158). 
47 6Kant, Critique of Jit(ýqemciit, 177. 
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life unsafe. This is its frightening and wonderful transformational 
power. "' 
Inasmuch as this is true, theology is a kind of engagement -a violent battle as much 
as it is a formal promise of marriage - but with/to whom? Might we then strip it 
bare, this question theology asks and/or is asked, to get beneath its textual, textile 
surfaces, and behold it in its natural glory? Moreover, might we yet behold the 
question of theology's character, for us the fundamental problem of theology, in its 
essential, naked truth and origin, as it strives to understand all it can of, and indeed to 
fashion the very categories of thinking about, God? 
And yet, we cannot stop here - for, indeed, what would be the character of 
this undressing? Would it be rape or consensual; would this act of love be violence or 
foreplay? When surfaces are compound, when theology's flesh is textual and textile 
(i. e., published, bound, and disseminated in an endless array of monographs), its 
undressing cannot go simply skin-deep. Like the instrument of torture in Kafka's 
harrowing fable, 'In the Penal Colony', where vibrating needles engrave into the skin 
of the convicted his or her transgression, the piercing of theology is a sort of tattooing 
andjudgment that unveils its very truth. As in Kafka's tale, the result of'the Harrow' 
is inevitably death, but just before death comes understanding: 
It begins around the eyes. From there it radiates. A moment that 
might tempt one to get under the Harrow oneself Nothing more 
happens than that the man begins to understand the inscription, he 
purses his mouth as if he were listening. You have seen how difficult 
it is to decipher the script with one's eyes; but our man deciphers it 
with his wounds. To be sure, that is a hard task, he needs six hours to 
accomplish it. By that time the Harrow has pierced him quite through 
and casts him into the pit, where he pitches down upon the blood and 
477 Charles Winquest, Pchrilig Theology (Chicago: UniNcrsity of Chicago Press. 1995), 149- 
0 
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the water and the cotton wool. Then the judgment has been fulfilled, 
and we, the solider and 1, bury him. "' 
In the words of Freud, the theological Subject, as it were, in its attempt to assess and 
to judge, 'wants to incorporate [its] object into itself, and ... it wants to do so by 
devouring it. ""' Unable to escape the limits of its ontological and perspectival 
dilemma, the Subject's most ingenious and meticulous attempt at theology's dissection 
/ analysis, i. e., to bring it into accordance with the Subject's rule and/or method, be it 
through systemising, narrating, or even deconstructing, is also a verdict and a 
sentence. 
Tyler Roberts is to be credited for recognising this tendency in the seminal 
works of two of America's most prominent contemporary theologians, Stanley 
Hauerwas and Mark C. Taylor. "' Each thinker, he argues persuasively, falls prey to 
the metaphysical recalcitrance of narrative. For instance, while Hauerwas claims that 
self-identity, or, in his apposite tenn, 'character', is derivative of one's knowledge of 
and submission to God, one's knowledge and trust are always already deeply 
embedded in a preexistent Christian narrative in which humanity recognises itself as 
'contingent', 'historical', 'sinful' creatures of God. "' According to Roberts, this is the 
very sort of 'master narrative' postmodem theologians, those who have been made 
wary by those most incredulous insights by the likes of Friedrich Nietzsche, Frederic 
478 Franz Kafka, 'In the Penal Colony' in The Penal Colony: Stories and Short Pieces (trans. 
Willa and Edwin Muir; New York: Schocken Books, 1961), 204. 
479 Sigmund Freud, 'Mourning and Melancholia'in The Pelican Freud Library [On 
MetapsYchology: Die TheorY of PsYchoanal. vsis] (vol. 11; trans. James Strachey-, ed. Angela Richards, 
HarniondsN\ orth. Penguin, 1984), 258. 
4go Tyler Roberts, 'Theology and the Ascetic Imperame: Narrati), e and Renunciation in Taylor 
and Haucr\\ as', Motlern Theology 9 (April 1993): 181-200. 
481 Stanley Haucr\\as, Die Peaceable Kingdom (Notre Dame: The Unlýcrsity of Notre Wine 
Prcs,,, 198)3), 27-21). 40-49. 
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4ýý2 Jameson, and Franýois Lyotard, are instinctively wary . 
Nevertheless, even Mark C. Taylor - who is as suspicious as they come, 
especially of beginnings and endings, and who is delighted by the notion of a 
fnomadic self who endlessly errs and sempiternally puns in carnivalesque discourses 
that would make Bakhtin blush and Zarathusa proud - is unden-nined by an 'Internal 
narrative': 
Once there was a pre-modem subject who embraced faith in God. But 
in itsJoumey to modemity the subject overturned the God-human 
relationship, making God its own creation as well as dominating others 
and hoarding possessions in a futile attempt to secure a foundation for 
itself and escape from death. But, when the subject recognized this 
futility and embraced the difference at the core of its identity, it 
emerged into postmodemity, an etemity of play. There the subject 
threw off lacerated consciousness, entered the divine milieu, and erred 
happily ever after. 484 
What makes Roberts's essay so compelling is not simply that he questions whether 
Hauerwas adequately addresses the disruptive implications of the interplay between 
'history and the world' and the 'unity and plot of the Christian narrative, "' nor that he 
calls out Taylor's slippage back into the metaphysical moonng of narrative. Rather, it 
492 1 Is it not important, then, to think about how theology interprets and even constructs (and 
reconStl-LlCtS) the Christian narrativesT (Roberts, 'Theology and the Ascetic Imperative', 188). 
493 Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postinodenz AlTheology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1984), 149-65. 
484 Roberts, 'Theology and the Ascetic Imperative', 186. Roberts rounds out his critique ýý Ith 
much the samc conclusion as Walter Lowe: 'Taylor purports to end narrative (and metaphysics, the self, 
history) only by telling a story that will end all stories - one that has been told for millennia' (A 
Deconstructive Manifesto?: Mark C. Taylor's Erring', Journal of Religion 66 [July 1986], 324-3 1). 
Criticisms of Taylor are nothing new. As with Jacques Derrida, the academe's reception has often been 
either love or hate. Interestingly, most of the negative theological appraisals aimed at Taylor and 
Derrida have been, and are still, levelled upon earlier, ostensibly more 'play'-affirming, writing. 
Indecd, one might easily substitute his name and works in Graham Ward's c\aluation of an inadequate 
assessincrit of Derrida: 'He concentrates upon [Taylor's] earlier \\ork and does not see how [Taylor's] 
work has developed. [Taylor] has moved from the discursive style of ... [Erring], through the mix of 
eenres in [Tears], to the essays in [About Religion] which deepen the questions of his earlier ýýork both 
in terms of form and thenie' (Barth, Derrida, anel the Language of Theology [New York: Cambridge 
Uni\crs1ty Prcss. 1995], 227 n. 21). 
Robcrts. 'Thcoloov and the Asectic ImperatIN c', 188. 
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is in his insistence that disruption and narrative are not mutually exclusive, and that 
disruption is as structurally necessary to narrative as narration is to disruption. 
Unable to free itself fully from the beginnings and endings of narrative, or the 
contingencies of life, the peculiarities of what Gordon Kaufman has described as its 
Imaginative construction' cannot be lost on or in our theology. Kaufman writes: 
Although it may be obvious to us that the constructive work of the 
imagination has in this way always been constitutive of theological 
activity, theologians have seldom understood themselves to be engaged 
primarily in imaginatively constructing a theistically-focused 
worldview; on the contrary, they have largely regarded themselves as 
attempting to express in human words and concepts what the divine 
King had objectively and authoritatively given the church or 
synagogue in revelation. The fact that their work was thoroughly 
imaginative and constructive in character was simply not recognized. "" 
On the contrary, has not the more common modem tendency been for the theologian 
to peek inside and g(r)asp, as though an exact science? Eschewing aesthetics and 
embracing the methods of the natural sciences, post-Cartesian theology became, 
according to Hans Urs von Balthasar, yet another 'special isati on' devoid of sensits 
spiritualis. "' 
Consequently, traditional theological discourse has become not unlike an 
infant, as observed by Friedrich Schlegel in his erotic novel Lucinde. 
Unquestionably there lies deeply rooted in the nature of man a desire to 
eat everything he loves and put every new object he encounters 
immediately into his mouth in order to break it down. A healthy 
hunger for knowledge makes him want to apprehend the objects 
completely, to penetrate and bite through to its inmost core. 488 
496 Gordon D. Kaufman, 'Theology as Imaginative Construction' Journal of the American 
A cademi, o Method (3 
rd ed., 
. ýf 
Religion 50 (March 1982), 78; also see his An Essay on Theological 
Atlanta: Scholar's Press, 1995) and In the Face of Aývstei-Y: A Constructive Theology (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1993). 
497 Hans Urs \on Balthasar, The Glor * ý, of 
the Lord: A TheologicalAesthetiCs (vol. 1 -1 trans. 
Erasino Leiva-Mcrikakis; eds. Joseph Fessio S. J. and John Riches. - San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1982), 74-70. 
Schlegel. Tucinde'and the Fragments, 5 1. 
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Indeed, in the Christian tradition, the theologian's desire to 'know' God, i. e., what lies 
beneath the fleshly masquerade of the Incarnation, has often taken on overtly sexual 
tone. In his study of depictions of the Crucifixion in medieval Europe, for instance, 
Richard Trexler notes that it was customary for Jesus' crucified body to be regarded as 
a 'volume to be penetrated'. "' Thus one might find Jesus appearing and quickly 
embracing Rupert von Deutz in a dream, kissing him, and then opening his mouth, 'so 
that I could kiss him more deeply 1.490 Battista Varani is even more literal with his 
desired penetration when he expresses the wish to wriggle into Christ's dying body in 
search of his heart. 491 In this way, theology becomes as though a sacrament, upon and 
into which, traditionally, the theologian cannot help but attempt to gaze or probe; 
furthermore, from which the theologian cannot be fully differentiated. 492 
489 Richard C. Trexler, 'Gendering Jesus Crucified' in Iconography at the Crossroads: Papers 
from the Colloquium Sponsored by the Index of Christian Art, Princeton University, 23-24 March 1990 
(ed. Brendan Cassidy; Princeton: Department of Art and Archaeology, Princeton University, 1993), 
108-09. 
490 Cited in Trexler, 'Gendering Jesus Crucified', 109. 
491 Cited in Trexler, 'Gendering Jesus Crucified', 109.. Also see Jean Wirth, L'image 
midijvale: naissance et d&eloppements, Vl'-XV' sikle (Paris: M6ridiens Klincksieck, 1989), 323; and 
Ta naissance de J6sus dans le coeur: 6tude iconographique', Publications du Centre europ9en ditudes 
bourguignonnes, XIV-XVIe sikle 24 (1989): 149-58. Citing Wirth once again, Trexler notes also: 
'Long before modem psychoanalytic insights, the genital implications of such penetrations were clear 
among late fifteenth-century German printmakers, who might, for instance, provocatively place the 
crucified Jesus'pierced, externalised heart over the space where his genitals belonged' (Trexler, 
'Gendering Jesus Crucified, 109; also see Wirth, LImage mMiivale, 323). 
492 While Robert Smith is describing Hegel's philosophical method, he may just as well be 
describing the sacramental desire of theology when he writes: 
Its method, tacitly supposed to be plastic or protean, adaptable and therefore free a 
priori, sacrifices itself in taking on as exactly as possible the imprint of what it helps 
to describe, its 'object', in order to maximize the object's phenomenon unto nournenal 
reception. Like any power of mediation philosophical method invites being thought 
of as a virtue, since it gives itself up for the sake of what it mediates, as though it had 
a free will and, as such, one that might have been less altruistically trained. .... 
Hence the oblique ontological make-up of'method', existing only to the extent that it 
vanishes in fulfilling the task that makes it what it is - disappearance it-ould be the 
greatest scope of its being. (Derrida and Autobiography [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995], 14 [emphasis mine]) 
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4. When Repression is Creation 
As we have already alluded, wnting about The Confidence-Man has also taken 
on a character strangely resembling its composition. Upon examining the tweim -six 
handwritten fragments of The Confidence -Man, "' the only such fragments available 
for any of Melville's novels after 1850, Elizabeth Foster concludes that Melville's 
style indulges in 
understatement, underemphasis, litotes, and complexity that looks like 
simplicity. As we see him in his revisions moving always in these 
directions, and away from the loose structure, open clarity, and 
directness of his earliest versions of passage, we watch many ideas 
growing less and less obvious. "' 
By clustenng qualifiers in a doggedly elusive attempt to diffuse meaning through 
apparent understatement and clausal subordination, Melville insinuates a 'syntax 
[that] abets the hinting and whispering which are the language of this novel', and 
which have proven constitutive of most of its commentaries. "' Steven Kemper 
notices this same dynamic in the novel's first chapter, in the barber's sign that reads 
'NO TRUST, which the narrator describes as: 
An inscription which, though in a sense not less intrusive than the 
contrasted ones of the stranger, did not, as it seemed, provoke any 
corresponding derision or surprise, much less indignation; and still 
less, to all appearances, did it gain for the inscriber the repute of being 
a simpleton. "' 
Kemper astutely notes that the description here is entirely negative; that is, the 
493 The fragments consist of various versions and emendations to chapter fourteen, a list of 
possible chapter titIcs, and an unused section entitled 'The River'. The fragments are discussed and 
prcsented in the NW-NB edition, 401-499; cf., Foster, 'Textual Notes'm The Confi-dence-Man (1954), 
373-78. 
494 Foster, 'Textual Notes' in The Cmifidence-Man (1954), 376. Some of Foster's examples of 
this con%ersi on are quite tell Ing: 'proof sufficient' first became 'proof presumptiNe', and then 'some 
pi-csumption', 'prove otherwise' ýýas diluted to 'prove not so much'; 'many characters' was obscured in 
I no feN% charactcrs'. 'it NN ould' was qualified to 'it ought to'-, and 'a fatal objection' was made ambiguous 
by 'an adequate objection'. 
5 
405 
Foster, 'TcxtLial Notes' Ae Confidence-Man ( 19,54), 377. 
496 NýI& I Ile, Onfidence-man, 
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narrator provides details as to what the sign and audience are not, but offers no hint as 
to what they actually are. 
497 
The composition of the book, as proposed by the three main genetic 
theories, "' for the most part builds upon the foundation laid by such indeterminacy. 
While the differences between the theories are substantial, and the specifics regarding 
each are highly conjectural and often fraught with problems, they remain united in 
their assumption that Melville substantially and for a vanety of reasons altered his 
original text. "' Most commentators agree, for example, that the order in which one 
now reads The Confidence-Man does not come close to the order in which Melville 
wrote it. Though Watson G. Branch's theory is the only one that explicitly displaces 
the first chapter, the arrival of the deaf mute aboard the Fidýle, "' the standard line 
interpretation as a whole agrees that the book's ending was not. what Melville 
originally had in mind. "' For one reason or another, they argue, he deviated from his 
497 Steven E. Kemper, 'The Confidence-Man: A Knavishly-Packed Deck' Studies in American 
Fiction 8 (Spring 1980): 30. For a similar development of related issues, see Cecelia Tichi, 'Melville's 
Craft and Theme of Language Debased in The Confidence-Man'ELH: A Journal of English Literary 
History 39 (Dec. 1992): 639-58. 
498 Cf., Leon Howard, Herman Melville, 227-32; Watson G. Branch, 'The Genesis, 
Composition, and Structure of The Confidence-Man' Nineteenth- Century Fiction 27 (1973): 424-48; 
and Tom Quirk, Melville's Confidence Man: From Knave to Knight (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 1982). For a summary of the theories, though one that leans towards Branch's - not surprising, 
since he is one of the contributing editors of the volume- see Branch, et al, 'Historical Note', 294-3 10. 
499 For a logical and an aesthetic critique, respectively, see Hershel Parker, 'The Confidence- 
Man and the Use of Evidence in Compositional Studies: A Rejoinder'Nineteenth-Century Fiction 28 
(June 1973): 119-24; and Michael S. Kearns, 'Interpreting Intentional Incoherence: Towards a 
Disambiguation of Melville's Pierre; or, The Ambiguities' Bulletin of the Midwest Modem Language 
Association 16 (Spring 1983): 35-54. 
500 Thomas P. Joswick was one of the first poststructuralists to get his hands on The 
Confidence-Man, and he too homes in on this most enigmatic of beginnings, arguing that it in fact 
displaces itself. 'Figuring the Beginning: Melville's The Confidence-Man' Genre II (Fall 1978): 389- 
409. 
50 1 To the best of my knowledge, the 'standard line' of interpretation, because of its historical- 
critical approach to the book, is the only branch of scholarship to broach this particular issue with any 
significant fervour. 
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path, and, for better or worse, embarked on a different course. 'O' 
In this reading of the novel, The Confidence-Man flowed forth not unlike the 
Mississippi River on which it is set. Perhaps, one might even suggest, like 'The 
River', Melville's excised, silenced (possible) first chapter: 
[T]he unhumbled river ennobles himself now deepens now purely 
expands, now first forms his character & begins that career whose 
majestic serenity if not overborne by feirce [sic] onsets of torrents shall 
end only with ocean. "' 
Melville's text, too, so the compositional theories go, at first glided on'glad and 
content', ostensibly innocuous and well on its way to becoming a fine novel, until it 
reached St. Louis, its purportedly misplaced beginning, where the raging torrent of the 
Missouri awaited in ambush. "' 
But at St: Louis the course of this dream is run. Down on it like a 
Pawnee from ambush foams the yellow-painted Missouri. The 
calmness is gone, the grouped isles disappear, the shores are jagged & 
rent, the hue of the water is clayed, the before moderate current is rapid 
& vexed. The peace of the Upper River seems broken in the Lower, 
nor is it ever renewed. 506 
The Missouri River, as such, 'dethrones his sire and reigns in his stead', usurping the 
'benign name Mississippi' until its ineffable entry into the sea, 'long disdaining to 
502 This deduction is based mostly upon Black Guinea's description of those passengers who 
can apparently substantiate his claims to truly being a poor, black cripple. It is surmised by most 
standard line commentators that because Guinea is one of the guises of the Confidence Man, his list is a 
telling outline for Melville's originally intended progression of the subsequent guises. The degree to 
which it adheres to the novel has been debated ad nauseam. For some of the more interesting 
discussions see the following: Foster, Introduction to The Confidence-Man (1954). Ixx-Ixxi 1, Irwin, 
,, linerican hiierogývj)hics, 334-35; 
Peter Bellis, 'Melville's The Confidence-Man: An Uncharitable 
Interprctation'Anierican Literature 59 (Dec. 1987), 557-59; and H. Bruce Franklin, The Wake of the 
Gottv. - Melville's Mythology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 157-65. 
5113 Branch, 'The Genesis, Composition and Structure', 438-39; 'Editorial Appendix: 
Manuscript Fragments' in 71ze Cotifidence-Man: His Masquerade (1984), 490-99. 
504 'Editorial Appendix: Manuscript Fragments'in The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade 
(1984), 497. 
5oi , Editorial Appendix: Manuscript Fragments'In The Confidence-NIan. - His Masquerade 
(1984), 497. 
506 'Editorial -\ppendix. Nlanuscript Fragments' in The Cotifidence-, Van: His. Vasquerade 
(1984), 497-99. 
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yield his white wave to the blue'. "' As we have already seen, especially in Chapter 
Three, Melville is not instinctively content with the notion of serene union, of 
mystical peace, or of tranquil nature. For him, rather, the tendency Is toward an ironic 
destructivity that is also creativity. Although the destructive rage of 'The River' is 
ultimately silenced by the deaf mute in Chapter One of The Confidence-Man, the 
observations of Foster and Kemper above inform us of the possibility that the silence 
is but a show. 
Insofar as it is a fictive put-on, the repression of destruction paves the way for 
Melville's most consciously creative novel, wherein characteristic malleability and 
potential are privileged over essence. Which is to say, the deaf mute that supplants 
the Missouri River screams the possibility of a truly living Subject existing precisely 
as character. It is this concem with subjectivity qua characterisation that links 
Melville, undoubtedly in ways even he was unaware, to the post-Kantian theoretical 
developments of the nineteenth-century. Moreover, it is in this refracted light that 
Melville's contribution to our thinking about theological discourse emerges, within 
and as the radical theatricality of his Masquerade. Only in this, we will see below, is 
the creative apocalypticism of Moby-Dick and Pierre most fully reallsed -i. e., in the 
aesthetico-theological immanence of materialism. 
As rehearsed thus far, my contention is that insofar as modem theology is 
necessarily concerned with itself (dialectically) as both Subject and Object, it is not 
distinct from the imaginative enquiry of Herman Melville. Their linkage, however, 
, 10es beyond the popular professional desire for interdisciplinarity, and is, in tact, 
bound by their complex engagements with what Michel Foucault in The Histoty of 
507 'Editorial Appendix: N13111.1script Fragments' in The Confidence-Alan: His Masquerade, 
(1984), 499. 
I -ý Z, 
Sexuality calls the genealogy of'deep subjectivity. Indeed, what Foucault savs here 
of the individual is, I would argue, as applicable to theology as is to Melville and his 
Masquerade: 
For a long time, the individual was vouched for by the reference to 
others and the demonstration of his ties to the commonwealth (family, 
allegiance, protection); then he was authenticated by the discourse of 
truth he was obliged to pronounce concerning himself. "' 
In keeping with my aim here, Foucault relates this shift to the emergence of the 
literature and philosophies of self-consciousness, those 'long discussions concerning 
the possibility of constituting a science of the subject, the validity of introspection, 
lived experience as evidence of the presence of consciousness to itself. ".... For 
Foucault, of course, this is especially problematic because it is built around a 
forgotten / repressed, and sometimes forced, confession. 510 in this way, he actually 
longs for the self-present, apocalyptic anonymity that he resists as an illusion 
provoked in and by language and power. 
I would really liked to have slipped imperceptibly into this lecture, as 
into all the others I shall be delivering, perhaps over the years. I would 
have preferred to be enveloped in words, borne way beyond all 
possible beginnings. At the moment of speaking, I would like to have 
perceived a nameless voice, long preceding me, leaving me merely to 
enmesh myself in it, taking up its cadence, and to lodge myself, when 
no was looking, in its interstices as if it had paused an instant, in 
suspense, to beckon to me. There would have been no beginnings: 
instead, speech would proceed from me, while I stood in its path -a 
slender gap - the point of its possible disappearance. 511 
By the end of his life, in a manner reminiscent of Melville, Foucault attempted to 
508 Michel Foucault, The Histoi-y of Sexuaht. v-, Volume One: An Inti-oduction (Ncýý York: 
Pantheon Books, 1978), 58. 
509 Foucault, -1he HistorY of Scxualit. v; Volume One, 64. 
.f 
Sexualit-v; Volume One, 59-60. Cf, Michel Foucault, Politics 5 10 Foucault, Die Historv q 
Philosophy Culture: Interviews and Other Writj'ngs, 197TIVN4 (trans. Alan Sheridan; ed. La\ýrence D. 
Kritzman, New York and London: Routledge, 1988), 14,50,95. 
51 1 Michel Foucault, AeArchaeology (? f Knowledge; and The Discourse on Language (trans. 
A. N1. Sheridan 'Smith-, New York: Vinta-c. 1982), 2 15. 
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come to terins with his ambivalence regarding autonomy and anonymity, and 
ultimately settled on an 'aesthetics of existence', which he defined as 'an analysis of 
the relation between forins of reflexivity -a relation of self to self - and hence 
between forms of reflexivity and discourse of truth, forms of rationality and effects of 
knowledge. "" It is, he concluded, only in this critical act of ascesis, the active 
engagement with the formation of oneself, that the self-becoming of a free Subject is 
possible. "' 
While Foucault is almost certainly correct when he relates the emergence of 
personal identity to modem literature and philosophy, we should not necessarily be so 
quick to follow his scepticism about the subjectivity derived from either. In his 
appeal for an authentic, 'pure self-stylization, which would not be imposed as a 
universal norm, but would rather be open to the choice of the individual', "' Foucault 
is deeply under the influence of a conception of subjectivity qua presence that is as 
inadequate as it has been pervasive. "' He would often have done well to recall his 
512 'Structuralism and Post- Structuralism: An Interview With Michel Foucault' in Essential 
Works of Foucault, 1954-1984 [Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology] (vol. 2; ed. James D. Faubion; 
New York: The New Press, 1994), 444. Cf, , Marli Huijer, 'The Aesthetics of Existence in the Work of Michel Foucault' Philosophy and Social Criticism 25.2 (1999): 61-85. 
513 For further elaboration on the related themes of critical philosophy and ascesis see Michel 
Foucault, 'What is Enlightenment? ' in Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984 [Ethics: Subjectivity 
and Truth] (vol. 1; ed. Paul Rabinow; York: The New Press, 1997), 315-17; 'Self Writing' in Essential 
Works of Foucault, 1: 207-09; The History of Sexuality; Volume Two: The Use of Pleasure (trans. 
Robert Hurley; New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 72-77; 'Technologies of the Self in Essential Works 
of Foucault, 1954-1984,1: 223-5 1. 
514 Peter Dews, 'The Return of the Subject in late-Foucault' Radical Philosophy 51 (Spring 
1989), 40. Foucault's inspiration in this regard is clearly Nietzsche, who writes in The Gay Science: 
'To give style to one's character -a great and rare art! It is practised by all those who survey all the 
strengths and weaknesses of their nature, and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them 
appears as art and reason and even the weaknesses delight the eye' (The Gay Science [trans. Walter 
Kaufman; New York: Vintage Books, 1974], §290). 
515 Cf., Andrew Bowie's persuasive criticism of Heidegger's myth that the modem Subject has 
always oppressively laid claim to truth as self-certainty. Bowie contends that while Heidegger's 
subversion of the cogito, ergo sum is correct, he does not adequately own up to his philosophical debt 
to the repressed subjectivities -of Romanticism, and thus paints a reductionistic picture (From 
Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literan. Theory [London: Routledge, 
1997], 182-92. 
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own characterisation of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the 
literature and philosophy of the profoundly paradoxical self-positing self truly took 
hold in the wake of post-Kantian idealism. For indeed, such was the emergent age of 
modem aesthetics, Foucault points out elsewhere, 'when words ceased to intersect 
with representations and to provide a spontaneous grid for the knowledge of things'. "' 
Consequently, we might note, neither should we reject Hegel as quickly as has 
been the postmodern tendency. Hegel, of course, sought a systernatisation of identity- 
in-difference, and, therefore, the culmination (or'end') of all philosophical reflection. 
Personal subjectivity, he thus argues, is 'pure self-recognition in absolute otherness', in 
which the Subject 'relates itself to itself and is detenninate, is other-being and being- 
for-self, and in this determinateness, or in its self-externality, abides within itself, in 
other words, it is in and for itselr. "' The Subject, then, is never self-present. On the 
contrary, subjective identity becomes itself only in-and-through difference, and 
difference becomes itself only in-and-through identity. In other words, to affirm 
itself, identity must negate itself and become its very opposite, that is, difference, for 
'identity is different from difference'. "' At the same time, because identity is in- 
difference, its relation to its other is naturally a subjective, redemptive relation to 
itself"' 
516 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: 
Tavistock, 1970), 304-05. For an elaboration on the development of philosophical aesthetics in this 
period, see Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and SubjectivitY: From Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1990). 
517 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spint, 14,18. 
518 G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic (trans. A. V. Miller; London: George Allen & Unxý in, 
1969), 413-17. Hegel explains that 'Identity is the reflection-into-self that is identity only as Internal 
repulsion, and is this repulsion as reflection-into-self, repulsion, which immediately takes itself back 
into itself. Thus it is identity as difference as difference that is identity \N ith itself (413). 
519 'Difference in itself is self-related difference, as such it is the negativity of itself. the 
difference not of an other, but of itself from itself, it is not itself but its other. But that which is 
different from differcrice is identitv. Difference is. therefore, itself and identity. Both together 
COIIStItUtc difference, it is the whole and its moment' (Hegel, Sciencc of Logic, 417). 
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it is, of course, no coincidence that in developing the al I -encompassing 
implications of his System, with regard to subjectivity, that Hegel also incorporates 
the three classical arguments for the existence of God: the cosmological, teleological, 
and ontological proofs. First, with the cosmological proof, Hegel demonstrates that 
the finite is not simply self-identical, but inherently and self-contradictorily needs the 
infinite. "' With the teleological proof, he continues, God's purposeful wisdom and 
activity are demonstrated. Purposefulness, he writes, 'marks the beginning and end of 
the process ... hence it is the final end. 
"" That is, it demonstrates the consequences 
of the cosmological argument, and is the identification of individuals by virtue of the 
self-realising ends of his dialectic. "' Furthennore, the reunion of beginning and end, 
of subjectivity and objectivity, Hegel continues, is demonstrated in the ontological 
proof, which essentially replays the double-negation at work in his System. This 
unity of subject and object, in sum, is truth (or the Absolute Idea); " and the'pure 
being' of God, in turn, is the self-realised eschatological 'essence of all reality. 024 
Such is the symmetry of thought I have been developing throughout these pages 
between the formation / becoming of the Subject and formation / becoming of God. 
The two finally cannot be distinguished. 
520 'Humanity rises from the finite to the infinite, rises above the singular and raises itself to 
the universal, to being-in-and-for-self. Thus religion consists in this, that human beings have before 
them in their consciousness the nothingness of the finite, are aware of their dependence, and seek the 
ground of this nothingness, of this dependence-in a word, that they find no peace of mind until they 
set up the infinite before themselves' (G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion [trans. R. 
F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. A Stewart; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987], 2: 254- 
55). 
52 1 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosopky of Religion, 2: 405. 
522 qt [teleological purposefulness] is something fixed that is exempt from the process-, it is not 
determined by anything else, but has its ground in the subject - it is determined by the free self- 
determining of the subject' (Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 2: 405; cf., 2: 404-21,703- 
719,748-52). 
523 Hegel, Science of Logic, 756. 
524 Hegel, Science of Logic, 86. Or, to return to the body metaphor: 'When we grasp this life- 
force in its true nature, it is seen to be one principle, one organic life of the universe, one living system. 
All that is. simply constitutes the organs of the one subject' (86) 
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Importantly, though, we must not fail to recognize that even Hegel's 'pure 
being', the self-creative end of self-emptying, is itself always already an act of 
autopoesis. That is, self-becoming is ultimately a self-creative projection of the 
possibility and desire of the very subjective immediacy it must also avoid and 
disavow. Indeed, Hegel admits as much: 
But this pure being is not an immediacy, but something to which 
negation and mediation are essential; consequently, it is not v"hat we 
mean by 'being', but is 'being' defined as an abstraction, or as the pure 
universal; and our'meaning', for which the true [content] of sense- 
certainty is not the universal, is all that is left over in face of this empty 
or indifferent Now and Here. "' 
Inasmuch, then, as Hegel shows a kind of perspectival inadequacy (and thus, we will 
say, duplicity) itself to be constitutive of the Subject, he provides the ontological 
grounds for the vitality of Melville's literary recasting of the aesthetics of existence as 
that of the Masquerade par excellence. 
Admittedly, this language of 'aesthetics' and 'becoming', and thus of 'existence' 
and'Ilfe', would seem far removed from the systematically redemptive fetish that, its 
cries of protest notwithstanding, still grips traditional theology. And yet, in keeping 
with the self-creative poetics of Melville's Masquerade, only when theology takes 
seriously the unthought autopoesis of its self-becoming that it fully realises its radical, 
creative potential. Indeed, such is the supplementary relationship of Melville's 
apocalypticism in Moby-Dick with the creative duplicity of the Masquerade in The 
Confidence-Man, that the possibility of a radical theology is ultimately unthinkable 
525 Hegel, Phenomenology of Sjnrit, 61 [para. 99]. Cf., 'What we encounter here is again the 
ultimate ambiguity of Hegel. According to the standard doxa, the telos of the dialectical process is the 
absolute form that abolishes any material surplus. If, howc% cr, this is truly the case \ý ith Hegel, 
hoýk 
are we to account for the fact that the Result effectively thro\\ s us back into the \\ hirlpool, that 
it is 
nothinlZ but the totality of the route \ý c had to travel in order to arri\ e at the Result'? In other ýý ords, is 
not a kind of leap frorn "not-yct" to "always-already" constitume of Hegelian dialectics: we endeavor 
to approach the Goal (the absolute form dc\ old of any matter), when, all of a sudden, \\ c establish that 
all the time we were alreadý there'. ' Is not tile crucial shift in a dialectical process the reversal of 
anticipation - not into ful fill 111clit, but - retroaction'. " (Zi2ek, 
Tarrying With the Negative. 156) 
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without an aesthetic theology; that is to say, a theology attuned both to the constitutive 
inadequacy and miraculous potential of theology as a fully incarnate theological 
Subject. "' 
Contra Balthasar, though, the aesthetically aware theology in view here is not 
simply an appropriation of aesthetic concepts, such as that of beauty; and neither is it 
only 'the attempt to do aesthetics at the level and with the methods of theology', thus 
'betraying and selling out theological substance to the current viewpoints of an inner- 
worldly theory of beauty. " And yet, following his important distinction, neither is 
an aesthetic theology necessarily the same as theological aesthetics. For the latter, 
Beauty is the transcendental deten-nination of Being that can only be known in full by 
a theology guided by faith. "' In contrast, the aesthetic theology insinuated by 
Melville's Masquerade attends to the suffering / ressentiment wrought by the 
sovereign presence of some Ding an sich or transcendental deten-nination of Being 
beyond the limits of phenomenal expenence, and thus also to the attendant desire that 
maintains subjective attachment to the status quo and existing horizons of expectation. 
There is, in short, for aesthetic theology truly nothing behind or beyond the 
mask of phenomenal experience; and this is why, paradoxical though it may seem, 
something new, something miraculous because it was previously impossible, is made 
526 Cf., especially, Thomas J. J. Altizer's important reminder of apocalypse as both a 
beginning 
and an end: 'Ultimately apocalypse is the apocalypse of God. If ancient Christianity could reýerse an 
original Christian apocalypse by knowing the absolute immutability and the absolute transcendence of 
God, a reversal of that transcendence and immutability is surely an apocalyptic reversal, one giving 
witness to, if not embodying, a new apocalypse of God. Certainly the 
Christian can knoýk' an 
apocalypse of God is having occurred in the crucifixion, for if the crucifixion is 
finally the crucifixion 
of God, it unquestionably embodies a truly and even absolutely neNý realization of the 
Godhead.... 
rm .,,, pse, is Thus an absolute transformation of the Godhead, a transfo ation which is apocal- 
simultaneously an apocalyptic ending and an apocalyptic beginning. 
It is an apocalýptic ending of 
God, and thus truly the death of God, and the apocalyptic beginning of an absolutely new 
Godhead' 
(1he Contemporary Jesus [Albany: State Unk ersity of New York Press, 1997], xxv-xxý 1). 
527 Balthasar, The Glory (f the Lord, 1: 38, cf. 1: 79-117. 
ý;, g -5( 1972), 
565. 
John Riclics. 'The Theology of Hans Urs \on Balthasar. p,, jrt 1', Tilf, olog) 
4. 
Z% 
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possible in the immanent materiality of lived experience. This Is not, however, a 
philosophical denial of theological discourse, of its possibility or its content; 
moreover, neither does it ignore the differences between theology and philosophy. It 
is, rather, the creative recasting of theological grounds in general, whereby theological 
discourse is fundamentally an imaginative reflection upon the problematic desire and 
attempts for an impossible cognisance of its own incognisance, i. e., the necessary 
excessiveness or repressed remainder of its self-becoming or character, sati on (is 
theology. 
5. Theology as Aesthetic Intensity 
It should, of course, go without saying that this aesthetic theology, due in part 
to the unabashed debt it owes modem literature and philosophy, is not in concert with 
'the aesthetics of Christian truth' professed by the guardians of ecclesiastical 
theology. "' Neither is it, though, an apophatic exercise in mystical silence, "' a 
deconstructive affinnation of 'hyperbolic alterity', "' nor a confessional 'sacralizing' of 
its discourse / liturgy. "' When theology betrays some necessary, immaterial essence 
529 E. g., David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2003). Hart (alongside John Milbank) is the 
undisputed heir to Balthasar's aesthetic project, forcefully carrying It into the new century alongside an 
(overly? ) aggressively polemic attack on (primarily postmodem) philosophical encroachments into 
theological territory. For Hart, the 'engagement' between philosophy and theology is only ever a fight 
to the death. 
53 0 The best contemporary representatives of this position, one an analysis and the other an 
actualization are, respectively, Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity In Christian M. vsticism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). and David Jasper, The Sacred Desert: Religion, 
Literature, Art, and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). 
531 John D. Caputo is certainly the most prolific philosopher cum theologian today writing 
about deconstruction and theology. For representative examples, see his 'God is Wholly Other 
Almost: Di 
, 
'fl()-ancc and the Hyperbolic Alterity of God' in Ae Otherness of God (ed. Orrin F. 
Surnmerell, Charlottes\ dle, Va.. University Press of Virginia, 1998), 190-205, On Religion (Ne\k 
f God. York: Routledg, 200 1), as N\ A as his forthcoming work The tleakness o 
532 1 ýini thinking here, in particular, of Radical Orthodoxý. Cf. James K. A. 
Smith, 
Introducing Radical Orthodo-vy: 11opping a 1"ost-Secular Theology (Grand Rapids. Mich: Baker 
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that is to be unveiled, the Good or the True behind (or analogously transcendent to) 
the phenomenal mask, its character is that of a phenomenological, teleological or 
liturgical revelation. On the contrary, aesthetic theology cannot abide in the 
immediacy or immateriality of'pure being', the analogia entis of'theological 
5,4 metaphysics', "' nor can it be in the interest of a 'structurally deferred' presence. , For, 
indeed, as Theodor Adorno memorably wrote in Minima Moralia, any such 
authenticity, be it immediate, analogical, or as a hope deferred, 'Itself becomes a lie 
the moment it becomes authentic, that is, in reflecting on itself, in postulating itself as 
genuine, in which it already oversteps the identity which it lays claim to in the same 
breath. 1535 
By the time he wrote The Confidence -Mai i, Melville seems to have understood 
this point well. Deftly, he situates his reader into the same predicament as the old 
man at the end of the novel, who, while examining a banknote with his newly 
purchased 'Counterfeit Detector', laments: ... there's so many marks of all sorts to go 
by, it makes it a kind of uncertain. """ To make matters even more complex, the old 
man recognizes that some signs, such as red marks, which by their absence hint at a 
counterfeit, also cannot always be trusted because ... some good bills get so worn, the 
red marks get rubbed out. And that's the case with my bill here - see how old it is 
or else it's a counterfeit, or else -I don't see right - or else - dear, dear me -I 
Academic, -1004), John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, eds., Radical Orthodox-v: A Nen, Theology (London: Routledge, 1999). 
5 13 Cf., John Milbank, 'Only Theology Overcomes Metaphysics' Neiv Blackfi-lars 76.895 
(July/August 1995): 352-43. 
-S"4 Cf., once again, Foucault: 'this rather weak identity that NN e try to preserve behind a mask is 
in itself merely a parody'('Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', 386). 
5 '5 Theodor Adol-no, Minima Moralia (London: Nc\N Left Books, 1974), 154 
536 Nlel\ ille, The Confielence-Man, 248. 
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don't know what else to think. """ His search for the bill unsullied by falseness, and 
thus for a clearly marked identification of authenticity, is paradigmatic of the desire of 
the reader of The Confidence-Man to identify the contours of its network of deception 
-that is, the differences between, and thus the identity of, conned and con man. Botli 
are, as we have seen above, wild-goose chases. 
'Stay, now, here's another sign. It says that, if the bill is good, it must 
have in one comer, mixed in with the vignette, the figure of a goose, 
very small, indeed, all but microscopic; and for added precaution, like 
the figure of Napoleon outlined by the tree, not observable, c% en if 
magnified, unless the attention is directed to it. Now, pore over it as I 
will, I can't see this goose. ' 
'Can't see the goose? why I can; and a famous goose it is. There' 
(reaching over and pointing to a spot in the vignette). 
J don't see it-dear me-I don't see it. Is it a real goose'. " 
'A perfect goose; beautiful goose. ' 
'Dear, dear, I don't see it. 
t538 
The old man's concern about bank notes of uncertain value and authenticity reaches 
beyond the obvious ambiguities of a nascent nineteenth-century American capitalism. 
More provocatively, it engages and participates in the thoroughly theological 
assumption of / desire for authenticity; an authenticity that, in the process, is betrayed 
as a confidence game par excellence. 
The theological confidence game of The Confidence-Man, as it were, is 
characterized on one level by the subtle intertwining of duplicity and sacrifice in its 
unsubtle biblical and eschatological allusions, which culminate in the novel's 
prophetic conclusion: 'Something further may follow of this Masquerade. ' And yet, 
like the apocalyptic return of a sacrificed Christ and the forgiveness wrought by the 
-S. 
17 
McIville, Pie Cotifidence-Alan, 248. 
N/Icl\ ille, The Confidencc-Alan, 248. 
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blood of a bull, both of which are often believed to be evoked in the final act of the 
novel, "' that which was sacrificed remains just beyond the clouds or behind the 
temple's veil, an infinite object of theological desire. Is perhaps something similar 
occurring in the Gospel of St. Matthew, where the resurrection, from which Jesus 
ostensibly claims his identity and authority (Matt. 28.18-20), is also presented and 
regarded by some, even amongst the disciples (Matt. 28.17), as a 'deception' (Matt. 
27.63-66; 28.11-15), a counterfeit? Does not the Gospel of Matthevv quickly conclude 
with an affirmation -'And remember, I am with you always, to the end of the age' 
(Matt. 28.18) - that Jacques Derrida might paraphrase, 'There is no secret as such; I 
deny it. "" Much like sacramental wine, the presence and memory of Christ, 
affirmation and denial continually bleed into one another, confusing the sacred'good 
news' with -the indeterminate, deferred desire of a secret, sacrificial passion. 
What, then, can one possibly say of theology in the midst of the Masquerade? 
If, as above, it betrays some essential truth or identity or essence that is to be 
(impossibly) unveiled, something behind the mask, the character of the Masquerade is 
that of a revelation - i. e., a miraculous unmasking. But, of course, as we have seen, 
this unmasking neverhappens' as such - or at least is deferred to the inaccessible 
horizons of a 'messianic' self-presence and/or nestled safely away in the 'sacralized' 
immanence of its discourse / liturgy - for where there is no mask, there is no truth or 
identity to disclose. The reflective economy of theology's self-becoming in view here, 
i. e., where the Subject of theology is that of a self-characten sing return to/of itself, 
poses a dual threat. On the one hand, there is the (retroactively) imposed sovereignty 
of systematic, transcendent order, in the guise of coherence, beauty, and efficiencý', on 
539 cc c, "I'l 
L 137-70 
specially Wadfington, The Conlidence 
Game inAmen 
540 Derrida, 'HoN\ to Avoid Speaking', 95. 
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the other hand, there is the confused nihilism of deified immanence. Which is to say, 
the transcendental Subject of theology can but loathe the matenal immanence of its 
embodied reflection, which knows not what it does or is without the transcendental 
criteria of the Subject. The Object of theological reflection, then, in the name of the 
sovereign Subject, suppresses and hates the sovereign-shattering surplus of freedom 
and autonomy without criteria that emerges from the dialectic of the Subject's self- 
becoming but cannot itself be contained by it. 
To return to the language of Schelling and dialectical materialism of Chapter 
Fhree, then, the unconscious state of theology is the pursuit of that which m,! ould fill 
the void left by the Subject-Object split of its 'sinful' condition. Of course, as seen 
throughout our analysis of Melville, such a pursuit is self-deceptive insofar as it 
chases that which it cannot actually want. That is to say, without its reflective split, 
there would be no theology. Its lack of wholeness, its own original sin, makes it what 
it is. The transcendental ambition for sovereign wholeness, the pure night of 
'theology without theology', is theology's end: its purpose for being and its impossible 
suicide / annihilation. Therefore, its real aim is to pursue, in the insane circularity of 
unrequited desire, wholeness without truly wanting it, in order that'the vomit of its 
loathed identity' (i. e., the autonomous excess that emerges from and paradoxically 
sustains the desire of its suicidal self-violence) might be effectively held within. ý" 
The objects of its desire, from the Christian significance of the historical Resurrection 
to the universal possibility of justice, are the means by which the anticipation of and 
passion for wholeness are given their faces, but actually function as the forestalling 
obstacles / masks to it. 
54 1 Melville, Pierre; or AcAmbiguitics, 171. 
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The complex relationship between the transcendent ambitions and immanent 
materiality of theology is not, though, that of a balanaced co-cletermination. At its 
root, rather, is a desire fraught with an inherent undecidability, which Slavoj Zi2ek 
describes well: 
Two characteristics of this paradoxical causality should be retained: a 
cause is inherently undecidable - it can enhance the feature it stands 
for or its opposite; and above all, there is no 'proper measure' in the 
relationship between a cause and its effect - the effect is always in 
excess of its cause, either in the guise of the upward spiral 
(aggressivity leads to more and more aggressivity) or in the guise of 
the counteraction (awareness of aggressivity brings forth a fear of 
'overreacting' that deprives the sub . ect of the'normai'measure of 
aggressive self-assertion ). 542 
Consequently, the aesthetico-theological awareness of Melville's Masquerade, in its 
rethinking of self-becoming as self-creation, is just as concerned with the apparently 
chaotic freedom of shape and mask as it is with the unexpected order and 
homogeneity of self-organisation. My argument here is that the conscious 
constituents of its network of confi dence- seekers and con fi dence -givers, are 
necessarily in the precarious, creative state of becoming, and thus do not preexist the 
game / duplicity itself... Indeed, such has been the 'undecidable'praxis and character 
of theological discourse and confidence games (i. e., their communication and 
maintenance), forever performed as though on a precipitant point in which a small, 
seemingly isolate change has the potential to push it into chaotic madness or lock it in 
54 2 212ek, 'The Abyss of Freedom', 80. 
543 In writing about the flexibility and fluidity of the 'big con', David Maurer notes the 
seemingly infinite variations any given con game might take depending on the situation. The best con, 
as such, is infinitely adaptable. Maurer writes. 'Whenever a mark objects at any stage of the game. his 
arguments are met immediately by one or the other of the con men, for instance, if, after the 
convincers, tile mark N\ ants to back out, the roper professes to be so thoroughly convinced that he 
offers to sign an agreement by which he will buy out the mark's interest in the deal for a liberal 
consideration; usually, after one of these "chills" the mark comes back into the deal \ý ith greater 
confidence than lie has c\ er had before. Any one play maNI in\ ol\ ea great number ot'dc\ lations ot'thi,, 
impossible to include in a written \ersion of the ganic because it is impossible to determine \ý here 
, iily p\ cri mark may balk. and it is c\cn more 
difficult to foresee how the con men might meet hk 
object ions' ( 1he Big Con, 100-0 1). 
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an inert stasis - there being, in the end, very little functional difference between the 
two. 
The performance of theological discourse qua confidence game, then, is as 
epic as it is tragic, for the transcendental ambition for sovereign wholeness qua 
adaptive order cannot ultimately quell the spontaneous eruption of creative / 
imaginative autonomy. The idiosyncratic character of theology becoming-itself we 
are unfolding here is, thus, not unlike what Gilles Deleuze has described in one of his 
final essays as 'a life': 
We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It 
is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a 
life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is 
complete power, complete bliss.... it is an absolute immediate 
consciousness whose very activity no longer refers to a being but is 
ceaselessly posed in a life.... The transcendental field is defined by a 
plane of immanence, and the plane of immanence by a life. "' 
For Deleuze, the potency of immanence lay in the indefinite article because a life is 
not the same as the one who lives it. On the contrary: 
A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes 
through and that are measured by given lived objects: an immanent life 
carrying with it the events or singularities that are merely actualised in 
subjects or objects. This indefinite life does not itself have moments . 
. 
but only between-times, between-moments; it doesn't just come about 
or come after but offers the immensity of an empty time where one 
sees the event yet to come and already happened, in the absolute of 
immediate consciousness. 115 
In this way, too, the aesthetic theology embodied by Melville's Masquerade is that of 
a living discourse attuned to the self-becoming of expenence, and thus to the intense 
potential of making all things new. Such 'a life', Philip Goodchild writes of Deleuze, 
is no longer modelled simply on 'the true', but is 'an attempt to generate an ethos of 
544 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence. - Essqvs on A Life (trans. A. Boyman; NeNý York: Zonc 
Books, 200 1 )ý 27-28. 
545 Deleuze, Purc Immanence, 29. 
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thought that expresses an intensification of life'; in this way, he continues, the unity of 
thought and being, i. e. 'the true', 'is replaced by an aspiration for the unity of a living 
thought and the unthought which gives life to It. 1546 
In close, then, theology gains its comprehensibility in the midst of the self- 
reflection of its discourse and discipline; but, vitally, remains altogether inadequate to 
explain why this is so. It is precisely in his embodiment of something not unlike 
Deleuze's description of 'pure immanence', which we have cast here as aesthetic 
intensity, that Melville emboldens theological thinking to reimagine the possibilities 
of a non-sovereign, materialistic holiness in non-dualistic terms. "' 
546 Goodchild, Capitalism and Religion, 165. 
547 This is wholly at odds Nvith the presentation of immanence as nihilism in 
Radical 
Orthodoxy. Cf., Milbank (et a]), Radical Orthodox. v. 3-4. 
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CONCLUSION 
My contention in the previous pages has been two-fold: (1) it is only when 
theology takes seriously its unthought self-becoming (i. e., as theological Subject) that 
it has any chance of thinking itself radi III ically; and (2) that any vision of radical 
theology is ultimately unthinkable without an attendant 'aesthetic theology' sensitiVe 
to both the coiistitutii, e inadequacy and the creatliv potential of the theological 
Subject becoming-itself I have contended, moreover, that radical theological 
thinking, that rethinking which occurs after the death of God which unthinks all 
established theological ground, is not sufficient simply as an apocalyptic silence, but 
is it itself only when given its creative voice by the aesthetic genius, i. e., the 
autonomous one who 'gives the rule to art', "' whose word and work continually do 
and/or create something new, perhaps even miraculous, out of the existing structures 
of a discourse and discipline. "' Of such a genius, Horkheimer and Adomo write: 
The greatest artists were never those who embodied a wholly flawless 
and perfect style, but rather those who used style as a way of hardening 
[Hdrte] themselves against the chaotic expression of suffering, as a 
negative truth. The style of their works gave what was expressed that 
force without which life flows away unheard. Those very art forms 
which are known as classical, such as Mozart's music, contain 
objective trends which represent something different to the style which 
they incarnate. "' 
That is to say, the aesthetic genius, perhaps even in the manner of a prophet, at first 
ý4111 Kant, Ae Critique of Judgement, 150. 
549 Cf., Carl Dahlhaus' essay on Arnold Schoenberg's 'aesthetic theology', in which he quotes 
the composer's 'inner biography': "This is also the place to speak of the miraculous contributions of the 
subconscious. I am conN inced that in the xN orks of the great masters many miracles can be discovered, 
the extreme profundity and prophetic foresight of which seem superhuman' (Schoenbei-, q and the New 
Music: Essa 
, %'s 
b*v Cai-I Daldhaus [trans. Derrick Puffett and Alfred Clayton, Cambridge: Cambridge 
Uni\crsity Press, 1987], 81). 
550 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, DialectIC of Enlightenment (trans. John 
Cumming-, Nc\ý York: Herder 'ý, Herder, 1944), 130. 
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must breach the existing horizons of possibility in any given language, genre, artistic 
style, as well as religious or political order, in order then to broaden the realm of 
thought with that which had hitherto remained unthought. "' Although such a genius 
is not necessarily a theologian, and perhaps precisely because of his or her earnestly 
irreligious intentions, the theological significance of the genius lies in the seemingly 
miraculous surplus of his or her freedom and autonomy, and the embodied avvareness 
of an aesthetico-theological intensity of life. It has been my contention here that 
Herman Melville's conception of subjectivity is precisely such an embodiment. 
While my intention has not been to cast Melville as a theologian, per se, my 
use of Melville certainly has theological intentions. I have argued here that 
theological thinking is a self-reflective thinking conditioned by the evolutionary 
complexity of its pragmatic adaptability and its reified systernisation. In reading 
theology through Melville, then, I have sought to highlight the interdisciplinary stage 
on which this complex self-reflectivity is enacted (that is, as a kind of perfonnance). 
Although it should be noted, my use of Melville is but one way of unpacking the 
implications of this refined, radical sense of self-identification for theological 
discourse. 
We have noted that it is a commonplace of contemporary Melville studies that 
in The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, Melville himself is the novel's title 
character. As I illustrated in Chapter One, though, it is necessary that we go even 
further and suggest that his entire career as a professional author, from its very 
beginning, bears the dubious marks of that which has secrets to tell and faces to 
55 1 For, indeed, as William Blake concludes in 'There is No Natural Religion': 'If it Nverc not 
for the Poetic and Prophetic character the Philosophic and Experimental would soon be at the ratio of 
all things, & stand still unable to do other than repcat the same dull round over again'. Thomas Altizer 
expands oil William Blake's prophetic role as the first 'Christian atheist' in his The Vcýi Apocal. ysc: 
Die Radical Christian Visioii of lVilliam Blake (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State Unkersity Press. 
1967). 
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disclose, and is thus a con game par excellence. As such, we find that the genius of 
Melville's complex theatricality is that it marks a significant discursive model for 
thinking the aesthetics of theological self-becoming: namely, as a kind of confidence 
game. The confidence game, we have seen, co-opts desire and the fluid possibilities 
of identity and narrative, and adaptively manipulates the social / discursive networks 
in which they are related, quite often in shocking, spontaneous ways. I ha-ve 
suggested that the self-organizational economy of theology is always already a 
counterfeit dependence upon the intimate miscegenation of the Subject of theological 
sovereignty and the Object of theological materiality. My point is not, however, that a 
true theology finally unmasks; on the contrary, it is that, as with Melville's complex 
presentation of subjectivity, the coherence of the confidence game qua theological 
discourse is beset, indeed retroactively (i. e., dialectically) sustained, by the 
structurally excessive, incomprehensible freedom of its untold possibilities and 
unactualized adaptations. 
Ultimately, the aesthetic fecundity of a theological self-becoming which is a 
self-creation cannot be limited to the interplay between (or analogy between) the 
productivity of its material immanence (i. e., of its discourse) and the transcendence of 
its sovereign ambitions to unmask, but actively emerges as a subversively creative 
symptom of the duplicitous dialectic between the 
two. 552 It is my closing conviction 
that without the creative genius, such as exemplified in Hen-nan Melville, the radical 
implications of theological thinking are too readily appropriated, in order that they 
might then be ultimately repressed, by the intellectual / political / economic 
552 My casting of this dialectic as 'counterfeit' and 'duplicitous', but fraught ýý ith exccs, is 
highly influenced not only by Bruno Latour's characterisation of modernity descnbed above, but even 
more importantly by the description of the subtle SLIýjW4,1t]011 of immanence bv so\ ereignty, 
particularly that of Capital, in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Enipi*i-e (Cambridge: Har-Nard 
Unkersitv Pre, ýs, 2000). p. 69-90. 
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confessional regimes of the status quo. "' In short, then, it is in its awareness of the 
profound intensity of that unthinking that emerges as the excess of thinking that the 
radical theological vision (i. e., after the death of God) is for the first time fully freed 
to resist its repression and/or pacification; and in so resisting, freed to create-itself 
anew. 
553 While many of my reflections regarding the adaptive order of the aesthetico-theological 
vision are deeply inspired by the network and complexity theories made most accessible by the likes of 
Bruno Latour, Murray Gell-Mann, Illya Prigogine, and Roger Lewin, I remain deeply disappointed at 
the degree to which the emergent structure of freedom and excessiveness, not to mention intensity, has 
been repressed by sovereign models of adaptation, most evident in the incorporation of complexity 
theory in and by the'biopolitics' of contemporary globalism. As it relates to theology, this frustrating 
development is most clearly evident in the recent work of Mark C. Taylor, especially his Confidence- 
Games: Mone 
'v and 
Markets in a World Without Redemption (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
2004). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's alternative reading of network culture, and its reN olutionary 
import, has proven to be an invaluable supplement. See their Multitude: War and Democracy in the 
Age of Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004). 
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